On Emotions:

A DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST ACCOUNT

Péter Bodor



L'Harmattan

Praise for *On Emotions: A Developmental Social Constructionist Account*

This book is part of an exciting new movement in psychology that links issues of emotion, identity, discourse, and development. Meshing a social constructionist account of emotion with the empirical examination of language development follows in the tradition of language socialization research and Bodor's work positions the field of developmental psychology in ways that will lead to whole new ways of problem setting in years to come.

Nancy Budwig
Professor, Department of Psychology
Associate Provost, Dean of Graduate Studies
Clark University

This is a major contribution to interdisciplinary scholarship concerning the nature and analysis of the mental, emotional and related features of the human condition. It is expertly referenced, well-argued and bound to be a controversial contribution to many current debates on all of these issues.

Jeff Coulter
Professor, Department of Sociology
Affiliated Faculty, Department of Philosophy
Boston University

I congratulate Peter Bodor on his important contribution to a constructionist understanding of emotions. Not only does this work make significant connection with philosophical, psychological and social issues related to emotional expression, but offers innovative research on emotional development. Bodor's work is of far-reaching significance and deserving of the widest audience.

Kenneth Gergen
Professor, Department of Psychology
Swarthmore College

Péter Bodor PhD., teaches courses on Social Psychology in Budapest, and on Language Acquisition and Linguistic Socialization at the University of Vienna.

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To Anikó, Panna and Sára

Contents «

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Finally, I want to say thank you to my family for their patience, support and encouragement.

Preface «

> Individual emotions are only overtones of social evaluation: the "I" can realise itself in the word only by relying on "we".
> (Bakhtin, 1926/1985, p. 21. – my own translation)

This study aims to analyse and uncover certain characteristics and processes of human emotional life and emotional development from a psychological perspective. In this introduction I will first characterise in general terms the theoretical stance of the study, then anticipate briefly the topics of its particular chapters, and, finally reflect upon its methodological stance.

What theoretical stance does the present study take? Throughout the paper a social constructionist framework will be worked out and applied parallel to a developmental perspective. The originality of this approach to emotions represented by the following theoretical and empirical investigations lies in an attempt to adopt a binocular vision of psychology as a discipline which takes as its subject human beings as *developing social beings*. However, as we will see, anchoring the standpoint of the research in social constructionism does not necessarily mean discounting other, more exclusively biologically or cognitively oriented approaches to emotions. Certainly, in the following there will be critical remarks concerning other, non-constructionist approaches to emotions, nevertheless the relevant claims will be based deliberately on types of arguments which aim not so much to show the complete inadequacy of other approaches, but rather foregrounding the possibilities where a developmental social constructionist account of emotion could help us to gain such insights or knowledge which might remain hidden from the point of view of other stances.

In this sense endorsing the perspective of a social constructionist psychology can be based primarily on heuristic and pragmatic concerns. Consequently, the merits of the present approach can be judged primarily on the basis of appreciating the large number of weaknesses and hopefully a few new insights and results which the following study bears and offers to its readers.

Emotions, as a topic of investigation are extraordinarily wide, and the approaches toward them are rather varied. Therefore, it seems reasonable first to explicitly anchor the investigations presented below. For this reason, Chapter 1. of the present study covers a relatively general theoretical exposition of the social constructionist stances within contemporary psychology, namely discursive and narrative psychology. Thus, in Chapter 1. only examples for illustrating the logic of discursive and narrative psychology will anticipate the topic of emotions.

Next, in Chapter 2., I will work out a general framework to appreciate the psychological study of emotions and to establish some guiding principles for it. In this way, Chapter 1. and Chapter 2. should be taken in the present context as two converging studies which share the common direction of the social constructionist theory of emotions. To a certain degree, however, these two opening chapters should be considered as self-contained studies in themselves, the first being an exposition of social constructionism in psychology, the second as an overview of how to conceptualise emotions generally, and within psychological studies in particular.

Chapter 3. presents a set of theoretical arguments and conceptual investigations which may contribute to a social constructionist theory of emotions. A social constructionist understanding of emotion will be introduced in contrast to biological, subjectivist and mixed, especially Jamesian, theories of emotion. Specifically, following Coulter (1979) it will be argued that emotions are connected to responsibility in an empirically demonstrable manner, a feature which can not be accounted for by other approaches. Then, a set of problems are raised already within the constructivist theory of emotions, indicating the nature of responsibility regarding emotions and the problem of emotional development. Specifically, the nature of the connection between emotion and responsibility will be further qualified and a new theoretical proposal will be raised regarding the paradox of the passive and at the same time active characteristics of emotion. In short, the paradox that emotions are a special, limited responsibility kind of action will be explained. In the case of emotions, instead of "in-order-to motives" which are salient in deliberating and interpreting most other types of actions, "because-of motives", a concept borrowed from Schütz, dominates. The problem of emotional development is also raised in this chapter, but its further investigation is postponed to the next Chapter.

Chapter 4. turns to the problem of analysing the development of emotions, most notably, the common field of emotional development and the development of emotional talk. As a conceptual introduction to Chapter 4., it is proposed, that the study of development be divided into two

major issues: what to learn or the "target" of development, and its "mechanism". Regarding the mechanism, as a key issue of a social constructionist theory of emotional development the natural-conventional transition problem is formulated. Then, to the natural-conventional transition problem a Vygotskian scenario is proposed for overcoming developmentally the "instinctual" versus "action-like" explanation of emotions and emotional behaviour. This proposal is followed by an analysis of the form and function aspects of emotional talk, which are to be considered as the "target" of learning how to use emotional language. Finally, two different possibilities of attaining the relevant form-function pairings through development are raised, the most often implicitly entertained "one step view", and its Wernerian alternative, where the protracted, gradual nature of developmental process is considered openly. Part of the framework worked out in Chapter 4. can be taken as a theoretical preparation for the investigations presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 5. is devoted to analysing the development of emotion talk empirically. This chapter is a detailed case study on the emergence of three types of lexical emotion markers as they occur in a child's and his caregiver's talk: words referring to emotional display, such as *cry* or *smile*, words conveying the subjective experiential constituent of emotions, such as *feel*, and emotion words proper, such as *happy* or *sad*. Although frequency data is relied on in this empirical chapter to establish certain developmental tendencies, its general character is rather qualitative and exploratory than quantitative and explanatory. The main reason for this is that, in my view, the theoretical concerns regarding a developmental social constructionist stance towards emotions worked out during the previous chapters are not so much to be taken as explaining reality, i.e. data, rather, the most they can do is to help us to understand better what is the case. This attitude is taken both in treating and interpreting data against the background of available conceptual analysis.

Finally, Chapter 6. offers a short summary, raises a set of open issues, and mentions possibilities for further research emerging from the present study.

About a half century ago Wittgenstein wrote the following remarks on the connection between problems and methods in psychology, published on the last page of *Philosophical Investigations*:

> The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. ... For in psychology

> there are experimental methods and *conceptual confusion*. ... The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (1953/1968, p. 232)

Most psychologists have not bothered themselves with the philosopher's warning, some of them perhaps think that the development of psychology since Wittgenstein's time has already overcome his sceptical concerns. But some psychologists, including myself, still think that his message is still very much valid. Therefore, the following investigation represents an attempt to work out a stance to psychology which can be coined as "applied Wittgenstein". Correspondingly, beyond theoretical arguments, the three main methods of the following investigations are conceptual analysis, empirical demonstration, and developmental reconstruction.

Chapter 1 «
Social Constructionism in Psychology

> The society of the future falls less within the province of a Newtonian anthropology … than a pragmatics of language particles. (Lyotard, 1979/1992, p. xxiv)

This chapter will be devoted to describing and characterising some central social constructionist ideas within psychology. After an attempt to introduce social constructionism on a general and abstract level, the two main versions of openly acknowledged social constructionist psychology will be discussed. These two versions of social constructivism are discursive and narrative psychology. Then, I shall consider the issue of how some major social constructionist authors position their own works within and towards traditional cognitive psychology. In the next section I shall first uncover some "intra" and "extra-psychological" historical trends which lead to the foregrounding of the concepts of discourse and narrative within psychological theorising. The historical sketch will be complemented by a conceptual one in which the concepts of socialised epistemology and its counterpart, discursive ontology, will be detailed as elements of a philosophical-conceptual scaffolding of social constructionism. Finally, parallels and affinities between various kinds of sociocultural psychologies, the theory of social representations, and the dialogic psychology on the one hand and social constructionism on the other will be highlighted and a set of social constructivist ideas in the history of psychology will be mentioned.

1.1 *Introducing Social Constructionism*

With a slight overstatement it can be claimed that academic psychology became nearly totally identical with cognitive psychology since cognitive approaches appeared on the stage just about four decades ago. Nevertheless, in recent years more and more ideas have been published in foregrounding narrative and/or discourse as unifying concepts for psychology. All of them can be said to adopt a *social constructionist* stance

toward their subject matter. Note however, that the term social constructionism is clearly an umbrella term even within psychology.[1] Just as there are varieties of the so-called "mainstream" cognitive psychology there are varieties of social constructionism as the title of Danziger's (1997) recent overview aptly realises. It can be argued, however, that on the one hand, all the social constructionist stances toward psychology are based on challenging the deeply rooted belief that for any scientific psychology the basic unit must be located within the individual. As Greenwood (1994, p. 91) pointed out "some explanations … can be psychological without being individual". While on the other hand, parallel to this move all social constructionist approaches re-locate the psychological phenomena - not surprisingly - into the social realm. What used to be taken as mental is reconsidered as functioning as, and produced by, the social; or in other words constructed by the social. The contrast between individual and social can be drawn in the language of explanation as well:

> Intrinsically social psychological explanations may be defined as explanations by reference to sets of arrangements, conventions, or agreements, recognised and accepted by persons who are party to them. Individual psychological explanations may be defined as explanations by reference to psychological states or attitudes that do not involve any recognition or acceptance of sets of arrangements, conventions or agreements (Greenwood, 1994, p. 91).

1.2 *Discursive and Narrative Stances of Social Constructivism*

The nature of this "social realm" into which social constructivist approaches re-locate psychological phenomena is considered in a number of different ways by different authors. Those approaches which may be called social constructionist in the "strict" sense, in so far as the relevant label is part of their self-definition, usually focus predominantly on the immediate discursive practices or on the organisation of narrative patterns. Therefore, discursive psychology and narrative psychology, as two major stances of social constructivism, will be detailed in this section. Note, however, that despite occasional debates between discourse-centred versus narrative-focused approaches (for example Edwards, 1997; Bruner, 1996), there is no clear cut border between narrativist and discursivist versions of social constructionism. Some other psychological approaches which are conceptually akin to self-proclaimed social constructionism, such as the sociocultural approaches, dialogic psychology and theory of social representation can be taken as social constructionist only in a more

"loose" sense, since the term "social constructionism" plays a somewhat less dominant role in their self-definitions, and will be discussed later (2.4) in this chapter.

1.2.1 Discursive Psychology

The version of social constructionist approaches which concentrates primarily on ongoing *discursive processes* has also been referred to recently as discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Harré and Gillett, 1994). Proponents of this approach are influenced, primarily by the ordinary language philosophy of Ryle, Austin and Wittgenstein, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and discourse analysis.

According to Harré, who happened to become one of the major theoreticians of the discursive approach, psychology is "the study of active use of symbolic systems of various kinds by active and skilled human beings in public and private contexts, for the accomplishment of various tasks and projects, jointly with others." (Harré, 1994, p. 3) Within this general discursivist framework psychological phenomena such as thought, remembering or emotions "are to be interpreted as properties or features of discourse, and that discourse might be public or private." (Harré and Gillett, 1994, p. 27) He explains his position:

> The word "discourse" is to be understood very broadly. Its usual implications of verbal presentation of thought and argument are broadened, to provide a handy word for all those activities which are intentional, that is make use of devices that point beyond themselves, and which are normatively constrained, that are subject to standards of correctness and incorrectness. (Harré, 1994, p. 2)

Thus, for example emotions, just like many other psychological phenomena, are to be studied as a discursive process, within "a structured sequence of intentional acts employing some sign system or other, for example ordinary language, and in principle it is jointly produced." (Harré, 1994, p. 3) Specifically, Harré (1993) proposes a double level analysis of emotions. On the level of local cultures he proposes studying *emotionologies* which can be explicated by conceptual, anthropological and historical analysis. This level is somewhat similar to the "langue" in the Saussureian approach to linguistics. While on the level of actual conduct Harré considers emotional displays and feelings as discursive acts, which can be explicated as meaningful contributions to an ongoing episode. Again alluding to the Saussureian project of linguistics, this second level is similar to the "parole".

At the level of cultures, or langue, Harré evokes emotionologies following Stearns and Stearns (1988). Emotionologies are the collective emotional standards of a given culture or society across time. Therefore, a particular emotionology can be considered as a mainly implicit theory of the emotions which are characteristic of a particular culture and defines the rules of emotional terms or emotional words just like the local systems of emotional display within a time period.

Thus, for example, the changing of emotionology between the 16th and 18th century embedded in the English language was documented by Carol Z. Stearns (1988). On the basis of studying diaries of the period she argues that during this period the meaning of English emotional terms changed profoundly. According to her psycho-historical analysis, it seems that the generic term *emotion* was hardly used as referring to some feeling as conscious experience of an emotion. Something similar holds to specific emotion terms such as *anger*.

> Before the end of seventeenth century, most diarists had difficulty thinking of themselves as angry. To be sure, many diarists had difficulty thinking of themselves as having emotions which could be named at all, and their records are useful to us only in making us aware of the lack of interest many had in their inner lives. (Carol Z. Stearns, 1988, p. 41)

Certainly, anger was present in the various forms of physical and symbolic fighting, beating and quarrelling as patterns of public conduct, seen as angry behaviour during this period. But it was practically absent as angry feeling. Then, by the late seventeenth century "more diarists began to write as though they had an awareness of feelings, and that from this awareness a sense came that behaviours could be controlled. … a new style which has hardly existed before … become predominant by the nineteenth century." (Carol Z. Stearns, 1988, p. 44) As she documented in detail, the meaning of anger gradually expanded from patterns of conduct, and gained an inner oriented, bodily feeling sense, as well. Interestingly, this process was accompanied by the need of and a sense of controlling emotional behaviour.

However, similarly, for example, to sex, where we can find both everyday life and scholarly reflections and conceptualisations on a particular practice, there is the level of immediate practice regarding emotions as well (cf. C. Z. Stearns and P. N. Stearns, 1988, p. 8). While the level of analysing emotions thus far might be compared to the Saussureian concept of "langue" as opposed to "parole", within a discursivist framework emotions are to be analysed on the level of actual conduct, as well.

Thus, on the level of actual conduct, immediate practice or parole, if you like, Harré considers particular emotions as socially intelligible acts within an unfolding episode.

The discursivist approach to emotions implies that neither feelings nor bodily feelings, nor biologically given emotional displays could be taken as Archimedean points in accounting for emotions. As Harré reminds us, "not all body feelings or displays are emotions or are associated with emotion" (Harré, 1993, p. 13). Thus, he argues, that if somebody frowns and stares at something it is a display of puzzlement, but not an emotion. Or taking another example, note, that the complex bodily feelings that someone entertains if the time comes to go to the toilet is not taken or recognised as emotional in any known culture. Instead, he argues that "feelings and displays are connected with emotions, or are to be taken as emotional, when they embody expressions of judgements and, in many cases though not in all, when they accomplish social acts." (Harré, 1993, p. 13)

For example, when a person displays anger or irritation, s/he expresses a judgement that something somebody else has done is a challenge or a transgression of one's rights or dignity. And corresponding to this, a display of anger or irritation is a judgement of the moral quality of the other person's action. At the same time such a display is a protest, as well, a protest which is directed at the person who is the offender, the target of the display. In this way "an emotional display is to be understood as a discursive phenomenon, an expression of a judgement and the performance of a social act." (Harré, 1993, p. 14) Therefore, a social-functional account of emotions is opened up. Here the following sort of questions are relevant: what kind of judgements are the displays used to express, and what are the social acts they perform? Beyond overt displays of emotions emotional feelings are considered as judgements, as well. They are "unexpressed or sotto voce judgements." (Harré, 1993, p. 14) Considering emotions as a peculiar types of judgements lies at the centre of Harré's discursive analysis of emotions:

> emotional feelings and displays: though judgements, they lack premises - emotional feelings and displays characteristically "come over" us. Unlike the conclusion of syllogism, that rest on biological responses and cultural training, not on other judgements. But like such conclusions, that have an irresistible quality about them. (Harré, 1993, p. 14)

Later on, when a working framework of a social constructionist approach to emotions has been worked out in greater detail I shall return to Harré

to borrow certain insights from his mainly conceptual analysis of emotions (see Chapter 4.). However, since Harré hardly analyses emotional talk *in situ*, we will try to turn to another prominent representative of discursive psychology, Derek Edwards, for an example. Edwards characterises his approach to the emotions, in the following manner:

> The discursive psychology of emotions dealt with how people talk about emotions, whether "avowing" their own or "ascribing" them to other people, and how they use emotion categories when talking about other things. (Edwards, 1997, p. 170)

Indeed, Edwards considers emotional discourse as a topic of empirical inquiry. His empirical work consists of analysing discursive practices of people, such as the clients of marriage counsellors or newspaper interviews. His main interest is rather rhetorical, more specifically argumentative, however. As he puts it, his main topic is "the rhetorical design and use of emotion categories" (Edwards, 1997, p. 171). At the same time, unfortunately, it seems, he is less successful in uncovering the details of discursive process in its more profound sense, in the sense of establishing or constituting some socially agreed upon reality, in our case emotionality.

With these general remarks in the background respecting the shade of discursive approach Edwards represents, it is not so surprising perhaps that Edwards' concrete analysis of emotion in discourse deals primarily with *post hoc* accounts of emotional situations of members, i.e. talk about past situations. Furthermore, a careful reading of his material reveals that his work contains neither any analysis of actual emotion avowals or ascriptions indexing actual emotionality, nor any emotional displays of the participants. To be fair, he openly restrains himself from analysing emotional displays (cf. Edwards, 1997, pp. 197-198). Nevertheless, his self-restriction implies that his avowal of dealing with emotional "avowals" (see the citation above) is not quite realised. It could be added to this point that below (see Chapter 3.) a case will be made that emotion avowals can be taken as part of a broader category called emotion displays.

In one of the emotional conversations analysed, a couple is discussing an earlier extramarital affair of the wife (Mary) in the presence of a marriage counsellor[2]:

1 Mary: (…) so that's when I decided to (.) you know
2 to tell him. [the affair] (1.0) U::m (1.0) and then::,(.)
3 obviously you went through you're a:ngry stage,
4 didn't you?
5 (.)
6 Ve:ry upset *ob*viously, .hh an:d uh, (0.6)
7 we: started ar:guing a lot, an:d (0.6)

(Edwards, 1997, p. 172)

First of all, as Edwards comments, we could note that the wife acknowledges the warrantedness of her husband's angriness to her infidelity, which is openly marked with the evidential "obviously". At the same time, by using the phrase "angry stage" she prepares her challenge regarding the reasonableness of the duration of her spouse's anger (not cited here), prefiguring her rhetorical move whose function is to blame her husband, specifically his dispositional jealousy for their marital problems.

This excerpt, just as others considered by Edwards, is mainly a discussion of past events, once-upon-a-time emotions. Note, that in this way Edwards' analysis of the relevant discourse is not able deal with the events, norms and moralities which made intelligible the jealousy, angriness, etc. at their actual occurrence. They are taken for granted. Rather, his analysis highlights, for example, that emotion ascriptions can be discursively constructed in a number of alternative ways: either based on a disposition, or alternatively, as reasonable reactions stemming from the circumstances. It also documents the fact that there is a normal time-course of being angry, which is in itself open to negotiation. These and related facets of our emotional life, are no doubt extremely interesting, and Edwards' analysis highlights a number of intricate details of them.

Edwards however considers emotions not so much as some psychological phenomena realised within a discursive process, and as such vulnerable to further argumentative usage or as I would tend to say argumentative application and polishing. Rather, he jumps immediately to a discussion of the discourse *about* emotions. In this way he is not really analysing emotions *as* discourse. The analysis below (in Chapter 5.) may be taken as an attempt to follow up the discourse-oriented empirical analysis of emotions within a type of discursivist framework which does not restrict the functions of discourse exclusively to argumentation. At the same time it intends to correct its two biases. The first of these biases is concentrating merely on talk about emotions and backgrounding the possibility of considering emotions as discourse *per se*; while the second

corresponding bias is taking into account of mostly "off line" data instead of concentrating on the "on line" discourse producing emotions. Indeed, one should anticipate intricate interrelatedness and differences between actual emotional talk, where display or avowal of some actual emotion occurs *versus* the account of some past events, however much they were emotionally loaded.

1.2.2 Narrative Psychology

In their attempt to re-locate the psychological interest into social, other, closely related constructivist authors evoke certain more enduring aspects of the "social realm" than discourse. They refer to *narratives* and the corresponding life histories in order to explicate psychological phenomena (Sarbin, 1986a, 1986b; Bruner, 1986, 1990, 1996). These narrativist authors are heavily influenced by Burke's dramatism (1989), theoreticians of history like White (1987), the symbolic interactionism of sociology, anthropology and structuralist and post-structuralist literary critics. Note, that these approaches are slightly less bound to ongoing interaction and its immediate context, than some of the "hard core" discursivists, such as Edwards. Rather, they consider slightly more "molar" albeit still very much fugitive units of analysis such as culturally defined canonical narratives.

The volume entitled *Narrative Psychology* edited by Theodore Sarbin could be taken as the first systematic exposition of a narrative stance towards psychology. In the opening essay of the volume (1986b) he introduces narrative as a "root metaphor" for psychology. The concept of root metaphor originated from Pepper's seminal work on the typology of metaphysics (1942), a work which has been barely referred to in recent years, and therefore deserves explicit exposition within this context.

Pepper described a set of world hypotheses or core metaphysical doctrines whose function is to provide a framework for the constructing of events in the world. Furthermore, he identified beneath each world hypothesis the corresponding root metaphors, which lie at the centre of the "analogical method of generating world theories." (Pepper, 1942, p. 91).

> The method in principle seems to be this: A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. This original area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor. He describes as best he can the characteristics of this area, or, if you

> will, discriminates its structure. A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories. In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to interpret all facts in terms of these categories. (Pepper, 1942, p. 91)

Pepper describes as "relatively adequate" word hypotheses formism, mechanism, contextualism (or pragmatism, as it is better known today) and organicism. It might be of interest, that Pepper expressed his belief that none of these four main world theories can claim primacy. Indeed, he characterised the practical consequences of his analytical metaphysical stance as "postrational eclecticism" (Pepper, 1942, p. 331).

On the basis of Pepper's analysis Sarbin argues, that the majority of psychological theories follow the logic of mechanism as world hypotheses, the root metaphor of which is the machine. Of course the machine could take various forms even within psychology, such as, for example, the psychoanalyst's hydraulic machine from the early, or the cognitivist computing machine of the late 20th century. Sarbin proposes, that beyond mechanism and machines, the contextualism as world hypothesis and the historical act as its corresponding root metaphor should be considered as a viable alternative for psychology. But what shall we consider as historical event or act? In this respect I shall go back once more to Pepper:

> By historic event, however, the contextualist does not mean primarily a past event, one that is, so to speak, dead and has to be exhumed. He means the event alive in its present. What we ordinarily mean by history, he says, is an attempt to *re-present* events, to make them in some way alive again. The real historic event in its actuality, is when it is going on *now*, the dynamic dramatic active event. We may call it an "act", if we like, and if we take care of our use of the term. But it is not an act conceived as alone or cut off that we mean; it is an act in and with its setting, an act in its context. … These acts or events are all intrinsically complex, composed of interconnected activities with continuously changing patterns. They are like incidents in the plot of a novel or drama. They are literally the incidents of life. (Pepper, 1942, pp. 232-233)

This is the sense of the historic event as the root metaphor of contextualism, and it can be further articulated by the concept (or as a root metaphor) of narrative for psychology, according to Sarbin. To make

his point explicit, Sarbin introduces the *narratory principle*: "human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative structures." (Sarbin, 1886b, p. 8) The principle can be easily illustrated by Heider and Simmel's classic demonstrations in which they show a short cartoon to their subjects (Heider and Simmel, 1944). The observers of the movement of the geometrical figures reported not on the physical movements of the figures, but on the humans in action within a context, on narrative figures within a plot; for example: "A man has planned to meet a girl and the girl comes along with another man. The first man tells the second to go; the second tells the first, and he shakes his head." (Heider and Simmel, 1944, pp. 246-247) - thus, a narrative of a set of dramatic events starts. As Sarbin himself summarised his position:

> The narrative is a way of organizing episodes, actions, and accounts of actions; it is an achievement that brings together mundane facts and fantastic creations; time and place are incorporated. The narrative allows for the inclusion of actors' reasons for their acts, as well as the causes of happening. (Sarbin, 1986b, p. 9)

In a nutshell this is the general framework that narrative psychology entertains. And now I will turn to a particular psychological phenomena, and see what a narrativist account of emotion looks like.

In accordance with the basic categories of contextualism, such as change, novelty, texture, quality, context and the like, Sarbin considers emotion as "a feature of social action" (Sarbin, 1986a, p. 85), an aspect of conduct. In other terms, while traditional psychologists wish to find emotions as "happenings inside the individual", for a narrative account they can not be studied in isolation, without their context: emotions are ingredients of "social life or drama" (Sarbin, 1986a, p. 85). Specifically, emotions are to be considered as dramatistic role playing, dramatic actions, the rhetorically emphasised identity claims of actors - in Sarbin's understanding. So, for example when somebody is angry s/he interprets somebody else's conduct as an insult. Consequently, as a response to this state of affairs s/he puts on the anger role, retaliates for the act and tries to gain back her/his challenged self-respect.

The dramatic actions can be best explained in comparison with the dramaturgic ones. Although both are types of actions designed for influencing others within the social drama of everyday life, there are significant differences between them. In a dramaturgic action, so insightfully explicated by Goffman (1959), the actor and the author is the same person. Here the performance projects a particular identity (presents him/

herself, maintains a face, etc.) mainly for strategic reasons. In opposition to this, an actor engaged in dramatistic action is not the author/playwright of his performance in its usual sense, and s/he is not following any transparent strategy. Rather,

> in dramatistic scripts the identity of the playwright is not easily reconstructed. Dramatistic scripts are patterned after half-remembered folktales, fables, myths, legends and other stories. Not taught and learned in any systematic way, the plots of these stories are absorbed as part of one's enculturation. … The contents of dramatistic roles are the compound of valuational judgements, intentions and actions that are sometimes identified as emotions or passions. (Sarbin, 1986a, p. 90)

The lack of clear-cut authorship endows emotions, the modern day descendants of passions, with their apparent passivity from the perspective of the actor. At the same time, the lack of strategic deployment differentiates authentic (if you like dramatic) emotions from other performances. Still, dramatistic roles such as anger, grief or jealousy are patterns of conduct, but a very peculiar type. These are the patterns which are "intimately tied to values, to conditions that involve one's identity" and they "are defined by many writers as emotions or passions." Thus, "anger roles, grief roles, jealousy roles and so on are enacted to further an actor's self-narrative; and self-narratives, like other stories, follow a plot." (Sarbin, 1986a, p. 91) Sarbin summarises his proposal for analysing emotions from a narrative psychological perspective in what follows:

> Dramatistic actions have a logic derived from longstanding cultural imperatives, the logic being contained in narrative plots. Sources of plots are found in myths, legends, folktales, parables, proverbs, morality plays and of course, religious narratives. (Sarbin, 1986a, p. 96)

Bruner's rough sketch of emotional development, taken as a proponent of narrative psychology and a topic which is eminently relevant to the present investigation, will be taken up as such and developed further in the chapters below, but will be considered in this context, as well. Being a moderate constructivist, Bruner does not wish to deny the evolutional heritage regarding emotions. At the same time, he develops a rudimentary theory of emotional development which attributes constitutive (rather than mere contingent) roles to social factors, such as interactions with significant others and the wider cultural context. Thus, on the one hand, he acknowledges the possible role of biologically given primary

emotions. While on the other, he attributes a crucial role to "exposure to cues and models" in "helping the child to contextualize initially undifferentiated feelings into highly differentiated social situations that give these feelings their affective signature" (Bruner, 1986, p. 116). Furthermore, he argues that these "models" are "not 'stimuli' in any Pavlovian sense, but achieve their significance by virtue of being caught in a connected symbol system that constitutes culture" (Bruner, 1986, p. 117).

A general characterisation of discursive and narrative psychology as two versions of social constructivism in psychology was presented above and exemplified with the case of emotions. In the following chapters I shall turn back to various constructionist proposals respecting emotionality. Indeed, in Chapter 3. I shall offer a more systematic exposition of the social constructionist approach to emotions including some of its critical features, but now, being faithful to the title of this chapter, I shall consider some further general characteristics of the social constructionist stance toward psychology.

1.3 *Positioning Social Constructivism against Cognitive Psychology*

At a more general level, concerning their own "positioning" within the field of "academic" psychology, all of these openly social constructivist approaches are critical of "mainstream" cognitive psychology. Broadly speaking, at least two major features distinguish them from "mainstream" academic psychology, most notably from the now traditional mentalist cognitive psychology. First, they are explicitly against cognitivism (Still and Costall, 1991), the type of formal and decontextualized reduction of mental properties and content whose main proponent is perhaps Fodor (e.g. 1985); and second, they are pro social in their style of explanation.

Note however, that regarding more recent directions within cognitive psychology - such as connectionist approaches - a more friendly picture emerges. On the one hand, consider the often neglected fact, that one of the first programmatic monographs on connectionism, Rummelhardt and McClelland's *Parallel Distributed Processes* attested affinities to Vygotskian and Whorfian views on language and thought (1986, pp. 42-47). Thus, they endorsed the Vygotskian view on consciousness as internalised conversation and hinted to the Whorfian implications of their approach, to the possible formative role language might exert regarding thought. In this way, from the perspective of connectionist approaches, social constructionist research focuses on what could be the

"outside" structure, or "input" which endows the neural networks with appropriate input for processing and development.

On the other hand, proponents of discursive psychology argue for an agonistic relationship between social constructivism and neural network level modelling, taking the latter as a plausible and useful paradigm for explicating the machinery which executes the phenomena they study. As they argue, "it is plausible to suppose that brain networks are structured according to the way 'presented patterns of information' figure in discursive context." (Harré and Gillet, 1994, p. 92)

The relation of the social constructionist approaches to the general project of cognitive psychology nevertheless varies significantly. Sometimes they present themselves as restoring the original intentions of the "cognitive revolution". Thus, the opening essay of Bruner's influential *Acts of Meaning* (1990) starts like this:

> [The cognitive] revolution has now been diverted into issues that are marginal to the impulse that brought into being. Indeed, it has been technicalized in a manner that even undermines that original impulse. This is not to say that it failed: far from it, for cognitive science must surely be among the leading growth shares on the academic bourse. It may rather be that it has become diverted by success, a success whose technological virtuosity has cost dear. Some critics, perhaps unkindly, even argue that the new cognitive science, the child of the revolution, has gained technical success at the price of dehumanizing the very concept of mind it had sought to reestablish in psychology, and that it has thereby estranged much of psychology from other human sciences and humanities. (Bruner, 1990, p. 1)

At other times they define themselves as proponents of a "second cognitive revolution" (Harré and Gillett, 1994). Indeed, with slightly different emphasis, Harré's standpoint seems to be rather similar to Bruner's, when he argues for seriously considering meaning, intentional action and convention against the backdrop of information processing. Still, he considers discursive psychology as "*the* cognitive science". (Harré, 1997, p. 337)

Finally, in their even more radical formulations social constructionists seek to establish and work out in detail a profoundly new paradigm for psychology (Gergen 1994, 2000; Edwards, 1997; Shotter, 1991, 1997). These more radical authors confront the traditional cognitive view more fiercely, and proclaim what they seem to believe is a completely new paradigm for psychology. A recent version of this is Edwards' formulation:

> The basic cognitivist position that we start with a given, external world, which is then perceived and processed, and then put into words, is addressed, undermined, and inverted ... The categories and functions of 'mind' are reworked ... as discourse categories that are coined and deployed in and for the business that talk and texts perform. (Edwards, 1997, p. 19)

Formulated in whatever evolutional or revolutionary manner, it is not any more a special *object made by the man* for solving various kind of tasks, namely the computing machine, which plays the role of central heuristic metaphor, or root metaphor in the above shortly described approaches. It is but a *type of activity* which is considered by these approaches as central metaphor, the *discourse* and/or the *narrative* used by people to understand each other, themselves and their world.

1.4 *A Plea for Socialised Epistemology and the Discursive Ontology*

It would be worth working out in detail what "intra-psychological" and "extra-psychological" conceptual developments lead historically to searching for alternatives to the computing machine as the dominant heuristic metaphor for psychology and eventually to foregrounding the terms *narrative* and *discursive*. Nevertheless, a thorough exposition of this issue is naturally well beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Therefore, I would like only to refer to some possible factors, or signposts here.

Regarding the "intra-psychological" factors of changes in conceptualising the mind we could follow an eye-witness' analysis. According to Jerome Bruner, a scholar who contributed significantly to the emergence of the now traditional cognitive psychology, and who as we have already indicated above, follows a narrativist stance, the "originating impulse of the cognitive revolution" was distorted when the "emphasis began shifting from 'meaning' to 'information', from the *construction* of meaning to the *processing* of information." (Bruner, 1990, p. 4) Of course, those profound technological changes which are conveniently labelled as the Information Revolution contributed significantly to the outcome of these changes. Thus, for most theorising "computing became the model of the mind, and in place of the concept of meaning there emerged the concept of computability." (Bruner, 1990, p. 6) As a consequence of this, "the old-fashioned mental states" (Bruner, 1990, p. 8) were seen through the glasses of computability, or even something to be excluded from psychology, while the issue of human agency was highly neglected.

Still, the task of psychology is "how to construct a mental science around the concept of meaning and the processes by which meanings are created and negotiated within a community" - according to Bruner (1990, p. 11). And as he argues, instead of computation, concepts like culture and narrative might play a crucial role fulfilling this task.

With respect to "extra-psychological" factors in changes in conceptualising the mind I will briefly, and naturally selectively, mention some significant episodes in the recent usage of the terms *discourse* and *narrative* outside the realm of psychology, though in its vicinity. Sellars argued as early as the 1960's that the main task of philosophy is to discuss in one coherent discourse both the ordinary and the scientific ways of thinking for which he coined the terms "manifest image" and "scientific image" (1963, p. 171). Ironically, Sellars is in some important respects a main intellectual source for a number of emblematic figures of "mainstream" cognitive psychology, including both the "mentalist" Fodor[3] and his ex-student the "eliminativist" Churchland (1995). Periods within the history of ideas are held together by discourses according to Foucault (e.g. 1985). It is well known how profound a role discourse plays in Habermas' (1984) social theory. Although in a number of different ways, the analytical philosopher of art Danto (1981), the neo-pragmatist R. Rorty (1989), the postmodernists Lyotard (1979/1992), the history theoretician White (1987) and the anthropologist Geertz (1973) all attribute a special role to the spoken language, to the role narrative and discourse play in the interpretation of their respective interests. And this tableau could be easily extended, but that is not necessary to making my point: besides the computer we face while compiling our texts, computing our data, communicating to each other through E-mail and thinking of ourselves as being similar to a machine, these thinkers and their colleagues also form the intellectual milieu of our age, and psychologists are no exception.

Of course, it would be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps even impossible, to find a common denominator for the specific ideas the above mentioned thinkers developed. Nevertheless, I do think that a claim for a *socialised epistemology* (cf. Bodor, 2001) is definitively common to all of them. Furthermore, while a *naturalised epistemology* (Quine, 1969) was significant in anchoring traditional cognitive psychology, it may be appropriate for the protagonist of the "second cognitive revolution" to endorse a stance, which I would like to call socialised epistemology: following the pattern of a naturalised epistemology, while offering an alternative.

A socialised epistemology would follow the path of Austin and Wittgenstein in seeking to understand the bases of our *Certainty*

(Wittgenstein, 1972) in our commonly shared culturally evolved presuppositions rather than merely in our biological propensities. Thus, within the field of the philosophy of mind it would favour rather an externalist account of the mental than an internalist one. The socialised epistemology sees *Descartes' Error* (Damasio, 1994) not so much in the (ontological) separation of the mind from the body, but rather in separating the mind from other minds. Or, alluding to the continental tradition, this epistemology follows Husserl's diagnosis of *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1970) and Merleau-Ponty's (1962/1995) attempt to integrate the body, the mind and the other into one coherent framework. Of course, the details of such a doctrine, in other words recruiting the relevant philosophical analyses and works on the sociology of knowledge, are clearly beyond our present purposes.

Insofar as a socialised epistemology is common to all recently proposed social constructionist approaches to psychology, the concept could serve to illuminate its philosophical propensities. The plea for a socialised epistemology can, furthermore, be complemented by an ontological sketch, as well. The ontological presuppositions of social constructionism were spelled out by Harré and Gillet as the following chart shows (see also Van Langenhove, 1995).

Table 1.1. Comparison of the Newtonian and Vygotskian ontologies

Ontologies	Locative systems	Entities	Relations
Newtonian	Space and time	Things and events	Causality
Discursive	Arrays of people	Speech acts	Rules and story lines

(source: Harré and Gillett, 1994, p. 29)

Although their attempt to explicate an ontology for discursive psychology might seems at some point opaque and controversial, it deserves an exposition within this context. Broadly speaking, an ontology may be taken as a system of often implicit assumptions about what the basic categories of being are within some field of interest, in our case within the field of the scientific study of psychology. Harré and Gillett develop their proposal for an ontology of discursive psychology, a "Vygotskian ontology", in a comparison with the classical, mechanistic, Newtonian ontology, which still lies now at the bedrock of much psychological theorising - according to them. As the table suggests, an ontology comprises of a "locative system", in which the "entities" can be found and individuated, the entities which come into specified "relations" with

other entities. Altogether these entities and their relationships comprise a world.

As the table shows, the "locative system" of the Newtonian ontology consists of time and space, which are conventionally fixed, ethalonized, therefore easily measurable dimensions. This, roughly corresponds to what in the Vygotskian ontology Harré and Gillett call arrays of people, and sequences of speakings. Specifically, they argue that while in the mechanistic ontology it is crucial that where there is something, yielding significance to the dimension of space, in the discursive ontology the relevant question is who is someone in relation to others, thus a kind of "people-space is constituted by the individuals" (Harré and Gillett, 1994, p. 31). Here individuals are "something like spatial points, defined in terms of interpersonal, social, and political frameworks." (Harré and Gillett, 1994, p. 31) At the same time, "some sequence of utterances .. that can serve as basic rhythm on to which other speech-acts can be mapped." (Harré and Gillett, 1994, p. 31) corresponds to, though largely independent from, the classical notion of time.

The entities located within the people-space and utterance sequence-time are speech acts in the discursive realm, instead of the Newtonian things and events. Finally, while causality means the principal way of relating one thing to another in the mechanistic ontology, rules and story lines play an analogous role within the world of discourse. It means that a speech act is not so much causing another utterance, rather it makes it appropriate or inappropriate, or in other terms, it makes it normatively accountable. For example, if someone promises something, the fulfilment of the promise is not so much caused by the promise, rather it is normatively preferred, and in case we break our promises, at least sometimes, we are obliged to account for it.

At the very end of this section it seems appropriate to anticipate a lethal-looking criticism of social constructivism. Indeed, some would have the impression that as a consequence of social constructionism scientific psychology is in danger of being deprived of its very subject matter, say, the mental processes. Therefore, it is important to note, that the psychologist's move to the social sphere may or may not be accompanied by an ontological commitment against the mental as such. On the one hand, there might be social eliminativist views such as Gergen (1994, 2000) or Shotter (1991, 1997), just like there are physiological and behaviourist eliminativist within the "mainstream" psychology such as the views of Churchland (1995) or Stich (1983), respectively. While on the other, a modest version of this reorientation of psychology toward the social only requires the supposition that the mental is not an ontologically

distinct category or not a sovereign realm. And this second formulation is hardly revolutionary. After all, it was scientific psychology's official father, Wundt's, starting point in his efforts to explicate the higher ranked psychical functions from their very products, from cultural objectivations like language in his *Völkerpsychologie*.

1.5 *Widening Social Constructionism: Sociocultural Psychology, Theory of Social Representations, Dialogic Psychology and Episodes from the History of Psychology*

If the general characterisation of social constructionism as a re-location of psychological phenomena from the individual into the social seems to be correct, one may include further psychological efforts into social constructionism as well. Considering, analysing and detailing the formative role of the social processes and products with respect to the individual's mentality are not at all exclusive characteristics of the recent social constructionist approaches in the "strict" sense of the term as it was introduced above. From an analytical point of view, talk or discourse, genres of talk or canonical narratives, language as social institution or as a primary system of social representations, writing as a powerful mnemotechnical device and communication technology, our symbolic environment, the semiotic system we dwell in, and the religions framing our life and death, are nothing else but different kinds of stances toward, or abstractions from a loose, fuzzy and hardly definable reality for which our pre-scientific concepts like social or cultural stands for. Therefore, taking a wider perspective, it can be argued that the various psychological approaches such as for example cultural or sociocultural psychology, the theory of social representations and the dialogic psychology are in a "loose" sense social constructionist approaches toward psychological phenomena as well.

The talk- and narrative-centred stances were described in some detail above. With the intention of lending wider context to social constructivism let me mention briefly some further versions or scholarly "constructions" of the social here.

The issue of intersubjectivity is a key element in accounting for cognition, communication and the functioning of the self in dialogical psychology (Rommetveit, 1992; Hermans, 1996). Cultural psychologists like Boesch (1991), Wertsh (1995) or Valsiner (2000), all attribute a central role to concepts like symbolic systems, mediation tools or semiotic mediation in the forming and functioning of the mind. Similarly, the theory of social representations as one of the leading paradigms of sociological social psychology (Farr, 1998) attests convergence to narrative psy-

chology. Nevertheless, cultural psychology and the theory of social representations usually concentrate on the psychological effects and producing of such "molar" and at the same time more transient, therefore in a sense more tangible objectivations as for example space and objects (Boesch, 1991), the structure of mediation means (Wertsh, 1995) or the family relationships (Valsiner, 2000). In this respect it is worth emphasising that the stances where the object of study and the unit of analysis, are near to orality, namely discursive psychology and narrative psychology, are in a better position to in attend to *negotiation*, the *emergence of meaning* from ongoing interaction. Or to put it differently, they are more on the activity pole in an imagined human-created environment and environment-created human cycle. On the other hand, it could be anticipated that from the perspective of cultural psychology and the theory of social representations it might be more natural to cover topics such as the cultural variations of mental processes and products, the social and historical forces forming and influencing them, just like putting under scrutiny such more enduring psychological effects like development (Cole, 1992; Moscovici, 1998) alongside the level of the personal (Valsiner, 2000). Corresponding to this, these latter types of constructionist psychologies imply some, though possibly not radical, change in the implied ontology, as well (cf. Wagner, 1998; Valsiner, 2000). Beyond the speech act and narrative conventions, various cultural artefacts, from body decorations across books to cathedrals, and different types of social institutions, from families across prisons to states or nations are to be considered as objects of analysis.

Finally, it should be mentioned briefly that social constructionism is present in the history of psychology from its beginnings. Thus, the horizon of social constructivism can be extended in time as well. It can be argued, that the idea according to which the very formation of mind just like its functioning are to be explained at least partially by social factors, be they conceptualised either as stemming from the immediate interaction, or originating from other less transient cultural and historical factors, has been continuously present in the intellectual tradition called psychology. Starting from Wundt (1921/1973) across Dilthey (1977), Mead (1934/1967), Bartlett (1932/1977), Halbwachs (1952/1992) Vygotsky (1987), the history of psychology is abundant with these or closely related kinds of intellectual efforts. Indeed, both the "strictly" social constructionist and the cultural, social and dialogical oriented approaches mentioned above refer to these historical figures, thus, attesting a common orientation.

Let me put it unequivocally: The main point of this section is not to claim that the different kinds of cultural psychologies and theories of emblematic figures from the history of psychology should necessarily

be subsumed under the term social constructionism. It is not the terminology that matters. Rather, I simply wanted to pinpoint certain inherent affinities or some points of convergence between recent cultural psychology, and certain ideas from the history of psychology on the one hand, and social constructionism in its "strict" sense on the other.

Chapter 2 «
Marking an Horizon for Emotion

> From our point of view, in a science of living processes and especially in its descriptive introduction, less depends upon excluding opposite views than upon approximation to reality, upon completeness, and upon combining everything which essentially belongs together.
> (Krueger, 1928, p. 69)

In this chapter a conceptual horizon will be established and detailed in order to explore a set of issues regarding the conceptualisation of emotion. Although, the perennial question - *What is emotion?* (cf. James, 1884/1948) - will guide us throughout the chapter, I do not intend to start with a clear cut or what appears to be clear cut definition of emotion. The other opposite of a definitional exercise, a rather Wittgensteinian track, offering an ostensively referential act, giving an example and saying look and see, this is an emotion which is characteristic, to Othello, for example - is also not tenable for my exploratory purposes (cf. Sarbin, 1989, pp. 79-82). Finally, a complete circumvention of the issue, as Ekman's, who, in his introduction to a volume entitled *Emotion in the human face* once wrote that the contributors "sidestepped the problem of specifying why the behavior they studied ... [had] anything to do with emotion" (Ekman, 1982, p. 11) does not seem to be fruitful either.

Instead of defining, exemplifying or circumventing the issue of what is the exact nature of emotion I would rather prefer only to signify the orientation I intend to follow in my investigations. By doing this I wish to present a conceptual horizon within which emotion is located, only for the purposes of orienting the imagined reader as well as my studies.

There is an apparently timeless intellectual strategy according to which anything can be captured both in relation to something else and in itself, *comparatively* and *immanently*. Below I shall rely on that strategy.

2.1 *Emotions Without*

The comparative setting of an horizon for understanding emotion will include three interrelated points. The first will highlight a contrast between two *communal traditions* or institutions of mankind, art and science, as we tend to understand them today. This section will also include some considerations regarding possible connections between emotions and the arts. The second comparison pertains to two very general aspects of, or stances towards, *intelligible human conduct*, the epistemic stance and the affective stance, as formulated by Elinor Ochs (1996), a leading anthropological linguist. Finally, my third comparative effort to work out a conceptual horizon for studying emotions stems from Heinz Werner's *organizmic-developmental theory* of psychology (1955). In his characterisation of *total psychic functioning*, Werner set up a contrast between physiognomic or in my interpretation emotional and logical-geometrical or in modern terminology a cognitive working of the mind.

2.1.1 Art, Science and Emotionality

Emotions are to be taken commonsensically as somewhat connected to and/or constitutive of *art* as opposed to *science*; the latter is usually considered a rather sober and rational cognitive activity. For a while, the dominant view was that science and nothing but science, is able to serve knowledge and provide information for promoting mankind. An emblematic figure and a major explicator of this position was Carnap, a leading positivist of its logical variety around the first half of the 20th century. Specifically, he maintained that only those statements are meaningful which contain verifiable object statements or logical truths, everything else is senseless (Carnap, 1932/1959). By this move he effectively relegated everything else beyond science and mathematics to the domain of nonsense.

Now, more than a half a century later, the state of knowledge is considered differently by many. As an example, one might consider Lyotard's famous text on the state of knowledge which became one of the most influential post-modern manifestos (Lyotard, 1979/1992). He argued on conceptual and historical grounds that none of the various attempts to legitimise science proved to be successful. Consequently, according to him, scientific knowledge is one type of discourse, but not the only one, and certainly not the one to which narrative knowledge could be reduced to. Alternatively, one might think of Goodman, who summarised his volume entitled *Ways of Worldmaking* as follows: "a major thesis of this book is that the arts must be taken no less seriously than the sciences as modes

of discovery, creation, and enlargement of knowledge in the broad sense of advancement of the understanding" (Goodman, 1978/1992, p. 102).

Science and art: two communal endeavours of mankind, two sources of insights, two aspects of our life. Two realms of objects and information, two worlds instigating joy and suffering. Two detached frame of reference for transcending or transfiguring our everyday life: twin moons for our days and nights. Indeed, it can be argued that our understanding the difference between science and art is historically evolved. After all, practising science and practising art were possibly not perceived as two distinct activities by people like Leonardo. Or, alternatively there might be attempts to transcend their segregation by standing on some highland of philosophy. Neither of these qualifications changes the fact however that any historical explication of the origin of the division between science and art, or any theoretical "fusing" of them, just like our ordinary occupation with either of them, presupposes a profound division, however much that may be historical in origin.

A psychological formulation of the division between science and art, taking them as "two modes of thought" accompanied by a firm persuasion respecting their irreducibility to each other was recently presented and detailed by Bruner (1986, 1996).

Beyond the apparently opposing concepts of science and art, the association of art and emotion are to be mentioned in this context. The connection between emotion and art is spelled out in a number of different ways. Their relationship is a major concern of a number of various aesthetics, and equally central for works devoted to the psychology of art. For example, it lies at the heart of the analysis of the *actor's paradox* which Diderot so elegantly explored (1994). What is the appropriate tactics for an actor in producing her performance on stage? Is it better to identify with the character's emotions as fully as s/he can, or alternatively is it better producing and at the same time controlling its emotional involvement?

Another example where the connections between emotions and art are recurrently thematized could be the concept of *catharsis* as signifying originally the "mechanism" of how a tragic drama affects its audience. This concept was generalised to other kind artistic experience later on. Amélie Rorty summarises the classical Aristotelian description of catharsis in three interrelated ideas:

> … it is a medical term, referring to a therapeutic cleansing or purgation; it is a religious term, referring to a purification achieved by the formal and ritualised, bounded expression of powerful and often dangerous emotions; it is a cognitive term, referring to an

> intellectual resolution or clarification that involves directing emotions to their appropriate intentional objects. All three forms of catharsis are meant, at their best, to conduce to the proper functioning of a well-balanced soul. (Rorty, A., 1992, p. 14)

Given its original complexity, it is not surprising that the concept of catharsis has been given many interpretations. Lessing considered it purely in moral terms (Lessing, 1962). Freud's version was, naturally, rather biased to its therapeutic value (Freud and Breuer, 1896/1991). Finally, Vygotsky's approach to the psychology of art could be mentioned in this regard which is but one formulation where aesthetics and psychology merge (Vygotsky, 1971). According to Vygotsky's shortest formulation: art can be considered as a *collective technics of emotions*. What did he mean by this? After analysing the structural and psychological constituents of tales, short stories and dramas, the genres of the literary domain he worked in most intensively, he proposes a synthetic account of artistic experience. He argues, that "aesthetical reaction" implies affects which stem from different and contradicting directions, based partly on contradictions inherent in the structures of works, such as the tension between story (fabula) and plot (suzhet). Then, at the high point of the art work these contradictory affects are discharged, destructed and annulled in a kind of shortcut, in a catharsis.

Perhaps needless to say, a psychological investigation cannot aspire to contribute much if anything to our understanding of the role and nature science and art play in the life of people. Also, the competence of psychologists in the field of aesthetics is very much limited. At the same time, psychologists are not entitled to neglect these issues, either. Ignorance of these and related issues could easily lead to such conceptualisations which are completely inadequate and uninteresting for a wider audience. Therefore, as rule of thumb, psychologists should keep them at least in the corner of their eyes, and formulate their accounts in such a way that they should be at least potentially congruent with the related issues.

2.1.2 Affective Stance *versus* Epistemic Stance

Leaving behind the "sacred" dual of science and art and focusing on the level of more "profane", everyday, albeit public conduct, social behaviour, or *communicative practices* (Hanks, 1996), a broad distinction can be drawn between *affective stance* and *epistemic stance* following Ochs (1996). The two stances or attitudes are defined tentatively by Ochs in the following manner:

> affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern ...; epistemic stance refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions, and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities. (Ochs, 1996, p. 410)

Interestingly enough, both the epistemic and the affective stances are at a high level of abstraction, and as such strong candidates for being *cultural universals* according to Ochs' analysis, which aims to establish a general framework for *language socialization*.

At this point, it is worth stressing that although the concept of cultural universals seems to be an oxymoron for a lot of psychologists, it is not. It only contradicts the more recent usual sense of universal within psychology which for a significant number of researchers denotes some biologically, more properly genetically given property. Of course, Chomsky's (for example, 1997) ideas on the innateness of linguistic universals has been tremendously influential in this respect. Note, however, that quite independently of the status of innateness of the Chomskian linguistic universals, there is nothing logically compelling in connecting universality exclusively to genetically given characteristics. From this it follows that the claims of biological universality are not superior *a priori* to claims of cultural universality.[1]

Remember, for example, Bartlett's classical analysis of the Jungian archetypical symbols as the innate content of collective unconsciousness (Bartlett, 1932/1977, Chapter xvii). Following Rivers, Bartlett emphasised: "It is perfectly true that similarity of symbols, however widespread it may be, does not of itself prove that their significance is inherited in any strict sense of that word." Furthermore, he argues that "the significance is passed on by persistent tradition, the latter being maintained through the age overlap which every social group displays" (1932/1977, p. 288), and by this he effectively points to the domain of socialization or social development.

Turning back to Ochs' formulation of cultural universals we are told that cultural universals mean an "outcome of pan-species commonalities in the human accommodation to, and structuring of, social life." (Ochs 1996, p. 409) Although, Ochs concentrates predominantly on the situated, consequently indexically co-constructed linguistic realisation of the respective stances, she also remarks that the concepts of affective and epistemic stances might be used in a wider, not exclusively linguistic sense as well.

As the final point of this section it is worth highlighting that in the present context it is not necessary to set "biology" against "culture" or vica versa, whatever meaning these two terms have. Indeed, the previous chapter argued for a social constructionist framework, nevertheless, any firm position taken up at this initial phase of the analysis would be premature, and would close instead of open vistas.

2.1.3 Physiognomic *versus* Geometric-Technical Psychic Orientation

In order to localise emotions contrastively on the level of a general psychology interested in total *psychic functioning*, I would argue for re-vitalising the differentiation between *physiognomic* versus *geometric-technical* orientation. The distinction was first introduced into experimental psychology by Werner in 1925 (cf. Werner, 1955, p. 11). Werner and his coworkers stipulated that there are "at least two idealized modes of perception: the physiognomic and the geometrical-technical." (Werner, 1955, p. 12), and argued that the further, more specialised psychic functions inherit the characteristics of the respective orientations. According to this, for example "[t]he problem of expressive language, as we see it, can be advantageously conceived within a wider framework, that of perception." (Werner, 1955, p. 12). Against this background I will suggest that we could re-interpret physiognomic as emotional and geometric-technical as purely cognitive.

A number of experiments were conducted with the aim of demonstrating, that under some circumstances the very objects of perception are physiognomic, and describing their characteristics (Kaplan, 1955). The main distinctive qualities of physiognomical or, as I would tend to say, emotional orientation, as opposed to geometrical-technical, or in other terms purely cognitive functioning, lies in the organismic and psychophysically undifferentiated character of the former. This total organismic involvement, is contrasted

> with the purely sensorial (visual, auditory) articulation of geometrico-technically perceived objects. The organismic state is not simply the ground against which the object is set, but itself partakes in the formation of the object. This mode of perception becomes strikingly explicit in the well-known phenomena of emphatic response, synaesthesia, etc. (Werner, 1955, p. 12)

Furthermore, the psychophysical undifferentiatedness "or even better undifferentiatedness of the material and spiritual" (Werner, 1955, p. 14)

is characteristic of physiognomic functioning. Perhaps the most compact formulation on differences between the geometrico-technical and physiognomic, reads like this: "The objects which in the geometrico-technical mode are regarded as things with only spatio-temporal properties, are in physiognomic perception seen as, e.g., harsh, threatening, depressed, etc." (Werner, 1955, p. 12)

Table 2.1. summarises the main points of the three conceptual aspects I have used up until now in the comparative localisation of emotions. My primary reason was rather to highlight the richness and pervasiveness of emotion related conceptualisations, instead of overplaying the opposition between emotion and cognition. Thus, the oppositions which were set up in the above sections (from 2.2.1 - 2.2.3) are more side effects, stemming from the applied comparative stance, than arguments pointing to a claim on how the world is arranged. It should be emphasised, therefore, that none of the three oppositions, nor the division between emotion and cognition should be taken as an "eternal" opposition. Surely, we might let the things be interwoven. Werner's qualification, the term "idealised" concerning the types of psychic functioning he identified, might very well apply to the other two opposites as well.

Table 2.1 Contrastive Localisation of Emotions

realms of reality	cognition related activities	emotion related activities
communal tradition or institution	science	art
communicative practice or public conduct	epistemic stance	affective stance
psychic functioning or psychology	technical-geometrical orientation	physiognomic orientation

2.2 *Emotions Within*

Up to this point the concept of emotion was approached *comparatively*, along three lines of comparisons, namely art versus science, affective versus epistemic stances, and finally physiognomic versus geometric-technical psychic functioning. Now, I shall turn to the emotions inner or constitutive characteristics. My tentative characterisation of emotion *immanently*, again will be divided into three interrelated points. First, the concept of the psychological universality of emotions will be intro-

duced. Second, a description of some of their central characteristics will be detailed within a broad functionalist framework. Finally, the relevance of emotionality in time will be focused on. Thus, beyond immediate or episodic emotional conduct, the issue of "crystallised emotions" and the concept of character will be briefly touched upon.

2.2.1 Omni-Presence of Emotionality

Emotions immanently can be taken as omni-present and complex patterns which can be abstracted from the totality of human life, or in psychological terms from the totality of psychological functioning. Two aspects of this proposition need to be explicated in this section. The first is that emotions are not things in the usual sense of the term, therefore their identification might require a certain amount of conceptual investment. The second is the stipulated feature of emotionality conveyed by the term omni-presence.

By saying that emotions are considered as a peculiar type of abstraction, a specific stand-point is occupied, no doubt. It can be stated shortly, however. The major implication of this stance is that *emotions are not objects* to be found. Nevertheless, note, that opposing reification of emotions is not equal with denying their reality. After all, neither our day of birth nor our last days can be meaningfully considered as things, while both of them are inevitable realities.

The second aspect of the starting proposition of this section requires somewhat more elaboration. The approach the present study takes toward emotions considers them as omni-present in the sense that some emotionality is always present in human conduct. Either implicitly, forming the background of behaviour or explicitly, when emotionality takes a foregrounded position, organising a whole episode and perhaps even thematized conceptually in the experience and/or linguistically in the communication.

A short poem might serve as a literary illustration of my point regarding backgrounded versus foregrounded status of emotionality:

Leigh Hunt: Jenny Kissed me

Jenny kiss'd me when we met,
  Jumping from the chair she sat in;
Time, you thief, who love to get
  Sweets into your list, put that in!
Say I'm weary, say I'm sad,
  Say that health and wealth have miss'd me,

Say I'm growing old, but add,
Jenny kiss'd me.

Note, that in the first two lines of the poem the narrator implicitly, but clearly announces joy and happiness. Here, the emotional character of the depicted episode is given inherently in the involved actions and in their way of presentation. In lines 5 to 7 the opposite happens. Here, the speaker explicitly avows a clearly opposing emotion to joy and happiness, being sad, and enumerates other vicissitudes of his life. These lines of the poem therefore foregrounds emotionality by explicit thematization, with the linguistic term "sad".

The thesis of omni-presence of emotionality amounts to a proposition on *the psychological universality of emotions*. This position was nicely formulated by Krueger:

> Whenever something happens mentally to a living being, we always observe or with good reason we discover an *emotional* mood. If anything at all changes in an experience, then the emotion always changes, either alone or together with other simultaneous experiences determining it. To the degree that we, as psychologists, try to explain anything, we never are allowed to neglect those facts nor their specific qualities and effects. This is, briefly, what "universality" of emotions should mean. (Krueger, 1928, p. 72)

To put it metaphorically: in this view the presence of emotions in mental life and conduct can be compared to the presence of water in the air. To be sure, there is always a certain amount of humidity in the air, even in the driest deserts of, say, Israel. Then, there is water in the perceptible forms of clouds of various types. And, of course, the rain is water in the air as well, be it a tender nurturing rain or a violent thunder storm.

Note, that suggesting psychological universality of emotion in itself does not conflict with either of the above mentioned biological or the cultural concepts of universality (see in the section 2.2.2). While these two second types of universalities are usually constitutive elements of "downward" (i.e. biologically oriented) reduction and "upward" (i.e. social-culturally oriented) reduction explanatory attempts at the level of psychology proper, any claims of psychological universality, are propositions on the scope of the relevant mental process or property.

2.2.2 Constituents of Emotion

During the act of abstraction of emotionality from human life a number of intertwined concerns or aspects deserve special attention, and play a crucial role. In this section I shall try to recruit some of these conceptual requirements. The main point will be that emotions involve an evaluation or appraisal of some objects from the perspective of the individual and accompanied with some specific motivational and behavioural elements. As a general background, note, that balanced overviews and theoretical proposals on studies of emotions such as the physiologist Grastyán's (1974), or the psychologist Scherer's (1984), all commonly emphasise the complexity of emotions. Thus, below a broad functionalist approach will be followed, stemming, at least, from Aristotle and revitalised by Brentano at the end of the 19th century. Perhaps needless to say, a number of contemporary emotion theorists share the basics of their position. Consider for example a formulation of emotion within this tradition:

> The emotion process is defined as a complex of changes in different subsystems of the organism's functioning. In an emotion these subsystems (the components) are differentially elicited, and thus some extent change independently of each other. The emotion process, according to componential views, generally includes the following components: a) antecedent event, b) emotional experience, c) appraisal, d) physiological change, e) change in action readiness, f) behaviour, g) change in cognitive functioning and beliefs, and h) regulatory processes. (Mesquita, Frijda and Scherer, 1997, p. 260)

My intention is not to compete with these or other contemporary proposals regarding the definition of emotions, especially, since at least in general, I tend to agree with most of them. Instead, I should rather focus on explicating some inner constituents of emotions which are relatively rarely explicated in the literature. In other terms, I shall turn to the immanent characteristics of emotions more openly, more explicitly than usual, in the hope of getting closer by a small step to what Averill called "the meaning of the emotion" (1992, p. 224).

As a solid starting point we might turn to an insightful remark of Grastyán: "behind every interpretation one makes of emotional expression in others there lies a complicated, unreliable, *intuitive act* (Grastyán, 1974, p. 758; italics added, cf. Hebb, 1946).[2] But what is the general nature of this "intuitive act"? As a physiologist, Grastyán unfortunately did not pursue this direction of enquiry. To this question, without claiming much

originality, I propose the following answer: the conduct of an organism, individual or person can be interpreted as emotional when it involves an *evaluation* or *appraisal* of some aspects or of some *objects* of his surroundings or reflexively of himself. Furthermore, this evaluation is not free-floating, disembodied, but quite the opposite, insofar it is *anchored* in the individual's own perspective, in his own well-being, it has profound *motivational* consequences. Or, as Grastyán put it: "The cognitive (…) *interests* of the organism seem always to be emotionally expressed; indeed, such a unity of function seems to have served the very survival of the human species." (1974, p. 799; emphasise added) It is worth complementing this citation with the corresponding section of Grastyán's manuscript, since it is even more explicit regarding the main direction of the present analysis: "In the emotions always the organism's real or presumed interests are expressed. The very fact, that this biased perception of the world does not necessarily yield deformed cognition is proved by the survival of the human species." (Grastyán, 1981, p. 72). In short, abstracting emotionality involves appreciating that some object is evaluated in relation to the individual by himself.

How is it possible to articulate further emotions taken as evaluation of some object by the individual? Or, in other words, what is the content of the "intuitive act", the first, the second or the third person psychologist (cf. De Rivera, 1999) accomplishes in understanding emotion? A closer inspection of the constituents of the above offered description of emotions might be helpful in this respect. First, consider the element referred as *evaluation*, which is perhaps the most characteristic, if not defining constituent of emotions. Of course, any evaluation or appraisal presupposes something valued, some kind of etalon or measure, and this is also true for emotional evaluation. Emotional evaluation therefore is made on the bases of certain *propensities* or *standards*. The result of evaluation can be manifold, but at its most basic it is either a positive or negative evaluation of something, as already Spinoza realised (1677/1986). The origin of these propensities or standards are possibly biologically determined at their onset and they might be culturally influenced as an achievement of development. Therefore, these propensities might serve the function of *good accommodation* thanks to the evolutionary history. Or, alternatively, though not antagonistically, they might be standards prescribing the *right action* according to the local moral order, thus serving the function of accommodation to a culture. Consider moreover, that any moral order is in itself a product of a particular sociocultural development as an element of the history of mankind. Remember, whatever origin these standards have, they are *given* to the organism or person when the time comes.[3]

As we have seen, any evaluations imply some standards. But there must be something to evaluate also. The relevant aspects of the being's environment or herself constitute the objects of the emotional evaluation, the *intentional objects* of any particular emotion. Furthermore, these objects do not stand in themselves, rather they are objects for an organism or person, they are objects within an activity. Thus, instead of an isolated object it is perhaps more proper to talk of a constellation of objects, which have their particular background and context within the activity of the individual.[4] For example, an intentional object of an emotion can be a snake which typically evokes fear, since it is evaluated as dangerous. Note, however, that the sight of a snake could be evaluated in an infinite number of positive ways, as well. Imagine for example a person who could not find her favourite pet, say a cobra, for a while and finally discovers him in her wardrobe. Within this scene it is natural, that the sight of the snake for her is a source of happiness or joy. Note, that there might be cases where we speak about emotion-like states such as anxiety, though no specific object is involved. My contention is, that these are marginal cases, since their conceptualisation depends on our prior understanding of normal or "fully fledged" emotions which have an object. Thus, anxiety is generally taken as fear without a proper object to fear.

The evaluation does not stand in itself, it is not a mere perception without action, it is not made for its own sake without any further consequences. In short it is not a mere contemplation. Just as Dewey's critique of the reflex arch concept (1896/1948) showed the futility of separating stimulus from response in a holistic account of conduct generally, the same holds true for emotional conduct, in particular. Consequently, the evaluation most of the time leads to some motivational-moving inclinations and eventually to *actions*. Beside instinctual and/or intentional actions all further aspects of an emotion realised in behaviour, all further constituents of an emotional syndrome (see also in Chapter 3.) could be potentially detected during an emotional episode. These elements include emotional displays, physiological changes, and the so-called emotional feeling (cf. Grastyán, 1974, p. 757), and the latter can be taken as equal to the conscious experience of an emotion, in my understanding. Particular psychological theories of emotion may attribute different weights, significance and occasionally priorities to these different aspects of emotionality.

The emotional evaluations bring about certain manners of conduct, which are instrumental, but at the same time potentially informative for the con-specific mates and others. And, as Darwin (1984) already noted, these originally instrumental actions could serve as bases for the process

of ritualization, which, together with the principle of antithesis, is the basic mechanism responsible for the evolving of certain communicative patterns, *emotional displays*.

Naturally, both the emotional evaluation and the conduct it brings about are executed by the organism's body, just like any other life function. It offers a place for physiology in emotion research, since the immediate or proximal causal mechanisms of emotions are physiological. However, it can be argued that *physiological changes* can not be taken as emotions *per se*. The logical reason for this is, in short, that any attempt to identify a putative physiological mechanism for a particular emotion presuppose the prior identification of the same emotion outside physiology. Thus, if some wish to study an animal's "anger centre", first he has to know how to make an animal angry and what it looks like. Only after answering somehow (even implicitly) these questions regarding the nature of emotions could one launch studies on central mechanisms and bodily organs or processes specialised exclusively or just recruited momentarily for executing certain patterns of working, which might lie behind particular emotions.

Emotional feelings are one type of conscious experience humans may entertain. Since not all feelings are emotional and not all emotions have a feeling component one might anticipate an intricate relationship between emotions and emotional feelings. Apart from some general remarks on positioning the problem, I cannot offer more in this section. One way to position the issue of emotional feeling is to rely on a general functionalist approach to consciousness. Within a functionalist logic articulated by James (1890), among others but advocated by such cognitive psychologists as Anderson (1982), the control of behaviour shifts onto the conscious level when a lower level of control is unsuccessful. Emotional feeling may be similar to consciousness in general, thus they might play a vital role in situations where lower levels of processing relational information is less successful.

It seems to me that the tentative formulations above regarding basis upon which we can detect emotions, and what constituents they might contain, is broad enough to include the Ethologist's, the Sociobiologist's, the Cognitive Psychologist's, and the Social Constructionist's concerns, and at the same time narrow enough to circumscribe a horizon.[5] Perhaps an exclusively Physiological or Behaviourist orientation, concentrating only on the proximal causes of emotions and a radically Subjectivist position would be exceptions in endorsing the formulations above.[6] These two latter approaches to emotions can be considered as kinds of metonymical moves insofar as they attempt to substitute certain parts of the emotional complex, such as neural, muscular and glan-

dular activity patterns, or subjective experiences, to the whole emotion complex, and will be further considered in the next chapter.

2.2.3 Duration and Emotion

The scope of abstractions of emotionality from human conduct can be various in the sense of time as well. In the following section three slices of human life will be differentiated in this respect. The applied or perhaps more frequently rather implied "time-window" of human life in this respect is particularly relevant. Therefore, all conduct from momentary "emotional states" or experiences, just like actual emotional behaviour or conduct, through such semi-steady states like neurosis (the positive counterpart of which is unfortunately not lexicalised) to those profound guiding principles within the life course which are held to define persons as characters or virtues, seem to be relevant with respect to the horizon of emotion. As Aristotle already indicated, the concepts of character and emotion are intimately tied to each other (cf. Robinson, 1996). This last facet of emotionality is a key element in a person's social and personal identity.

The relevant abstractions of emotionality as an anchored evaluation of some object could be based on a transient event. In this view, the unit of analysis is an *emotional episode* and its constituents. There are various attempts to articulate the elements and their relationships within an emotional episode. Thus, they can be taken as paradigm scenarios (De Sousa, 1980), or prototypical scenarios inherent in cognitive models. For example, according to Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), a prototypical anger scenario, contains the following temporally ordered elements: offending event, anger, attempt to control anger, loss of control, and retribution. Others prefer to consider emotional episodes as scripts with elements or "subevents that make up the emotion: causes, feelings, physiological changes, overt actions, and vocal and facial expressions." (Russell, 1989, p. 302). These kinds of relatively short emotional events are studied mostly by psychologists. Note, however, that emotionality can be considered as relevant to certain more stable aspects of the personality as well. It is not easy to articulate patterns or units in this respect, but we could establish at least two further, more or less distinct, variations alongside characteristics like duration and flexibility.

One such pattern or *semi-steady state of persons* which psychology has invested great effort into is neurosis. At least in some descriptions neurosis can be taken as an emotional disorder. As such, it is some habitual way of reacting to otherwise everyday events of life with negative emotions.

They form a loose category recently referred to as anxiety disorders (DSM-IV, BMO). Consider, for example an account of agoraphobia:

> Panic is diagnosed in individuals who report distress over their experience of fear in anxiety situations that do not warrant such a response. Agoraphobia is diagnosed in individuals who experience both panic and the imperative desire to prevent its recurrence, which is expressed by avoiding situations in which panic has arisen. (Capps and Ochs, 1995, pp. 46-47)

In this sense we can speak of neurosis as "crystallised green emotions" (Bodor, 2001) with the implication that better understanding of emotionality could help in understanding neurosis and *vice versa*. Still neurosis is considered by most psychologists as a potentially "curable" state, so it is taken, if not easily, but eventually, as a changeable state.

Finally, consider emotionality as an aspect of someone's *character.* Wholeheartedness, envy, bravery, cowardliness: these and analogous characteristics can be a lifelong developing and/or permanent feature of a person. Some researchers such as Jung (1928), or Szondi (1952), think of character or temperament as originating mainly from genetically given predispositions, with the implication of its relative rigidity. Others, such as Erikson (1959), Adler (1956), or Averill and Nunley (1992), argue for more openness of personality and lifelong chances for development, therefore, presupposing relatively greater flexibility respecting character. We do not have to take sides in this debate. For our present purposes it is enough to say that the partial overlap of our emotional vocabulary with the terminology we apply to persons as characters attests the fact that emotion and character are intimately tied concepts. In this sense we can speak of cowardly people, envious people, and perhaps people who love.

2.3 *Summary*

In this chapter a preliminary characterisation of emotion was offered. Since I have tried to grasp the richness and complexity of the phenomena to which emotions are significantly connected to, any definitive formulation was deliberately avoided as much as it was possible. Although, a number of issues raised in this chapter will not be explicitly followed later in the present study, their mention may serve as signposts for our further, more psychological investigations. Particularly, we will not follow the art versus science issue which is clearly beyond the competence of psychology. For similar reasons, the possible connections between aesthetics and emotions will not be detailed within this context, either. Furthermore, I shall not deal with such habitual emotionally loaded ex-

perience and behaviour patterns as the unhappy realisation of them which could be what is called neurosis. Similarly, the issue of character and virtues will not be pursued further within this context. To sum it up, in this chapter the richness of emotion-related phenomena and conceptualisations were indicated with the intention of framing my further studies within the field. Perhaps in attending to these wider than usual concerns respecting emotionality, our investigations will be relevant to others, and will not be encapsulated into any hermetic box or department of psychology.

Chapter 3 «
Towards a Social Constructivist Account of Emotions

> Emotions are not something which just happen to the individual; rather, they are acts which a person performs. (Averill, 1996, p. 224)

This inquiry has been more exploratory than argumentative up to this point. The previous two chapters therefore could be taken as two parallel introductory essays converging into a developmental social constructivist account of emotions. Thus, the Chapter 1 introduced, characterised, and pondered certain implications of social constructivism in psychology generally, and its discourse and narrative oriented versions, in particular. In the Chapter 2, a broad framework was presented for conceptualising and studying emotions, also for exploratory purposes. The main reason for this somewhat unusual double introduction is that a social constructivist framework for understanding emotions lies at the intersection of social constructivist approaches to psychology and the study of emotions.

This chapter will present arguments for, and details of, a social constructivist theory of emotion. The chapter starts with a set of general remarks on the conceptualisation of emotions, which details issues of irrationality versus responsibility of emotions. First, three traditional scientific and lay conceptualisations of emotions will be described and criticised; biological reductionism, subjectivism, and their peculiar admixtures. Next, a critical feature for human emotionality, its connection to responsibility will be detailed and exemplified with discourse analysis. Then, a social constructivist theory of emotion will be described and supplemented with an account of linguistic manifestations of emotions. Thus, I will develop a framework for including the linguistic manifestations of emotions into a social constructivist framework. Finally, some unresolved issues of the theory will be mentioned, specifically the issue of the development of emotions. It will be formulated as the natural-conventional transition problem, and this will head the next chapter where a social constructivist account of emotional development will be considered.

3.1 *Emotions as Versions of Irrationality*

Emotions have suffered a hard fate within the conceptual system of psychology until recently. According to the classical, generally accepted, and cultivated views, emotions are in opposition to cognition: emotions are the irrational aspects of our nature.

These views generally take either the form of biological reductionism or the form of subjectivism and sometimes appear as a smart combination of them:

(i) Biological reductionism: Emotions are basically phylogenetically or evolutionary evolved moving forces executed by physiological mediation and accompanied by special display patterns (for example, Ekman, 1977; Zajonc and Markus, 1984).

Although a number of important issues can be raised and debated within this type of view of emotions, all the various approaches of this type share a simple assumption: emotions are causally produced by molar (i.e. ethological) and/or molecular (i.e. physiological-biochemical) biological mechanisms. The various biologistic approaches to emotion therefore all share a common implication according to which no constitutive role can be attributed to agenthood and/or to social factors in the explanation of emotions. Thus, Ekman's display rules are excellent examples of regulative rules; for Ekman, just as for Chomsky or Freud, social interaction is given a secondary, constraining, or repressing role in the forming of emotions, language, or personality, respectively. This has profound consequences with respect to the possible connections between language and emotion as well, insofar as one maintains that language is considered as a social institution and its usage requires agents. One can not travel far with this kind of reductionist view in case s/he considers language as creating realities, not merely mirroring them, or takes language as something which is not merely a representational device but a tool to act with. Furthermore, in the view of biological reductionism the intricate relations between emotion and culture, emotion and morality, cannot usually even be posed, or at best, are relegated to secondary, non-formative, merely oppressive roles or repressive functions.

The central figure of the commonsensical view or "social representation" of this type of scientific view of emotions could be captured in the following: *When they move us, the dirty animal moves*. Its moral is straightforward: *Let's repress it*.

(ii) Subjectivism: Emotions are essentially private feelings which are solely subjectively accessible experiences.

It is a peculiar view of emotions, since to my knowledge nowadays there is no explicit sponsor of this position in the scientific psychological (i.e. not pop-psychological) literature on emotions. There are good reasons for this: an evident implication of the subjectivist view of emotions is that it allows no room for criticism, which makes emotions practically impossible objects of study or of acquiring any kind of controllable knowledge with respect to them. Indeed, it can even be argued that mentioning subjectivism within this context is nothing other than posing a paper-tiger for the sake of an easy victory. Contrary to this, I am convinced that implicitly subjectivist arguments about mental experiences in general and emotions, in particular are very common in psychology. It seems that a number of cognitive approaches to emotions implicitly, sometimes even explicitly, entertain this position. For example, Ortony, Clore and Collins position in their volume entitled *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* is rather equivocal in this respect: "emotions are subjective experiences, like sensation of colour or pain, people have direct access to them" (1988, p. 9).

The central figure of the commonsensical view of emotions as subjective experiences can be summarised in the following: *When they move us, the untouchable sacred moves*. Its moral is clear: *Let's cultivate it*.

(iii) Biological reductionism and subjectivism combined: Emotions are felt bodily changes.

There is a set of conceptualising emotions which are a combination of subjectivism and biological reductionism. Clearly the prototype of these ideas is what came to be known as the James-Lange theory of emotions. Here the emotion is the subjectively felt biological, more properly physiological, state of the body. In James' words: "*the bodily changes follow directly the* Perception *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* Is *the emotion*." (1884/1948, p. 291)

As Averill (1992) notes, this view of emotions proved to be remarkably attractive during the following next hundred years. Despite Cannon's thorough physiologically grounded criticism in the 30-ies regarding correspondence between emotions and bodily changes (cf. Grastyán, 1974), the idea of emotions as felt bodily perturbances, survived. Thus, a number of weaker versions of the same tune have been suggested since then. According to one loose version of the original thesis, emotion is considered as cognitively labelled felt arousal, where the originally sup-

posed emotion specific organismic states or patterns turn out to be some more general process, called "emotional arousal" (Schachter and Singer, 1962). Note, that while the original Jamesian version implied a token to token correspondence between a particular bodily state and a particular psychological experience of an emotion, under the labelling theory of emotion, the original correspondence is somewhat loosened, and only type-token matching is supposed.

A further version of the same Jamesian tune is the facial feed-back theory of emotions (Tomkins, 1980)[1] . This is a rather peripheral version of the original feed-back idea. It tends to save the original Jamesian theory's token to token identity conception.

The combined approaches generated a huge amount of empirical research. However, there are surprisingly few reliable results, which seems to confirm the basic proposals of a Jamesian theory. In a typical and frequently cited research of the Jamesian type of theory on emotions, Ekman and his colleagues set out to prove the thesis that particular emotions correspond to particular physiological activity patterns (Ekman, Levenson and Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, Heider and Friesen, 1992). The researchers trained and instructed actors to activate certain groups of facial muscles and on this background asked them to pose a set of facial display. At the same time they measured a set of physiological markers, such as heart rate and finger temperature. As a result they found correlation between facial behaviour and patterns of physiological changes. In this way they proved, that one organismic pattern, i.e. the activity of a set of facial muscles, are accompanied by another, i.e. a set of physiological measures. However, since one group of variables they used posed facial emotional displays, the results are not especially informative regarding emotions *per se*, regarding non-posed emotions. Furthermore, although the results of these and similar studies are usually interpreted as evidence for considering emotional experiences as stemming from bodily states, these studies neither proved that bodily states cause emotional experiences, nor that the latter are felt aspects of the former.

It is symptomatic, that unlike a plain biological reductionism or subjectivism, these later mixed views on emotions do not have any clear-cut correspondence in common sense. It seems, that they are scientific in so far as they are so far from everyday conceptualisations of emotions that they could not gain a fertile soil in common sense. Interestingly, these views have a propensity for depicting emotional feelings at best as rationalisations, but not rationality. Furthermore, the fact that they promise a real insight into human nature by unveiling its deepest secrets, might be a reason for the charm of these stances toward emotions.[2]

As Averill notes: "most people believe we run because we are afraid. To turn this sequence around seems like a real discovery. Psychologists like nothing better than seemingly counterintuitive discoveries. It demonstrates to sceptics that psychology is a science after all!" (Averill, 1992, p. 224)

Both of the above described "pure" views on emotions just like the various mixtures or cocktails of them suffered serious and, in my opinion, lethal attacks. Biological reductionism was profoundly questioned on the basis of studies demonstrating historical (Stearns and Stearns, 1988; Harré and Finlay-Jones, 1986) and cultural (Rosaldo, 1980) variability of emotional life and emotional vocabularies (Wierzbicka, 1992).

At the same time subjectivism was questioned primarily on the grounds that emotional terms cannot be names for private emotional feelings. Since, in order to match a referential device (say the word *anger*) to its referent ("anger" as a private feeling), one must be able to pick out or identify the referred something unambiguously. But the emotional states in so far as we conceive of them as private experiences by definition cannot be identified publicly; and especially so, if we do not yet have a word for them. Consequently, if this formulation were true, then no one would ever be able to acquire words referring to emotional feelings. In other words, every convention or rule learning must rely on some publicly available fact (apart from Wittgenstein, 1968, see especially Bedford, 1956-57/1986).

The critical remarks mounted against the subjectivist and biological reductionist attempts are inherited by the mixed theories. Furthermore, for the approaches which tends to equate the psychological experience of having an emotion with felt bodily changes it is also critical, it seems, that felt bodily changes are neither necessary, nor sufficient for having an emotion. On the one hand, as it was noted earlier, there are felt bodily changes, such as the itching in the nose before a sneeze, which are not emotions, therefore, felt bodily changes are not sufficient conditions of emotions. On the other hand, since there are emotions such as shame and guilt, where it is highly implausible to find some consistent differentiating bodily patterns, bodily changes are not necessary conditions for individuating emotions, either. In short, reducing emotions solely to felt bodily changes does not seem to be a plausible option. The above concerns show that emotions can not be reduced to patterns of bodily changes or to emotional arousal. Of course, this position does not imply that sets of bodily changes or emotional arousal do not play any role in a complex emotional reaction. In sum, as Averill put it:

> James's theory [of emotion] is a dead end for two main reasons: First, it is irrefutable, and a theory that is irrefutable is empirically meaningless; second, by focusing attention on bodily changes during emotion, it has led many investigators to ignore two important facts about human emotions, namely, (a) emotions are intimately related to a person's sense of self, both in terms of eliciting conditions and consequences, and (b) emotions can be understood only in the context of broader interpersonal and social relations. (Averill, 1992, p. 222)

The type of arguments, which highlight certain untenable elements of the traditional biologist, subjectivist and mixed conceptualisations of emotions, could serve as the basis for refuting them, or in other words for challenging certain approaches to emotion. At the same time apart from Averill's remarks most of these arguments do not offer many positive cues or explicit characteristics of emotional life, around which we could try to arrange the various intuitions we entertain and the facts we appear to have with regard to them.

3.2 *Emotions and Responsibility*

Neither a purely biological approach nor the view which attributes priority (and epistemological specificity) to private emotional states or feelings, nor the mixed approaches seem to be congruent with an essential feature of adult emotional life. Namely, emotional conduct, such as particular actions, displays, avowals related to emotions, and the accounts given about emotions equally show that people's emotions are necessarily connected to people's responsibility, to their social accountability. The next two sections are devoted to demonstrating this proposition.

If the claim is true that any emotional display, action, account or emotion avowal of a person is somehow connected to responsibility, it contradicts both an exclusively biological and a subjectivist explanation. Furthermore, insofar as the blending of subjectivism with biological reductionism, i.e. the mixed approaches to emotions inherit the conceptual and empirical problems of subjectivism and biological reductionism, they are not able to cover intimate connections between emotions and responsibility, either. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise that these arguments do not mean that biological, or to be more proper, ethological factors do not play any role in our emotional life, or that we do not have emotional feelings. By questioning one extreme view it is very easy to slip into another extreme. On the contrary, in the next chapter I will argue that within a developmental perspective, we must start at the level

of a biological-ethological analysis of emotions, but we should be aware that it is only the beginning of our journey. Furthermore, a comprehensive account of emotions should explicate the role and the development of emotional feelings as conscious experiences of emotions, as well. And last, but not least, a social constructivist interpretation of emotions should allow a proper place to their immediate causal analysis, to the physiology of emotions. Thus, a social constructivist stance has no conflict with the idea, that just as with any kind of life function, emotions indeed might have their characteristic physiological executive processes.

Within the philosophical literature it was Solomon (1980) who argued most consistently for the conceptualisation of emotions on a similar basis, arguing for connections between responsibility and emotions. In his analysis he followed the paths Sartre (1955/1984) opened in understanding emotion. But we do not need to walk through the labyrinth of his conceptual analysis in order to grasp the immanent dependence of emotions on the concept of responsibility. A well chosen example of conversational analysis seems to be sufficient and more adequate for my present purposes, since it offers not merely conceptual but also empirical plausibility.

4.2.1. A Crucial Feature of Our Emotional Life which Hardly Fits into the Traditional Framework: Demonstration

In order to illustrate the hidden logical, and at the same time socially prescribed, connection between emotion and responsibility I present a data extract originally published by Coulter (1979, pp. 134-135, italics original).[3]

MW1 stands for First mental health worker
MW2 stands for Second mental health worker
MPP stands for Mother of prospective patient
SHE stands for Sheila, a pseudonym for prospective patient

1 :MW1:	What d'ya want to tell me today? You were telling me a bit about yourself last time Sheila; tell me some more about yourself.
2 :SHE:	laughs.
3 :MPP:	Go on then! (pause 2.0 secs.) What's funny?
4 :SHE:	begins crying and looking imploringly at assembled company.
5 :MPP:	*Don't* (1.5 secs.) Shut up! What's there to be unhappy about?

6 :MW2: Perhaps she's feeling ill.
7 :MPP: Nah ... she often cries ... just like when there is no reason to.
8 :SHE: begins to laugh, then breaks into sobbing.
9 :MW1: Why are you crying, Sheila? Don't ya feel well today?
10 :SHE: sobs even louder. (duration of 5 secs.)
11 :MW2: Tell us what's troubling you.
12 :SHE: begins to laugh loudly and looks delighted.
13 :MW2: Are ya laughing at me?
14 :SHE: No.
15 :MW1: Are ya laughing at *me*? (Sheila begins laughing louder) What is it? (Sheila laughs more) Ya keep laughing at us, what is it?
16 :SHE: Dunno.
17 :MW1: Ya do ... don't wanna say, though, do you.
18 :SHE: No.
19 :MW2: Why not?
20 :MPP: Why not? (1.5 secs) Minute ago you were crying.
21 :MW1: Is it those awful voices again?
22 :SHE: Mmmm.
23 :MW1: What are they saying now?
24 :SHE: (still laughing): They co;:hm ta tanta::hlize me (breaks into sobs).
25 :MW1: What do they say that's upsetting ya now?
26 :SHE: They scream at me ... sometimes they tease me (laughs).

3.2.2 Explication of the Example

No doubt, the case is deviant in the sense that Sheila's alternating positive and negative emotional displays are not transparent to her interlocutors. That is why Sheila's interlocutors' sustained searching procedure is directed at identifying the objects of her displays. Nevertheless, their "method" (or "ethnomethod") seems to be natural and normal: they offer just an "outloud" version of something which is usually done silently.

Most of the time we are routinely able to identify the reasons for others' emotions from the course of interaction and the available context. If not, we ask for it, and our partner either gives us a legitimate reason or refuses to give it more or less openly or perhaps we are talking to some special person like Sheila the realisation of which requires a third type of category, called lunatic. The pattern of conventional reasoning by

which Sheila's interlocutors try to establish a socially legitimate object of her emotional state seems to be natural, and does not seem to be relying on any subjective or psychophysiological states. Sheila's partners simply try to find out what can be a possible object for Sheila (a joke or a treat, a threat or a danger etc. - i.e. an intentional object in its Brentanoian sense) which affords such extremely positive or negative evaluation as her laughing or crying attest. On the base of these considerations I would tend to say: The procedure which usually followed in our heads here comes to the public domain. Let's have a closer look at some fragments:

Line 3: Mother asks : What 's funny? - Searching for an object for display – by doing this presupposing it is not available;
Line 4: Sheila begins crying;
Line 5: Mother asks: What is there to be unhappy about? - Again object searching - mother conceived of Sheila's behaviour as emotional;
Line 6: MW2 shifts to physical condition interpretation of crying: expresses ambiguity between physical versus emotional interpretation of display;
Line 7: Mother connects actual display to other "no reason to behave this way" cases - not emotional but emotional-like behaviour interpretation is offered, but not accepted by others; see lines 9 and 11;
Line 9: MW1 again tries a physical interpretation;
Line 11: MW2 again opens up the physical vs. emotional issue with the general term - trouble;

In this way, it can be demonstrated empirically that emotions are open to criticism, and that at least potentially, we as adults must be able to give a reasonable account of them. If not, our interlocutors are entitled to conclude either that we are not able to (due to specific causes, suggested in lines 6 and 9), or do not want to (due to specific reasons, as explicitly claimed in line 17) co-operate with them. This is the sense in which people are responsible for their emotions.

To generalise "Types of situation are paradigmatically linked to the emotions they afford *by convention*. The link is neither deterministic nor biological, but sociocultural. It is, in a broad sense, moral; a person may be found morally deficient not to be, e.g., upset by the death of his father, moved by an act of extreme courage, angry at a miscarriage of justice – given, that is, that he concurs in the relevant description of the situation." (Coulter, 1979, p. 127.)

3.2.3 Qualification of Connection between Emotion and Responsibility

This is the point where a "radical" constructivist would unashamedly turn to articulate his or her own formulation of emotions which would take into consideration its connection to responsibility. And indeed, it is the track the author of this study followed in a previous study (Bodor, 1997). Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the above described scientific and lay conceptualisations of emotions should alert one that there is something in them beyond what was considered this far. At the moment it suffices to say that there might be a kernel of truth or a common wisdom in all of the above critically evaluated approaches to emotions. This point might be the following: the biological, the subjective-feeling based and the felt bodily changes accounts of emotions all echoes an important intuition regarding emotions, insofar as all depict the individual as if s/he were passive regarding his own emotions. This apparent passivity together with the above demonstrated responsibility should be reconciled somehow. This issue will be further analysed below. But first, in order to avoid certain misinterpretations, the character of the connection between emotions and responsibility should be further qualified, at least in three respects.

First, it seems worth underlining that this responsibility can be, but need not be felt, i.e., consciously entertained, or experienced actually. The case is similar to the mother or father who is responsible for his or her child, but in order to be that, s/he does not have to entertain the conscious experience or feeling of responsibility in each and every second. In this sense, to be a responsible parent amounts to acting with implied consequences of caring and at the same time of avoiding doing such things which implicate the contrary.

Second, the kind of responsibility documented above is not to be confused with the question of "emotion control", a popular topic of developmental research in the field of emotions (for an excellent overview see Josephs, 1993) at least partially motivated by the "let's repress it" motive. Rather, it is a necessary constituent of emotions as such, while the question of control already presupposes the existence of some emotion, consequently the responsibility the control involves operates on a different level. The analogy of constitutive rules versus regulative rules can be evoked to clarify my point. Constitutive rules define some activity. Thus, playing chess presupposes the rules of chess. Without the relevant rules there is no chess playing. Though there might be playing with chess pieces, moving pieces irrespective of the rules of chess, this latter activity can not be called playing chess. In opposition to constitu-

tive rules, regulative rules do not create specific activities. Regulative rules impose restrictions on activities which exist independently of them, of the regulative rules. Thus, one might drive a car without obeying traffic rules, though it would be a risky enterprise (cf. Searle, 1969). In this way, the very existence of emotions may involve constitutive rules, while their regulating through display rules may involve regulative rules.

Third, note that the adult's emotional life has been referred to in the above as connected to responsibility, and not the new-born infant's. At least in Western culture we do not impose on or impute to infants any kind of responsibility at least at the very beginning of their lives. This feature of our culture may turn out to be so general that it might very well be a candidate for being a Cultural Universal. But regardless of its generality, the transition from infant to adult implies a qualitative change, be it explicated either as a developmental process or as a socialization process. Below I will address these issues explicitly, but we will leave this complication to one side for a moment, and concentrate exclusively on adults and their emotions. Remember though, that whatever else emotional development include, it will necessarily includes responsible emotional conduct as a target of development.

3.3 *Basic Concepts of the Social Constructivist Theory of Emotion and the Language of Emotions*

In the following section I will introduce a social constructivist approach to emotions as a stance which is able to account both for the emotions connectedness to responsibility and their apparent passivity. Thus, first I will briefly characterise the Social Constructivist approach to emotions. Then I will offer an account on the human agent's active and at the same time passive relationship towards her/his emotions. Finally I will present an attempt to localise the language of emotions within the constructivist framework.

3.3.1 Basic Concepts of a Social Constructivist Account of Emotion

In the social constructivist view, the emotions are the evaluative, relational aspects of our perception and interpretation of situations and of our conduct directed by them. As cognitive schema, they contain an internal representation of social rules, in other words they consist of the internalised aspect of the "local moral order" (Harré, 1993; Harré and Gillett, 1994). Functionally speaking, from the perspective of the persons,

they serve the evaluation of situations and the organisation of responses to them. From the perspective of the sociocultural environment they contribute to the maintenance and ratification of the local value system and moral order by members.

In their behavioural manifestations, emotions are "socially constituted syndromes" (Averill, 1986, p. 100). The term syndrome in this context serves to highlight the fact that emotional conduct usually involves a set of responses which form a more or less unified pattern. Emotional syndromes may contain the following elements: physiological events, expressive reactions or emotional displays, subjective experiences, and instrumental actions.

The evaluation of situations and the responses to them, i.e. realisation of particular emotional syndromes are governed by constitutive and regulative rules. Note, that these rules are not determining behaviour, rather they define and prescribe a set of culturally appropriate responses. These rules are learned through interactions rather than invented by some kind of solitary contemplation on physiological processes and/or private mental experiences. However, advocates of the social constructivist stance have not studied children's emotional development in the home environment.

3.3.2 Are Emotions Passions or Actions? – a Social Constructivist Answer

The analysis has thus far shown that emotions are somehow connected to responsibility. Furthermore, emotions frequently "seize upon", "overwhelm", or "overcome" us. Somebody gets mad, somebody else falls in love. In other terms, an individual actor is in some sense passive regarding his own emotions. It seems, that the above critically characterised subjectivist, biological reductionist and mixed visions of the conceptualisation of emotions are partly nurtured by this motive of passivity. Insofar as responsibility and passivity are equally central features of human emotionality, both of these features should be accounted for in a theory of emotion. The theoretical proposal below will be a social constructivist one, but any other theory should face these issues. It seems to me, that accounting for these apparently antagonistic characteristics of human emotionality is one of the most difficult tasks and one of the least reflected upon issues in the field of emotion research. Thus, the following analysis can be taken as a first approximation.

As was introduced in Chapter 1, various social constructionist authors attempt to elucidate emotion with concepts such as transitory social roles, discursive acts or dramatistic actions. Thus, within a discursivist framework the different constituents of emotional syndromes such as emotional feeling and emotional display "is to be understood as a discursive phenomenon, an expression of a judgement and the performance of a social act" (Harré, 1993, p. 14) Correspondingly, according to Sarbin, emotions are dramatistic role enactments (1986a).

Clearly, taking emotionality as a type of action as Harré suggested, or role playing as Sarbin maintains allows a proper place for responsibility. Whatever else the concept of responsibility involves, it is almost commonsensical that as a logical necessity, it must involve some self-initiated conduct, as well as an element of self-determination. In this way, social constructivist accounts are congruent with the idea that emotions are connected to responsibility.

However, the kind of responsibility an adult human being holds in respect to her/his emotion should be co-ordinated with another central characteristic, namely with the apparent passivity of individuals regarding their emotions. Consequently, a social constructivist account also has to acknowledge and interpret this feature of emotion. Considering that emotions are in some way responsible actions involving an element of self-determination; and that emotions or passions are changes one passively undergoes, changes which are beyond one's self-control and involving a lack of self-determination, a neat paradox emerges.

The issue was most directly confronted by Averill. As he wrote:

> In contrast to the view that emotions are biologically primitive, the present [constructionist] position is that most standard emotional reactions are social constructions. On this assumption, the experience of passivity may be treated as a kind of illusion. Emotions are not something which just happen to the individual; rather, they are acts which a person performs. In the case of emotion, however, the individual is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his actions; the initiation of the response is therefore dissociated from consciousness. (Averill, 1996, p. 224)

To resolve the paradox, Averill opted for the action-like conception of emotions and evokes the possibility that a person is "*unwilling* or *unable* to accept responsibility for his actions" (emphasis added) in order to account for its apparent passivity. In this respect it is also worth considering Averill's interesting definition of emotion: "An emotion is a transitory social role (a socially constituted syndrome) that includes an

individual's appraisal of the situation and that is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action." (Averill, 1980, p. 312) Here Averill tries to solve the paradox by evoking a process of interpretation in establishing something as emotional - both in the case of somebody else's conduct and in case of our own.

Somewhat later he describes a situation where two alternative interpretations could be given to the same conduct: it can be constructed either as an action or as a passive reaction. His example reads like this:

> If I reprimand a friend for behaviour I disapprove of, and if the reprimand turns out to be hurtful, I may attribute my remark to anger, thus abnegating responsibility; on the other hand, if the reprimand turns out to be helpful, I may interpret the response as an action, thus assuming credit for being so honest and forthright. (1980, p. 318)

The example depicts a case, when the actor interpreting one and the same conduct as emotional (or as non-emotional), because he is unwilling (or willing) to take full responsibility for the relevant action. The protagonist of the scene has argumentative, and in this sense perhaps self-centred, reasons for taking or not taking one and the same conduct as an active reply or a passive response to the given circumstances. An important factor here is the interest of the agent. However, there might be cases, when an actor is not so much unwilling but rather unable to take full responsibility regarding emotions. In order to tackle this latter possibility, i.e. the case when the actor is unable to take responsibility regarding an emotional action the process of interpretation should be further scrutinised.

As we have seen above, on a more general level, Averill's analysis evokes a process of interpretation which is completely in line with Grastyán's remark: "beyond practical interpretation of emotions a complex intuitive act should lie" (1981, p. 13). Such an intuitive act comprises such elements as appreciating the actual emotional behaviour of a person, the actual situation, and his personality – according to Grastyán.

But what is it which allows us to accomplish the remarkable double interpretation of emotions? In my attempt to account for the possibility of this double interpretation I follow the hypothesis that there might be something in the structure of the "intuitive act" or interpretation a person (who is emotional) and his mates (who are noting his emotionality) are equally engaged in for establishing something as emotional. From this it could follow that, depending on what aspects of the emotional event the interpretation focuses on, we can gain a passive or an active respondent.

In this regard consider that any action has a reason or a motive. Moreover, there are two types of these motives. An *in-order-to motive* of an action directed to the future; a *because-of motive* of an action rather following on from the past (Schütz, 1967). Furthermore, the actor usually sees only his in-order-to motive, the anticipated state of affairs, while his because-of motive, though an equally crucial element of the basis of his action, remains in the background.

As Schütz explains, during the course of a conversation, the speaker's in-order-to motive become the listener's because of motive and *vica versa*. This is called reciprocity of motives by phenomenologists. And certainly those exchanges of motives can be true for other types of coordinated actions, as well. For example, in-order-to be loved, the poet asks for a kiss from his lover, and "because(-of)" she is asked, she gives him a kiss. OK, they are happy.

But let's consider a less joyful example: a beggar whose body is seriously disfigured stands in the way. And he is given some coins. Here some moral command such as "help the poor unlucky fellows" seems to be operative. Under these circumstances, it might even be said that one did not really want to give money to the beggar, but eventually *just* did it. Perhaps unable to say why, but he still conducted an action. In this way, within the donation scene the in-order-to of the action is much less salient and harder to focus on than in usual actions; at the same time, the because-of motive of the action, although clearly operative, remains in the background, as usual.

Thus, there may be occasions and perhaps even types of actions in which the because-of motive is dominant over the in-order-to motive. These are the cases when some personal, institutional or moral "command" operates clearly as the because-of motive of an ensuing action. Leaving aside the cases of personal and institutional possibilities, it may be that when something is morally eagerly anticipated in a situation, it can effect conduct in a command-like manner. My point is, that there may be situations that imply such strong imperatives to act in a certain way, that the actor must do his duties, otherwise s/he seriously risks his/her standing as a morally responsible individual. Situations evoking overt emotionality are just this type of situation.

Supposing, furthermore, that the individuals' personal identities are crucially linked to the local moral order, one may get closer to accounting for the fact, that emotional conduct is so deeply informative about the personal identities of the actors.

Of course, claiming that emotions are actions in which characteristic and strong moral prescriptions operate as because-of motives does not rule out the possibility that the dominance of in-order-to motives could

lie behind emotional actions, too. Thus, if somebody is crying, in-order-to get a candy bar, a better grade, or a full time appointment it is still an emotional conduct – though it is very much an argumentative (or dramaturgic role playing à la Goffman), and perhaps not an authentic (or dramatic role playing à la Sarbin, see in Chapter 1.) emotional conduct.

As was described in Chapter 1., Harré reconstructs the cognitive structure of emotions as a peculiar type of judgement. As he writes, emotions

> are to be understood semantically, as "spontaneous" or "premiseless" judgements, that is judgements which are trained or naturally disposed to express, rather than those we arrive at after a process of ratiocination. … we might want to call this enthymemic judgements, collapsed arguments for which a logical structure and missing premises could be reconstructed. (1993, p. 8).

In another context he explains his position like this: "emotional feelings and displays: though judgements, they lack premises – emotional feelings and displays characteristically "come over" us. Unlike the conclusion of syllogisms, they rest on biological responses and cultural training, not on other judgements. But like such conclusions, they have an irresistible quality about them." (1994, p. 14) In other terms, it seems, he argues that one of the premises of the evaluative judgements so central to emotionality is "submerged". These premises, whether they be ethological or moral in their origin, are not open to question, to rational evaluation; entertaining them is not a question of choice. In other terms, both have a feature, that the instructions they contain can not be changed by the individual, they are out of or above individual control, and the experience of passivity therefore can be based upon them.

A parallel way for accounting for the seemingly passive characteristic of emotions can be based on Sarbin's theory. As was described above, he considers emotions as dramatistic actions. At the same time, while actions usually involve the actors as their authors, in a dramatistic action, "the identity of playwright is not easily reconstructed." (Sarbin, 1986a, p. 90) Instead of identifiable authors, the narratives of the particular cultures contains the information that what kind of actions are to be engaged in under certain circumstances. In this way, performing an action the actor is not quite the author of is central to understanding the experienced passivity of emotions.

Thus, it seems to me, that a closer look at the structure of evaluative judgement the emotions realise in Harré's account, just like lack of au-

thorship on behalf of the actor in playing dramatistic roles in Sarbin's theory, both might be helpful in resolving the activity-passivity paradox regarding emotions.

Against this background, I would like to introduce the concept of "limited responsibility" regarding emotions. To put it concisely, responsibility regarding emotions is limited because the acts stemming from an emotional evaluation are based not only, or not so much, on the actor's deliberation (in-order-to motive) but also on something the individual must obey (because-of motive). Hence the seemingly passive relation between the actor and his emotions.

The source of the "must" can be either instinctual or moral commands or instructions. Possibly, it is the latter which lies behind most human emotionality. They are culturally defined prescriptions, an important vehicle for them could be the stories of the particular culture which serve as a model of how to evaluate certain circumstances, and how to act under their auspices. These "instincts" or prescriptions are beyond the individual control, and in this way they are accessible for rational evaluation just partially, and usually only *post hoc*, when the respective conduct is already over, or suspended. In short, under this description, emotions are actions based on evaluation of situation and produced mainly on the basis of because-of motives, rather than on the basis of in-order-to instigation.

3.3.3 Linguistically Realised Displays of Emotions and Talk about Emotions

Social constructivist authors repeatedly referred to the concept of speech-acts as a possible way of explicating emotion and emotional language (for example, Harré, 1993; Coulter, 1979; Gergen, 1994). But they did not elaborate in detail the issue of taking linguistic manifestations of emotions as speech acts. Parallel to this, there is a distinct type of speech act called "expressives" in Searle's typology of speech acts (1979). However, he did not attest much interest in studying emotions in their own right. In this section, therefore, I will attempt to localise the types of linguistic manifestations of emotionality which pertain to the utterance level with the help of speech act theory.

Within the social constructivist framework of emotion, I suggest the linguistic expressions of emotions (in other words: the logically critical first person usage of lexicalised emotion markers) be conceived as linguistically coded expressive reactions or emotional displays. Thus, apart from the deceptive cases, which are parasitic on non-deviant cases, saying "I love you", "I hate you", "I am proud of you", "I am ashamed of

you", etc., really counts as loving, hating, being proud and being ashamed of you, etc. These and similar manifestations of emotionality are not publicised descriptions of private states. Being linguistically realised emotional displays they might contribute to emotional syndromes: they are *performatives* (cf. Austin, 1962/1973), and perhaps can be coined as *emotives*. In other terms, they are acts performed by language usage, by uttering an utterance with the effect of doing something, being emotional. At the same time the linguistic expressions *about* emotions refer to whole syndromes or to some aspect of an emotional event, including ascribed emotion to some other participant: i.e. they correspond to *constatives*. They are statements on the state of the arts.[4] However, beyond constative *versus* performative utterances, there is a further, and often neglected, distinction in Austin's *How to do things with words* (1962/1973) which can be utilised here. In the realm of performative utterances, he made a distinction between *primary* performatives and *explicit* performatives. His differentiation is based on the fact that in some performative utterances there is a lexical item, usually a performative verb, conveying the action value. An example for this might be the "promise" in the following utterance: "I promise I will be there". Such utterances are explicit performatives in Austin's terminology. While the vast majority of the performatives are primary performatives and do not contain such specialised explicit devices. Thus, the utterance of "I will be there" taken as a promise is an example of primary performative. On the basis of this distinction we would categorise a special subclass of linguistically realised emotional displays as emotion avowals, since they correspond to explicit performatives, they are explicit emotives. Most of the time they contain a specialised illocutionary device, usually a verb, which conveys the action value or force of the respective speech act. "I fear they are coming for us" – could serve as an example, where "fear" is the specialised illocutory device. A special feature of explicit performatives is that they are the only illocutory devices which clearly *specify* the type of act they figure in.

At the same time, we should speak about primary performatives with respect to emotions as well, if we admit the fact that the speaker conveys his relation to the topic in each and every utterance. For example: "They are coming for us" - uttered with a fearful voice, in appropriate context. In this example, instead of a verb, the intonation conveys the emotionality. These and similar conventional linguistic devices lend emotional colouring or mood to the utterances, but instead of specifying an exact type of emotion, rather they just presuppose them.[5]

The distinction between explicit versus primary performatives regarding emotions part overlaps with, though is perhaps more general, than the one proposed by Ochs: "An important difference between the use of

lexical terms of emotion and intonation is that typically the lexical terms assert or predicate a quality of self or others whereas intonation presupposes or implies that quality." (1986, p. 255)

An implication of the above formulation, especially of the possibility that analogue to primary performatives regarding emotions there are primary emotives is that we should abandon the conceptualisation of emotions as either existing or not existing.[6] Instead, as was already explained above, we should think of them as sometimes coming to the surface, being foregrounded or topicalized, and sometimes not. To sum up, the present claim is parallel to Krueger's formulation on the universality of emotions cited in Chapter 3., with the difference that what he stated with respect to the introspectively accessible psychical experience is here supposed with regard to the utterances which can be taken as one of the main media of discursively realised mind.

3.4 *Summary*

In this chapter a set of conceptualisations of emotions, such as biological reductionism, subjectivism and their admixtures were critically analysed and confronted with an empirical demonstration of the connection of emotion to responsibility. These considerations lead to the introduction and general characterisation of a social constructivist account of emotions. Then, an account was offered for linguistic realisations of emotions against the background of speech act theory.

The social constructivist approach offers a fairly plausible account of the adult's emotional life. It is able to face the issue of the apparent passivity of emotions and still saves its connection to responsibility and morality. Furthermore, as I have just tried to show, it provides a natural space for a framework to localise its linguistic manifestations as well. Nevertheless, it is not able to offer a detailed explanation of the genesis of emotions. The issue of development is frequently neglected in the constructivist works, or sometimes surfaces in the form of a general thesis: emotions are learnable. In this way one could get the impression, that the social constructivists are similar to ready made artists, i.e. to such artists who produce their objects from already made objects. But taking into account development would make that stance more plausible. First of all, it would be able to cover children's emotionality. Then, taking development seriously could help to overcome the frequently infertile nature-nurture opposition. It might also offer some further contributions to an account of subjectivity, and the related issue of passivity. In sum, there are a number of good reasons for developing a frame for accounting for the development of emotions up to their speech act like manifestation.

What is the process by which the possibly biologically based emotion-signalling system gradually grows to be a part of a rule-following conduct, which imply morality and controlled by agency? Furthermore, what is the way emotional language use functions and emerges within ontogenetic development? These are the problems within the social constructivist approach which I wish to concentrate on in the next section.

Chapter 4 «
A Constructionist Account of Emotional Development and of the Acquisition of Emotional Language

> Feelings and passional conduct are invented like words. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1995, p. 189)

A recent overview of the field, written by the historian Peter Stearns, a leading scholar on constructivist emotion research, concludes with the following remarks:

> The great strides in emotions research in recent years - sometimes supplementing, sometimes replacing older beliefs on the subject - leave a host of topics open to further inquiry. ... The most obvious challenge lies, ..., in blending disciplinary approaches and moving beyond the increasingly sterile either/or debates between constructionists and naturalists. The process of transmitting culture specific emotional rules to children lies at the heart of the mixing of innate and learned characteristics of emotion. (P. Stearns, 1995, p. 54)

In the remainder of the present study I would like to face the challenges Stearns envisaged both conceptually and empirically. Thus, in this chapter I will attempt to work out a developmental social constructivist framework for understanding and analysing emotions, especially emotional language, while in the next I will present a set of related empirical analyses.

Before entering into a detailed exposition of a particular field of development, it seems worth addressing briefly the question of how to conceptualise and analyse development in general. What is development, and how should it be studied? In order to approach this perennial question two related issues regarding learning and development will be discussed in this section. In other terms, at least two features of the concept of development seem to be relevant to our purposes. These are the issues of what to learn, and how to learn. According to the first,

there is something to acquire, there is a *telos* of the development. The second inherent feature of an account of development is related to some putative "mechanisms" or *processes* to which the developmental changes can be plausibly attributed to. What is the mechanism and what is the telos of development? Both of these issues will be explicated along the lines of a Vygotskian and a Wernerian conceptualisation of development, respectively. To sum up, the issue of development can be decomposed to at least two interwoven questions. The first asks: how development proceeds or what are the mechanisms of development. In this regard Vygotsky's inspiration will be followed. The second asks: what is the telos of development and what is its or perhaps what are its paths. In this regard Werner's analysis will be relied on.

In this chapter, I will first introduce the natural-conventional transition problem regarding emotional development. Then, a short description of Vygotsky's ideas on the genesis of higher mental functions will follow and on that bases a model regarding possible "mechanisms" of emotional development will be presented. During this, the telos of emotional development will be specified only generally as gaining realisation of emotions as responsible conduct (or "limited responsible" conduct as it was characterised in the previous chapter), including speech act-like manifestations of emotions. The "mechanism" involved in developmental change or productive processes in emotional development will be characterised as an inherently social process, starting from exchanges of gestures across overt discourse, or in Mead's terminology exchanges of symbolic gestures (1967), to the establishment of internalised discourse. In other terms, the development of emotions will be taken as a process realised through language socialization.

Then, after restricting the wider topic of emotional development to the linguistic realisation of emotionality, the telos of development will be further specified. It will be taken as the acquisition of specific form-function pairings of linguistic units and semantic/pragmatic functions, i.e. the acquisition of linguistic devices with appropriate functions. In this regard, the unit of empirical analysis of the next chapter is anticipated and specified as what to learn. The telos of development will be taken as the adult-like use of speech acts detailed above, in Chapter 3. Thus, the question of what to learn will be considered as linguistic devices which functions within peculiar real word language games. Furthermore, two possibilities of the emergence of these form-function mapping will be raised and circumscribed. According to the first, establishment of form-function pairings is a one-step process. According to the second, which can be coined as a Wernerian vision of devel-

opment, the emergence of new form-function pairings is a more gradual, multy-step process.

4.1 *A Vygotskian Framework for Accounting for the Natural-Conventional Transition Problem regarding Emotional Development*

The social constructivist approach offers a fairly plausible account of the adult's emotional life, and as I have just attempted to show, it also provides a framework for localising its linguistic manifestations. Nevertheless, no detailed explication of the genesis of emotions, including the acquisition of emotional language is available within the constructivist framework.

Social constructivist authors of the more radical variety sometimes downplay the role biological factors may play in the origin and functioning of mental life, including emotions. It might very well be that the usual scientific "monotheism" of either biology or sociocultural determination lies behind their arguments. However, biological factors do not necessarily constrain and determine human behaviour and conduct to such a degree that there is no room left for sociocultural factors to play a constitutive role. Biological capacities, may be similar to the "launch-pad of a rocket", rather than chains binding human animals to the planet, to the earth - to use and complement Dennett's fortunate metaphor from space research (1999).

Returning to the topic of emotions and their development, the following issue seems to be eminently relevant against this background: if one acknowledges both the possibility of biologically given capacities and the social constructivist claim that emotions are morally prescribed actions, then what is the process by which the possibly biologically based emotion-evaluating and -signalling system gradually grows to be a part of a rule-following conduct controlled by an agent? In my view, this is a major issue in emotional development, and I suggest it be termed the *natural-conventional transition problem*. This is the theoretical problem within the social constructivist approach to which I wish to suggest a number of ideas and a framework in the present section.

What is the logic of the natural-conventional transition, in other words, what is the process by which the natural expression of an emotion becomes an action, however limited in responsibility action (see the previous chapter), and realised in syndromes: in subjective feeling states, emotional displays, physiological changes and instrumental actions. And, of particular relevance in this context, insofar as first person emotional language use can be considered a type of emotional display, how

are a set of conventional linguistic devices acquired, which overtly or covertly marks emotions? How do children learn to realise emotions by an utterance, by silence, or by a contribution to a conversation? For example, how does the infant's crying when alone come to be the avowal of the sorrow of a lonely adult? How does an infant's joyful giggling, smiling, and rhythmic movements, etc., come to be the adult's enthusiastic declaration, "I am so happy"? Or, shifting perspective from the first to the third person and considering also the developing observer of emotional scenes: What is the way in which a child gradually acquires the capacity to interpret an event or somebody else's conduct as emotional on the basis of the situation and the emotional syndrome the observed person exhibited?

As the above questions already presupposed, emotional development and linguistic development partly overlap one another within a social constructivist stance. Emotional development, therefore, is taken in this context as consisting of the development of the recognition of emotion affording situations and exhibiting appropriate emotional syndromes, including various linguistic manifestations of emotion. Consequently, the questions of how do children acquire emotions, and how do children acquire language, can not be separated, rather they constitute two intertwined aspects of the same process.

On the basis of the characterisation of the constructivist theory of emotion presented in the previous chapter, the issue can be further qualified in the following manner: How do children acquire the rules for the evaluation of a situation, and the rules to manifest that evaluation in syndromes? Or, taking a more narrow, more language-centred scope, i.e. from the point of view of language acquisition, one might ask: how do children learn the linguistically coded expressions of emotion, that is, the various linguistic devices conventionally used for marking or keying emotionality, either overtly, via emotion specifiers, and/or covertly via devices which presuppose evaluation. Indeed, part of emotional development is what a child learns for appropriately displaying, avowing, ascribing and talking about emotions.

4.1.1 Vygotsky's Legacy

Due to the efforts of such developmentalists like Cole and Scribner (1974), John-Steiner (1985), or Valsiner (1988) Vygotsky's name is already widely known even within the North-American and West-European psychology, which dominates the field of inquiry. He developed a theory of cultural development in historic times, during the late twenties and early thirties of the twentieth century (cf. Kozulin 1990; Wertsch 1991). However, if one surveys the general contemporary stances toward psychological devel-

opment for didactic reasons, cultural or sociocultural psychology would stand as a counterpart of the universalist-constructivist view on development usually personified by Piaget. (cf. Cole and Cole, 1996)

Vygotsky's ideas have also proven very productive up till now within and more recently outside developmental psychology. For our purposes it is especially relevant that his ideas were followed by Bruner in his studies on a set of pragmatic aspects of language acquisition (Bruner, 1983), involving turn-taking rules, reference, and request making. More recently, such distinguished developmentalists and interestingly at the same time psycholinguists as Katherine Nelson with her depiction of mental development as *The emergence of mediated mind* (1996) and Michael Tomasello with his theory of *Cultural learning* (1993) all follow a Vygotskian line of inquiry. In this way, the present efforts of explicating the details of emotional development is but a small part of a wider enterprise whose characteristic feature is exploiting Vygotsky's legacy.

One of Vygotsky's most significant contributions to psychology is the way he interpreted the distinction between lower and higher mental processes and the solution he proposed to the formation of higher mental processes from lower mental processes plus the internalised interactions with others. The lower mental processes stand for reflex-like behaviours while the higher mental processes are responsible for the conscious and controlled types of behaviour in his characterisation. Furthermore, he also developed a genetic account for relating these two distinct, and seemingly antagonistic processes, to each other. Vygotsky's somewhat archaic formulation reads like this:

> We could formulate the general genetic law of cultural development as follows: Any function in the child's cultural development appears twice, or on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as an interpsychological category, and then within a child as an intrapsychological category. (Vygotsky, 1931/1981, p. 163).

Taking a broad Vygotskian perspective of emotional development is especially relevant within this context because it is the only available account on development which tries to co-ordinate the biologically given "automatic" behaviour regulation with culturally evolved "purposeful" behaviour regulation, or responsible conduct. Understanding the details of this shift regarding the regulation of human conduct is central to the natural-conventional transition problem described above regarding emotional development.

4.1.2 A Vygotskian Model of the "Mechanism" of Emotional Development

In this section, I will try to draw a framework for children's emotional development as a part of their sociocultural development. The theoretical framework below is a more sophisticated version of a previous attempt to solve the natural-conventional transition problem regarding emotional development which was worked out and published earlier (Bodor,1997). The application of Vygotsky's thesis to the problem of emotional development should proceed in the following way:

1.) As a point of departure, the *infant's* biological *preparedness* to recognize and produce emotionality should be considered. A set of converging research results indicates the infant's capacity to recognise (or at least differentiate between) various visual and vocal patterns which are conventionally taken as marking emotions (Miller, 1984). At the same time, research on infant imitation (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977) can be interpreted as showing that infants produce aspects of emotional displays at the very beginning of their life. These and related capacities are indeed important precursors of later emotionality.

Furthermore, this capacity of babies does not stand in themselves, but functions interactionally, or in Vygotsky's terms "appears between people as an interpsychological category". Thus, Papoušek and Papoušek postulated as early as the late 70's a biological mirroring mechanism (Papoušek and Papoušek, 1977). Later research identified the nonverbal processes of *affect attunement* (Stern, 1985) and *social referencing* (see Feinman, 1992, for a comprehensive overview), as overt mechanisms for exchanging evaluative information. Furthermore, following U•giris's analysis (1996), it can be argued, that beside and parallel to overt evaluation directed to certain activities, situations or objects, such as affect attunement and social referencing, there is a further layer of conduct which imply *covert evaluation*.[1]

> valuations often apply not to activities as such, but to the manner of carrying them out. Action contours such as intensity, redundancy, definiteness, expressiveness, and so on constitute the manner of carrying out specific activities. Being tied to action, understandings with respect to manner are likely to be negotiated early in life through the nonverbal communication system. (U•giris, 1996, p. 32)

The two overt processes of evaluation, are related in my interpretation, insofar as both of them can be taken as phenomena in which an agent's emotional stance and emotional evaluation is being modulated and exchanged by another through nonverbal means. Thus, while in an episode of affect attunement the infant's own emotional state is taken up and modulated by the caregiver, in the prototypical situation of social referencing the infant's relation toward some outside entity, such as a new toy, is modulated by the caregiver. A recent proposal connected parental affect-mirroring to biofeedback processes, and speculated on the pathological implications of deviant mirroring styles (Gergely and Watson, 1996).

Indeed, regardless of the merits of nativist (Campos, 1983) or empiricist (Gewirtz and Peláez-Nogueras, 1992) interpretations of social referencing, it can be argued that "social referencing, like imitation, involves the communication of information between persons, the roots of the phenomena may be traced to early interactions between infants and their adult partners." (U•giris and Kruper, 1992, p. 136).

The phenomenon termed social referencing (Klinnert et al., 1983) can be conceived of as one of the major initial machinery for identification of relational information and behaviour regulation. Thus, social referencing can be considered as the main process during the *first phase* of children's emotional development. Social referencing seems to be an important procedure in the cultural development of emotions as evaluative responses to certain types of situations. When some new object or person appears to babies, they actively seek information in the faces of their mothers and their relation towards the new object depends on the quality of the facial display their mothers produce. In other terms, the caregiver evaluates the situation and displays his/her relation toward it, while his/her display is the basis of the child's coming actions. Practically, this means that a negative facial expression or vocal reaction given by the mother causes the child to withdraw. The same goes for positive signals. Both voice quality and facial display can play this role up to the age of 9 months. At the outset the elements of this non-verbal procedure can probably be attributed to ethological determinants. Up to this point the child's emotion is predominantly framed and determined by her/his carer.

2.) In the *second* proposed developmental *phase* the frame or scaffolding is still maintained by the caregivers, but the child begins to play a more active role in emotional episodes. During these processes social referencing is gradually succeeded by mostly verbal comments and instructions with regard to emotional behaviour. It has nicely been demon-

strated that caregivers, mostly unconsciously, provide the child with emotion lessons or tutorizations as documented by Miller and Sperry (1987). Furthermore, as Dunn (1988) remarks, a high percentage of children pretend play is about so-called internal-state words.

These plays with parents and peers can be reconstructed as explicit practice for matching appropriate contextual or situational arrangements, displays, and behaviours or conduct including the use of internal-state words, a group of which are emotional. During this process, the salient features of the emotional situation and conduct are first non-verbally, then verbally identified and evaluated. Thus, the instructions of the tutorization and the morals of pretend play, both of which might implicate the emotional rules, are gradually internalised or appropriated by the children.[2] As a result of this internalisation children themselves get to be able to produce what previously was produced by their caregiver on their behalf.

3.) Finally, during the *third phase*, the inner dialogue comes to be fixed with respect to an emotion. The emotional evaluation of the situation and the response towards it therefore, becomes characteristically individual and almost automatic, albeit complex process. No open assistance is required any more in interpreting an emotion affording situation and for devising an emotional reaction towards it. Moreover, an uninvited contribution might even be perceived as an intrusion into a person's independence and sovereignty. If I am correct in my argument, then an uninvited contribution to somebody else's emotionality challenges one as a moral being, as a person with her/his own identity, but not as one who is the possessor of an authentic subjective inner experience; that is, it is a moral and not an epistemological challenge.

In this way both emotional evaluation (or morally prescribed judgement) regarding a particular emotion affording situation and its manifestation in different aspects of an emotional syndrome can be accounted for as evolving partly from biological predispositions and partly from discourse, from the internalisation of interactions with others. This framework of emotional development, makes it possible to acknowledge at one and the same time both the initial role of biological factors and the constitutive contributions of sociocultural environment. Remember however, that the telos of emotional development was specified only in general terms, as gaining the capacity to make morally founded evaluative judgements and their manifestations in responsible actions.

Note, that in this model, language use has a twofold significance. On the one hand, language use is considered a *tool of development* within the model, a "psychological tool", which if internalised may explain the natural-conventional transition, the shift from lower level "instinctual" emotional behaviour to higher level emotional conduct. On the other hand, appropriate language use is also implicated within the model as a *telos of development*. Thus, the framework, for example, may also be able to interpret the constructivist insight, that the first person use of linguistic expressions of emotion are not simple labels referring to inner and private experiences, but the application of performative devices. In this way, a given item of emotional vocabulary or an emotion metaphor, which is, of course, no more and no less than the tip of the iceberg regarding emotional development, is acquired, when the child is able to recognise and produce the relevant linguistic devices under the auspices of socially defined rules of emotions. This was my tentative account regarding "mechanism" of emotional development including acquisition of linguistic expressions of emotion conceived as the usage of linguistic devices.

4.2 *Development of Emotional Language as Attainment of Specific Form-Function Pairings*

The Vygotskian model offers a broad outline for understanding the intersubjective "mechanism" or process of emotional development within a developmental social constructivist framework. However, as it was already mentioned above, analysing development usually can be divided into two branches. On the one hand, development is taken as a set of qualitative changes towards some end state, usually referred to as the telos of development. On the other hand, development implies a set of processes or "mechanisms" which are responsible for making those qualitative changes. Only the second issue is covered explicitly by the Vygotskian proposal presented above. In this way, details of the development of emotional syndromes generally, and the acquisition of their linguistic constituents in particular, are not quite specified within the proposed framework.

The Vygotskian model presented above, pertains in principle, to the intersubjective "mechanism" of human emotional development or emotional socialization in general. In the following, however, I will narrow the scope of investigation to one aspect of this complex issue of emotional development; to the acquisition of emotional language. In this respect, the framework presented is to be considered only a bare skeleton of a developmental social constructivist stance, and the details of

acquisition of specific linguistic constituents of emotional syndromes are not specified. From this devised restriction it follows, that from this point on, the second and third phases of the Vygotskian model will be particularly relevant.

Pragmatically speaking, the telos of emotional development regarding its linguistic facets consists of the acquisition of linguistic devices for marking emotionality, either overtly and/or covertly. This telos is achieved by acquisition of the appropriate form-function pairings. First, in accordance with the concerns above, a short description of the relevant linguistic devices or "forms" will be offered. These devices amount to what is to be learned as linguistic units. Second, certain features of the semantic/pragmatic functions of the emotion markers will be detailed. Third, the actual and genetic relationship between linguistic forms and functions will be considered. Finally, an overview of the possible paths' of attainment of the relevant linguistic devices will be considered. There, we will concentrate on the problem of what is the best way to reconstruct this developmental trend in our respective area. Is the description of the emergence of the target forms enough to draw a picture of development or should some possible changes in their function be anticipated? Is development a one step (or one stage) process or does it involve a number of gradual form-function reorganisations as Werner suggested?

4.2.1 Forms to Be Acquired in Learning Emotional Language

The range of linguistic devices used for displaying emotion or, by using Ochs and Schieffelin's (1989) terminology the types of "affect markers" or "affect keys", is quite wide. Besides emotion terms it includes the grammatical encoding of emotional information as well as its phonological realisation (cf. Drescher, 2001). These linguistic units, alongside the appropriate functions, considered more openly in the next section, are the telos of development. From a developmental perspective, emotional development partly consists of mastery of a set of linguistic units which are instrumental in manifesting emotional evaluation through appropriate linguistic displays. From the perspective of language acquisition, the acquisition of these devices is part of the acquisition of emotional language.

A useful cross-linguistic list of "affect keys" can be found Ochs and Schieffelin's above referred paper (1989, pp. 12-14). Their list includes pronouns, determiners, tense/aspect, verb voice, case marking, number/gender/animacy marking, and a host of other particles or affixes, reduplication, intonation, lexicon, etc. Furthermore, it seems that a recently established field of study within linguistics coined morphopragmatics

partly overlaps with the study of emotional language - as the latter is considered in the context of the present study. Thus, Dressler and Barbaresi (1994) presented a detailed account of a set of morphological devices such as diminutives and intensifiers in different languages.

Indeed, most major proposals regarding the functions of language include in some way or another emotionality. For example, both Bühler and Jakobson emphasized what they called the expressive function of language (Bühler, 1934/1990; Jakobson, 1973; see also Pléh, 1984; Budwig, 1998; Valsiner, 1998). The various attempts which identify the general functions of language, just like the enumerating stance towards the issue of linguistic manifestation of emotions presented above, all point to the possibility, that *any* linguistically identified structural units may have an emotional function.

4.2.2 Functional Concerns Regarding Acquisition of Emotional Language

The functional concepts of *explicit emotives* and *primary emotives* introduced in the previous chapter may help to arrange further the various linguistic devices which index emotions. Following Ochs and Schieffelin's lucky terminology, the respective devices can be called *emotion specifiers* and *emotion modulators* (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989).

It should be noted that, very few of the above listed devices are appropriate for specifying the exact quality (or type) of emotionality they realize (in first person use) or evoke (regarding other's emotionality). Rather, most of these linguistic devices are emotion modulators, and function mainly as "modulating affective intensity of utterances" (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989, p. 14). Most of them, in this way, *presuppose* an evaluation on behalf of the speaker which is possibly shared by the interlocutor, and hence marks the speaker's emotional stance on the bases of this shared evaluation. In sum, these devices "can augment or diminish the intensity of affect" (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989, p. 15), the presupposed emotional or affective stance. As Ochs and Schieffelin puts it:

> it appears that linguistic structures more often specify a range of affective meanings than pinpoint a precise affective meaning. Thus, many structures simply encode 'positive affect' (which may cover happiness, excitement, love, sympathy) or 'negative affect' (which may cover sadness, worry, anger, disappointment). One implication of this finding is that affect tends to be specified syntagmatically through co-occurring or emergent features in talk, gesture, facial expression and other semiotic systems. (1989, p. 15)

However, it seems, that there is a set of lexical devices which are able to specify the exact quality of emotions as evaluative judgments. Most everyday uses of these devices not only display some presupposed background evaluation via linguistic means, but even specify a person's emotionality.[3] These specialized lexical devices are *sui generis* emotion words, such as *happy*, *sad* or *fear*. They are rather analogous to the devices Austin called performative verbs. First person uses of this type of lexical device are usually explicit emotives, or emotion avowals of the person. At the same time, second or third person uses of the same devices are about somebody else's emotionality, they are emotion ascriptions. These terms essentially marks or realize a particular emotion, a particular morally founded enthymemic judgment within a language community, within a given local culture. Furthermore, some other emotion related lexical devices mark other aspects of an emotional syndrome. Subjective experience is usually taken as an important element of an emotional syndrome. It is ordinarily conveyed by such lexical elements as the term *feel*. Behavioural displays such as actual crying or smiling also figure in emotional syndromes, hence terms such as *cry* or *smile* mark other aspects of the realization of emotions.

Using lexical devices for being emotional or talking about emotionality, – to which the empirical analysis of the next chapter focuses on – does realise or mark different aspects of an emotional event. First, they can be emotion specifiers as *genuine emotion words* such as *fear*, *happy* or *mad*. Second, they can be devices for *manifesting the subjective experiential aspect of an emotion syndrome*, as the term *feel* may serve. Third, they can be terms which refer to such *behavioural displays* of an emotion syndrome as *cry* and *smile* stand for. Furthermore, differences between acquisition of emotion avowals, i.e. first person use of explicit emotives, and emotion ascriptions, i.e. second and third person use of the same devices are to be considered, as well. Differentiation within emotional lexicon described above is summarised in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Types of Lexical Devices Instrumental in Performing and/or Constating Different Aspects of Emotional Syndromes, with Examples.

	Performatives	Constatives	
Types of emotional terms	Emotion Avowals	Emotion Ascriptions	Behaviour Descriptions
Emotion words	I fear	She fears	
Emotional experience words	I feel	He feels	
Words for emotional displays			I/he smile/s

Acquisition of the above differentiated types of emotional terms can be conceptualised as a field of *lexical development*, and at the same time as an element of emotional development as such. Furthermore, a related issue pertains to the emergence of emotion ascriptions and avowals regarding the respective devices. Consequently, a crucial empirical question in this respect is the following: What is the developmental pattern of acquisition of the terms which convey the above specified functional aspects of emotionality, which linguistically realise or index an emotion or some constituents of an emotional syndrome? In short, what is the pattern of development considered as attainment of appropriate emotional talk? This question will guide the set of empirical investigation presented in the next chapter. Therefore, occurrences of the above specified linguistic devices used with appropriate functions will be tackled in the transcripts. As a background of our investigations, available descriptive acquisition norms from the literature, such as the one collected and published by Dale and Fenson (1993) will be considered as well.

However, as was already indicated, there is a further level of analysis and understanding development beyond the description of the attainment of relevant form-function pairings. Detecting attainment of a set of specific form-function mapping is nothing other than detecting the product or outcome of a developmental process. What are the developmental processes behind the pattern of emotional vocabulary acquisition? What is the way of coupling forms with functions? Regarding this question, a set of putative intersubjective "mechanisms" were specified in the Vygotskian model on emotional development suggested above (see above, under 4.1). But the "intrapsychological" side of the process, the "psychological content" of emotional language use and its *development*, deserves more detailed explication. Two questions seem to be eminently relevant in this regard. The first asks: What is the *actual* na-

ture of the relationship between form and function? While the second reads: What is the *genetic* nature of connecting or coupling forms with functions, of matching them to each other during the developmental process? Thus, as the next step of the present investigation, a plausible psychological model should be outlined on the use and acquisition of the lexical aspects of emotional language, which is congruent both with the framework of acquisition as establishing form-function pairings and the proposed intersubjective teaching-learning processes.

4.2.3 Actual and Genetic Relationships between Linguistic Forms and Functions Regarding Emotional Language

The two major issues considered in this section are the following: How to conceptualise the relationship between form and function in actual language use? And, what kind of genetic relations can one envisage between forms and functions?

One, indeed often tacit, way to consider the "psychological content" of language use in general and emotional language use in particular, is the labelling view. This view, which is also called the representational view of language maintains that the relationship between linguistic form and function is predominantly representational. From this stance, on the one hand there is something, say an emotion or an emotion concept, while on the other hand, there is a linguistic unit, say a characteristic intonation unit or a word. So, the connection between these two realms, their actual relationship is considered representational. In other terms, in this view a linguistic unit represents an emotion (in the case of emotion words such as *love*) or an aspect of it (in case of words for display such as *smile* or experience such as *feel*). Here language use plays the role of *re-presenting* emotionality – for example with a word or in a proposition. Thus, for example, saying that "I am afraid of O's dogs" would be a linguistic representation of my fear of O's dogs. Correspondingly, under the labelling view language learning is comprised of building simple connections between forms and functions (depending on the approach they can be called meanings, concepts, or in cognitive terms, representations) which are originally independent of each other.

It seems, the labelling view presuppose that the primary function of language is descriptive or representational, i.e. linguistic items stand for something else, which is quite independently given. However, as was mentioned in Chapter 3., taking all use of language in a similar vein was criticized by ordinary language philosophers as committing the *descriptive fallacy*. As an alternative to the labelling view, this study takes language as a social institution, and correspondingly language users

are taken as persons who do perform actions with language. Thus, instead of advocating the labelling view where a mere representational role is given to language, language is taken as playing a performative role as well. Units of this action-aspects of language use was identified by Austin as performatives and described subsequently as the illocutionary force of utterances. At the same time, reference and proposition, which are favoured in descriptive approaches to language, are considered as just two types of the various possible acts realised by speech (Searle, 1969). Consequently, throughout this study, emotional language use is taken not exclusively as representational. Indeed, sometimes emotional language use should be taken as part of an emotional syndrome, as the supposition of emotive speech acts attests. In short, in my view, emotions and language are more intimately tied to each other than a labelling view implies.

The labelling or representational view of language largely means entertaining a further supposition, according to which the development of emotionality proceeds rather independently from language and language acquisition. The genetic or developmental relationship of form and function therefore is taken as originally independent of each other, and their matching consists of establishing a simple connection between the already fully developed emotionality and the respective linguistic form. As is perhaps clear from the previous chapters, the present stance follows another kind of reasoning. In light of this, I will argue that neither the solely representational, nor the genetic independence supposition of the labelling view is plausible regarding the acquisition of the lexical constituents of emotional language.

Therefore, instead of conceptualising lexical learning as simple labelling, which may or may not be, an adequate conceptualisation of second language learning, we will propose that learning emotion talk, and perhaps learning to talk generally, it is similar to learning certain moves within a game, learning to play a language-game. According to this, when someone says "I do not love you any more" it is more similar to saying "checkmate" in the game chess, than to describing or re-presenting something, say a physiological or private mental state.

Note, that by evoking the language-game metaphor, both the child's, and his caregivers' active role in the very process of development can be highlighted. Furthermore, in so far as talking is considered as playing a language-game, rather than mere linguistic marking, i.e. naming previously given outside or inside entities such as events, concepts, meanings, representations or physiological states, the game's structure, function, and, from a developmental perspective the novice's gradual immersion into the game, deserve close scrutiny.

Instead of labelling already given entities with ready-made forms, learning emotion markers is learning to use the respective forms appropriately within an intricate network populated by persons, acts, instruments, settings and agents – the elements which Burke's dramatism (1989) identified as crucial in accounting for human actions. In this way emotional language use can be a constitutive part of performing a transitory social role (Averill, 1980) or it can be a vital identity claim which contributes to a dramatic situation (Sarbin, 1986a). Learning the language game of emotions is learning how to make and recognize culturally appropriate evaluative judgements, a central feature of which are their enthymemic character, and how to realise them in practice, in culturally appropriate syndrome constituents, including their linguistic manifestations.

4.2.4 Images of Development as a One Step Process *versus* a Process of Gradual Differentiation and Integration

As was noted above, the labelling view of language is frequently, though perhaps not necessarily associated with a further supposition, according to which development of emotionality proceeds rather independently of language, and language acquisition. If that were the case, the development of emotional language could very well be a relatively simple mapping between two independently developing lines: those of emotional and linguistic development. In this view, one might consider development, for example language development, as a process of building and accumulating simple connections, possible associations, between simple elements (or forms) and functions (or meanings) as time passes. This might be the case when somebody learns the Hungarian word "alma" when she already knows what the English term "apple" is used for, whatever the respective knowledge implies.

However, there is an alternative way of considering development generally and symbolic development in particular. According to Werner and Kaplan "development is a constitutive moment of organismic functioning. We assume that organisms are naturally directed towards a series of transformations - reflecting a tendency to move from a state of relative globality and undifferentiatedness towards states of increasing differentiation and hierarchic organization." (Werner and Kaplan, 1963, p. 7). Application of the *orthogenetic principle* to our field of interest, to the development of emotional language and emotionality, offers us a more complicated framework than a simple accumulation view affords. A major methodological consequence of the orthogenetic principle is that the simple, so to speak "one jump" view of development and the

corresponding empirical description and analysis of data should be complemented by a more detailed one. The orthogenetic principle sensitises us to the possibility, that we are faced with a rather complicated business, where the same function can be attained by different forms, the same form can play different functions, and as if it were not complicated enough, in the meantime both forms and functions might got through changes. The one step versus protracted possibilities regarding genetic relationship between form and function are summarised by Werner and Kaplan in the following manner:

> It is an essential tenet of our organismic-developmental theory of symbolization that the basic relationship between any speech-form and the referent it represents cannot be one of mere contiguity or association. We have maintained that the contiguity thesis has a superficial plausibility only if one views vehicle and object as end-forms or products, that is only if one overlooks the organismic activity essential both to the formation of objects and to the formation of symbolic vehicles. (Werner and Kaplan, 1984/1963, pp. 205-206)

In the second part of the next chapter, especially in section 5.4, an attempt will be made to implement the Wernerian vision of development, to tackle development of emotional language according to these more complicated possibilities.

Werner and Kaplan's theory was mentioned above primarily regarding possible paths' of development. Finally, I consider two further related implications of the organismic-developmental theory of symbolization on the issue of "mechanism" of development.

First, that the orthogenetic principle, by acknowledging the active role of the child in her/his development, points to an agency which may be responsible for developmental changes. Thus, at least in my understanding, Werner and Kaplan's formulation cited above that "organisms are naturally directed towards a series of transformations" can be interpreted as a proposition on the organism's, in our case on the child's, active role in his/her own development. Above a Vygotskian account was proposed regarding the "mechanism" of development. Nevertheless, Werner and Kaplan's formulation of the child's activity in the very process of development can be complemented by the supposition, that some supra- or un-natural agencies, i.e. social direction such as for example guided and guarded participation (Rogoff et al., 1993; Bodor, 1998) could be considered in the very process of development as well. Thus, it seems to me, that on the level of the "mechanism" of mental develop-

ment the Wernerian vision can be co-ordinated with the Vygotskian insight regarding the sociocultural embededdness of development.

Second, acknowledging the child's own activity in relating forms to functions, instead of supposing an arbitrary connection between "objects and ... symbolic vehicles", their connection can be explicated as based on the gradually incremented and organised *lived experiences* of the child. And these experiences could supply the "subjective", "private", or even more properly idiosyncratic psychological content of the particular linguistic device. As a consequence of this, the psychological content between form and function can be evoked in explicating such otherwise usually ill-defined phenomena as connotative meaning. And this logic may even contribute to the explication of such mysterious phenomena as Wittgenstein was intensively occupied with in his later writings such as "feeling of meaning", or "aura"[4].

4.3 *Summary*

In this chapter two major components of a developmental social constructionist stance towards emotions were detailed: the first related primarily to the intersubjective "mechanism" of development, while the second pertains to its telos. The first issue was coined as a natural-conventional transition problem. To this a Vygotskian proposal was formulated to bridge developmentally the gap between non-linguistic and possible "instinctual" emotional reactions and the emotions' responsible, action-like and in some instances linguistic manifestations.

Details of the second issue, the "target" of emotional language acquisition were considered as establishing form functions pairings through development. Following a short overview of different types of emotional markers the topic of the present investigation was narrowed down to lexical devices. Two possible paths' of their developmental enfolding were considered. The attainment pattern of these form-function pairings will be analysed empirically in the next chapter.

In the next chapter I shall turn to the analysis of actual discourses. My frame of interpretation will be the theoretical framework worked out above. Insofar as ongoing interaction plays a role in emotional development it must be present in naturally occurring conversations between children and their caregivers. Therefore, conversations between children and adults can be analysed with regard to when lexically realised emotional talk appears in a child's language, what is the pattern of development, and more specifically what is the respective pattern regarding different aspects of emotional syndromes.

Chapter 5 «
Analysing the Development of Emotional Talk

> When philosophers use a word – "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 48)

The merit of a developmental social constructivist framework of emotions will be confronted with data in this chapter. The field of testing will be the development of emotional language. Of course, the proposed framework for emotional development has a wider scope than an investigation into the development of emotional language may cover. However, as the previous analysis indicates the issue of emotional language is a crucial pillar for the social constructivist stance: it is partly a target, partly a tool for development. Thus, any contribution to a plausible account of the genesis of linguistic realisation and the marking of emotions may contribute to the constructivist understanding of emotions and emotional development.

Certain points of the mainly theoretical and conceptual analysis of the previous chapters will be relied on while some implications of the proposals will be controlled during the empirical work described in this chapter. The method of investigation is a longitudinal study of a child's and his caregivers' conversations in the home environment. Thus, the study fits into a tradition of developmental studies which aim to reconstruct development from events occurring in natural settings. More specifically, it is connected to those language development studies focusing on production data. Therefore, at this point I would like to emphasise, that the empirical analysis presented below aims primarily at demon-

strating the theoretical framework proposed in the previous chapters, which is due to the exploratory and case study character of the present research.

The main issue orienting the empirical studies presented in this chapter pertains to the pattern of development and the order of acquisition of emotional language use. What is the pattern of the emergence of emotional language use in our data, approached first from the lexical level, but then by extending the inquiry to more pragmatic aspects, as well? The answer to this question should be based on analysing the child's and his caregiver's use of emotional language and changes in it over time.

In this chapter, I shall first (5.1) describe the corpus, the analysis is based upon, and the analytical device which helped to find patterns in the body of text. Then, the process of creating an emotional vocabulary based on the distinctions introduced in Chapter 4. and on the LEX database will be detailed.

Next (5.2), I shall show how the defined emotion vocabulary appears in the database at the first glance and describe the process of "data purification". In this way initial pattern searches will be qualified by certain initial coding operations, partly emerging from the data and partly motivated by some conceptual distinctions described previously, especially in Chapter 2. and 3.

After discussing a set of unanticipated outcomes of these "data purification" operations, we can turn to the description of the resulting emotion terms in the data (5.3). Here, the overall presence of emotion talk will be described and discussed first. Then, the pattern of different linguistically coded and/or realised aspects of emotion syndromes, such as emotional words, terms referring to emotional displays, and terms evoking emotional feelings will be presented. This phase of the analysis will be complemented by considering time as well.

In the next section, different functional uses will be established within the group of emotion words, such as genuine, phrasal and other uses (5.4). Their pattern of emergence will be interpreted within a Wernerian framework of development, i.e. with the help of the idea that development is a process of gradual differentiation and hierarchical integration.

Finally, a short overview of the main empirical, conceptual and methodological outcomes of the study is presented, together with some qualifications regarding the generality of the findings.

5.1 *General Characteristics of the Data Analysed and the Selected Emotional Terms*

5.1.1 Choosing the "Raw" Material and Analytical Device

In order to take a closer look at the usage of emotional language and its putative change and role during the developmental process, I have turned to the **Chi**ld **L**anguage **D**ata **E**xchange **S**ystem (CHILDES) as a resource (MacWhinney, 2000). The CHILDES System was originally developed for studying child language. It contains a unified transcription system, called **C**odes for the **H**uman **A**nalysis of **T**ranscripts (CHAT) and a set of programs called **C**omputerised **L**anguage **An**alysis (CLAN) which help in analysing the transcripts, and a continuously growing and practically freely accessible database. Since the CHILDES database contains transcriptions in CHAT format which are appropriate for utilising a set of CLAN programs, the system offers an ideal tool-kit for conducting language related developmental research.

For a number of reasons Catherine Snow's transcriptions will be relied on in the exploratory studies presented below. First, it is an accessible longitudinal database. The age of the child, Nathaniel, was 2;5.18 (year, months, days) at the beginning of recordings and 3;9.4 at the end. Second, it is a rather dense and naturalistic database. The recordings were made in the home environment, approximately every two weeks. The typical activities included feeding, bathing, playing, singing and a lot of book reading activities, which are occupations that broadly cover children's daily routines, at least in Western societies. Third, the transcriptions contain a relatively large number of "cries", which were taken as a rule of thumb for gaining transcripts from which emotionally loaded scenes are not excluded (i.e. censored out, possibly a natural tendency at least in our Western societies). Fourth, since Catherine Snow is one of the founders of the Childes Project, one can suppose that the quality of transcriptions she supervised is fairly good. Fifth, and finally, the "possessor" of the transcripts was accessible to the author and gave authorisation for its use. Typically, nevertheless, reasons for choosing a "sample from reality" cannot be strictly justified or controlled beforehand (cf. Psathas, 1990), and as such they constitute at best a reasonable choice.

5.1.2 The Corpus

The corpus contains 32 files of data collected by Catherine Snow between 1979 and 1980 in Brooklyn, MA. The "subject" was her son, Nathaniel, and apart from his parents some other adults appear more or less regularly in the recorded conversations as well. As already noted, Nathaniel was 2;5.18 at the start of the study and 3;9.4 at the end. The database contains 32 files, the transcriptions of conversations between Nathaniel and his caregivers at 20 points in time (for details see Appendix, Table 1.). The duration of the particular recordings in real time varied from 20 to 80 minutes, approximately. Table 5.1 provides a rough overview of the whole corpus with respect to conversational units. It details the contributions of each particular speakers by presenting the number of utterances, turns, and words they produced together with the ratio of words over utterances for each particular speaker.[1] Its last row contains the respective summarised data. Note, that descriptive data of "input" and "output" are especially relevant from the perspective of language acquisition or linguistic socialization.

Table 5.1 Some Conversational and Linguistic Units in the Transcripts which Offers a Gross Overview of the Whole Database.

Name of Speakers	utterances	turns	words	words in an utterance
Nathaniel	13518	10479	40483	2.995
Mother	16976	9839	81658	4.810
Father	2723	1600	12327	4.527
Gra	3	3	13	4.333
Kat	1100	559	5378	4.889
Ren	138	92	718	5.203
Lia	134	96	448	3.343
All	34592	22668	141025	4.076

Regarding the distribution of *utterances* and *turns* by speakers, one could note the following: Altogether 34592 utterances and 22668 turns were produced by the participants. Out of this Nathaniel produced 13518 utterances in 10479 turns, while his input comprised 21074 utterances, from which 16976 utterances and 9839 turns were used by his mother.

Distribution of *word types* and word *tokens*, and the respective input-output ratio in the transcripts, including retractings, can be summarised as follows[2]: All together 142543 words were used by the seven speakers (token frequency), the size of a developmental novel. This amount of

words, meant 4428 different kinds of words (type frequency). The type/token ratio (TTR) was 0.031. Nathaniel, the child, used 2295 types and 41659 word tokens, his TTR was 0.055 - usually considered as "output" in language acquisition studies. His caregivers used 4137 different word types on 100884 occasions, their TTR was 0.041 - this constitutes the "input" at the level of words.

On the basis of a rather weak albeit complex hypothesis, namely that there is something like emotional development, including on the one hand i./ the development of emotional talk on the part of the child, and on the other hand ii./ that the linguistically realised interaction is an agent or medium of development as the Vygotskian tradition maintains, or linguistic socialization, as Ochs argues, one might anticipate that there will be interesting events with respect to emotional development in the respective transcripts. In other terms, it follows from the framework proposed in the previous chapter that the child's emotional talk develops as an aspect of his/her emotional development, and that the linguistic, more properly conversational environment plays an active role in this development. This still begs the question of how to recognise it; a rather intricate question, indeed.

5.1.3 Choosing Emotional Terms

As I already indicated above, the present research approached emotional development from the top down, from the tip of the iceberg, that is from the level of lexicon. This stance from lexical level will be complemented later with a more pragmatically oriented analysis. Practically this starting point meant that emotional development was approached through the use of those words which somehow index emotions. To do this a restricted emotional vocabulary had to be established. Consequently, the next step was to decide what terms will be considered in the analysis as relevant words with respect to emotional talk. The list of emotional words in English, as in most other languages is rather long, and it is not clear what items should be included and what items excluded at a closer look. Nevertheless, since our study is openly exploratory, it seemed reasonable to concentrate only on some characteristic terms.

As is probably clear from the discussion in the previous chapters, at least the following aspects of emotional talk seem relevant to our purposes: talk about *feelings*; talk about *bodily displays* occasionally attached to emotions like crying and smiling; and emotional talk proper, using words like sad or mad, either as *emotion ascriptions* (openly mentioning somebody else's emotionality) or *emotion avowals* (mentioning somebody's own emotionality, or, in other terms, using verbal emotion dis-

plays). At least these three aspects of an emotional event are to be marked, coded and/or realised linguistically. But exactly what words should be considered? As a starting, and at the same time anchoring, point with respect to other developmental studies, it seemed reasonable to turn to the LEX longitudinal database (Dale and Fenson, 1993), in order to obtain a list of emotional terms relevant for children.

The LEX program was developed to provide developmental norms on 680 English words (more properly, 396 words from 8 to 16 months; 680 words from 16 to 30 months) included in the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories (CDI): Infants and/or MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories: Toddlers (Fenson, et al., 1993). The developmental norms were constructed on an extensive study based on parental report. In the "norming study", more than 1700 parents completed either the CDI: Infants (8-16 months; N=659), which provides information on comprehension and production for 396 words or the CDI: Toddlers (16-30 months; N=1130), which provides information on production for 680 words. The database contains the percentage of children at each age whose parents report occurrence. Fenson et al. (1993) summarise evidence concerning the validity of the CDIs as well. Several studies have directly correlated CDI data with laboratory and home assessments, with impressive results.

The following terms were identified as emotional words from the MacArthur Inventories and selected for further analysis: *hate*, *love*, *happy*, *mad*, *sad*, *scared*, *cry*, and *smile*. The words *laugh* and *feel* were also included in the list, although, interestingly these two terms are not present in the MacArthur Inventories, consequently they are not present in the LEX database either. It should be noted, that the relevant items on our list - *hate, love, happy, mad, sad, scared,* - significantly overlap with a number of various proposals concerning "basic emotions" (for example: Orthony et. al., 1988), or "modal emotions" (Masquita, Frijda and Scherer, 1996).[3]

With the help of the LEX program one can provide the month-by-month figures from the sources listed above (Infant Comprehension, Infant Production, Toddler Production) for each word on the list and summed totals for the entire list. The pattern of production of toddlers of the selected emotional words according to the LEX database is presented on Table 5.2. (for infant production data see Appendix table 2).

Table 5.2
Lexical Development Norms: Toddlers Production (M stands for months)

WORD	M16	M17	M18	M19	M20	M21	M22	M23	M24	M25	M26	M27	M28	M29	M30	TOTAL
cry	14.1	13.6	16.3	34.2	42.6	47.2	58.3	71.8	67.3	86.7	80.8	82.7	84.5	*81.7*	*95.7*	*58.1*
hate	2.6	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.1	1.4	1.4	9.4	4.7	16.0	15.4	19.8	24.1	*28.3*	*34.3*	*9.9*
love	17.9	13.6	20.0	28.8	34.0	45.8	47.2	63.5	**60.7**	76.0	65.4	66.7	81.0	*85.0*	*97.1*	*52.7*
smile	7.7	4.5	2.5	11.0	10.6	22.2	19.4	31.8	27.1	41.3	41.0	54.3	55.2	*70.0*	*74.3*	*30.3*
happy	15.4	13.6	20.0	27.4	38.3	36.1	41.7	64.7	54.2	61.3	61.5	76.5	75.9	*68.3*	*87.1*	*49.1*
mad	5.1	1.5	0.0	5.5	4.3	15.3	16.7	27.1	**20.6**	40.0	38.5	49.4	44.8	*51.7*	*72.9*	*25.2*
sad	0.0	0.0	2.5	11.0	12.8	16.7	22.2	34.1	25.2	44.0	46.2	50.6	51.7	*58.3*	*80.0*	*29.6*
scared	7.7	1.5	2.5	8.2	5.3	13.9	22.2	32.9	34.6	44.0	52.6	63.0	56.9	*60.0*	*82.9*	*31.6*

The numbers in the table stand for percentage of parents who judged that their children use the relevant words at the indicated age. Thus, for example, roughly sixty out of one hundred parents of 24 months old children thought that their children produced the word *love*, while twenty thought the same respecting *mad* (in bold characters).

Nathaniel was almost two and a half years old when the first recordings were made. The respective developmental norms for 29 and 30 months of age therefore are highlighted (in italics) on the above table for each selected emotional term. One might try to speculate the pattern of acquisition of emotion related terms emerged from the LEX database. However, for the present purposes the main conclusion is that the acquisition of the emotional vocabulary we selected for study is still under way during the time period the transcripts covers. Thus, on the basis of developmental norms we can predict that in some sense Nathaniel already knew what most of the relevant terms are used for, but that there is something more to learn about them. A major implication of this is that one might anticipate important events respecting emotional development during this period. In so far as this hypothesis seems plausible, it is exactly the "niche" of development, especially if we do not consider development as a simple "product" or "output" in some black or white manner. I shall return to these issues below, especially in the second half of the present chapter (under point 5.4), but first a more traditional description of the occurrence of relevant terms in our transcripts will be offered, the lexical development of our domain. In other terms, I shall first try to show the overall presence of emotion related terms in our sample of everyday conversations and describe the pattern of development considered as a mere change of "product" in time together with the respective general patterns of input.

5.2 *Initial Coding, "Data Purification" and some Unexpected Results*

5.2.1 Initial Coding Operations and Distribution Analysis

With the transcriptions and a list of emotionally possible relevant words at our disposal it is possible to offer an initial distribution analysis with respect to the "target" terms. As a practical research operation, this and all further analysis was performed on the basis of coding along a specific coding line, a so called dependent tier, marked as emo%. The number of occurrences of the relevant terms were calculated both in Nathaniel's talk and in his linguistic environment, in the talk produced by his caregivers. In other terms, both the input and the output of the relevant aspects of emotional language acquisition are represented in Table 5.3. Furthermore, according to the structural constituents of emotional syndromes (see chapters 3. and 4.), all occurrences of the selected *em*otional *w*ords (hate, love, happy, mad, sad, and scared; assigned code: EMW), candidate words for *em*otional *d*isplay (cry, smile, and laugh; assigned code: EMD) and the number of occurrences of the word which may express *em*otional *e*xperience or feeling (feel; assigned code: EME), were separately coded and tabulated as well.[4] The respective number of occurrences of these "target" terms in the transcripts and their absolute numbers are summarised in Table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3
Absolute Number of Possible Emotional Talk Related Terms in the Transcripts

	All Speakers	Input	Output
All emotional terms	268	200	68
Emotion Words	122	94	28
Words for Display	98	59	39
Words for Experience	48	47	1

The rows of the table present absolute frequencies of occurrences of target terms. Thus, the first row shows the summarised data of all occurrences of possible emotional terms. At the same time, the second, third and fourth rows depict the number of occurrences of possible emotional terms in the transcripts according to three categories, corresponding to the aspects of emotional syndromes, such as emotion words (*love, hate,*

scared, sad, mad, happy), emotional displays (*cry, laugh, smile*), and emotional experience (*feel*). The columns represent the overall frequencies and the input-output distribution of the relevant terms as they emerged from the transcripts. Of course, different morphological realisations of the relevant terms, such as for example, *feel*, *felt* and *feeling*, were identified and are included in this table, and throughout the analysis.

From this kind of data one might start an analysis of development of the lexical aspect of a specific domain of mental functioning. Thus, Bartsch and Wellman, for example, present a similar introductory table containing all occurrences of "desire" (want, hope, wish, care about, afraid), "thought", and "belief" terms (think, know, believe, expect, wonder, and dream) without any further qualification (1995, p. 28). These were the categories and terms they focused on in their attempt to reconstruct what they called the development of "theory of mind" on the basis of conversational data - a project to which the present analysis in a certain degree can be compared to in its direction and in its methods, since they also tried to exploit the CHILDES. Wellman and his colleagues (1995) related studies on "children conception of emotion" can be mentioned in this context as well.

5.2.2 Logics of "Data Purification" and some Unexpected Results

However, a qualitative oriented analysis might prevent one from accepting the type of data presented in Table 5.3 at face value. Note though, that in the mechanistic searching procedure that led to the contents of Table 5.3, various non-intended matches of the specific forms might be included together with matches which fulfil functions other than the present research is primarily interested in. Therefore, a set of warranted qualifications or preparatory coding of data is required.[5] This problem can be labelled as *data purification*. In this respect, it should be noted that these research operations are inevitable, but they should be as explicit as possible. Furthermore, at least ideally, these research operations should not be self-serving, i.e. should not lead to the discounting of such data that do not fit into the original expectations or hypothesis of the researcher. Indeed, some researchers might opt to deal only with the purified data, and not to deal with the discounted material.[6] Still, "noise" is also "part of nature". Perhaps the best way to avoid the unfortunate possibility of self-serving data purification is if one attempts to account for the deviant, discounted cases as well. This is certainly somewhat at odds with hypothesis testing logic, but perfectly in line with the exploratory type of research.

In the studies relying on linguistic material, the data purification problem generally could be formulated as how to differentiate non-intended forms and other non-relevant functional uses of some specific linguistic units (in our case lexical devices) from such uses which are in the primary focus of interest. In short, the data presented above had to be qualified. The qualification of raw material or the "filtering out" of non-emotional uses of the target terms fell into two broad groupings.

The first type of qualification was based on the fact that there might be cases when the forms did not map the specific semantic/pragmatic function the speaker originally intended and therefore can be considered as accidental. Naturally, these tokens are to be identified and omitted from further analysis. For example, imagine that one wants to study the usage of colour terms and finds *blue* in an utterance where clearly a sticky material such as *glue* should be referred to. Of course, this is a rather general problem of empirical research on utilising linguistic material (regarding child language data cf. Brown, 1973) In order to deal with this problem, a coding category called **acc**ident (ACC) was established and applied to all relevant occurrences of the target terms. The results of this coding are not especially spectacular. In our entire data there were two cases of accidents of this type[7]:

*NAT:	ne ne ne ne ne dis [: this] .
*FAT:	xxx .
*NAT:	enne stand up de de *happy* .
%emo:	$EMW:ACC
*MOT:	well you open the cream and then you lie down for your **nappy** .
*MOT:	there, well done [: do&en] .
	(age of Nat.: 2;7.1)

*MOT:	eight what ?
*NAT:	dose [: those] are lady .
*NAT:	*hate* **eight** or lady ?
%emo:	$EMW:ACC
*NAT:	lady-s .
*MOT:	**eight** .
	(age of Nat: 2;8.20)

The accidentally (ACC) used emotional terms above (relevant elements of the conversations here and throughout this chapter are in italics) are presented along with their immediate conversational contexts, with two

preceding and two following utterances. It is clear from the context, especially from the interlocutor's corrections and from the self-correction in the second case (in bold), that what first appeared formally as an emotional word was an accident. Particularly, both of these mistakes can be accounted for by phonological reasons. At this point, having identified these non-emotional uses of the target terms and at least broadly accounting for them, one can exclude them from further analysis.

The second type of qualification of the raw material already implies a set of far more particular research-specific concerns. This type of qualification is based in general terms, on the fact that there might be cases when the forms clearly targeted some other semantic/pragmatic function than the primary object of the study. In studies pertaining to, or at least starting with, a lexical level of analysis, this amounts most of the time to excluding such lexical items as have the same form or structure, but different semantic meaning or pragmatic function as the object of the study. Imagine, for example, that one is still interested in colours and finds an item *blue*, but in a particular utterance it is not predicating the colour quality of something. Instead, *blue* is used as a kind of descriptor of a mood or a type of sadness. Naturally, this item of *blue* is to be omitted from the colour-focused study.

For our present purposes therefore, it seemed reasonable to differentiate non-emotional from emotional uses of the respective lexical elements in a principled manner. Consequently, in the context of the present investigation, all items of target terms are to be excluded which occur other than in emotional uses.

Three further types of data purification originated from the above concerns and were implemented during the coding procedure. The first of them is perhaps the more transparent. It is related to the phenomenon called homonymy, where one and the same linguistic form conveys two or more meanings. Specifically, the English term *cry*, originally intended to capture the behavioural display facet of emotional language use, has a non-emotional meaning, such as speaking loudly or shouting, as well. Thus, this use of *cry* is not to be taken as emotional language use, rather it was taken as a homonym and labelled HOM. An example for this reads like this:

*NAT:	now dis [: this] is your page .
*MOT:	you know what this is ?
*NAT:	what ?
*MOT:	direction .
*NAT:	<he-'is &n> [/] <he-'is not> [/] he-'is not *cry-ing* .

%emo: $EMD:HOM
*MOT: no he-'is yell-ing .
*MOT: he-'is yell-ing dingo .
*MOT: watch out .
(from Nath19.cod)

The second type of restriction also related to the term *cry*. Note, that crying as a specific behavioural display can be accompanied by or can signal a negative experience either in the context of pain or in the context of an emotional event. Thus, in order to investigate emotion related language use, the clearly pain related uses of *cry* had to be labelled and treated differently. On the basis of the discursive context, therefore, all pain related occurrences of *cry* were coded as PAI. These uses of the term *cry* appeared in the transcribed conversations in the following segment for first time[8], at age 2;5.18.:

*MOT: was [: is&ed] it fun to go ice skate-ing?
*NAT: fun.
*NAT: slip.
*MOT: you slip-ed yes.
*NAT: fell [: fall&ed] down.
*MOT: you fell [: fall&ed] down and bump-ed your head.
*NAT: head hurt.
*MOT: it hurt did-'nt it?
*MOT: but you were [: is&ed] very brave.
*NAT: brave.
*MOT: you did-'nt cry very long.
%emo: $EMD:PAI:SIN:2nd
*NAT: *cry* very long.
%emo: $EMD:PAI:SIN:2nd
*MOT: no -: .
*NAT: no -: .
*MOT: did-'nt cry very long.
%emo: $EMD:PAI:SIN:2nd
*NAT: *cry*.
%emo: $EMD:PAI:SIN:2nd
*MOT: and then we came [: come&ed] home in the car.
*NAT: came [: come&ed] home the car.
(from Nath01c)

Third, a thorough overview of all the possibly occurring emotional terms in their conversational context led to a further, not quite anticipated, conclusion that one of the candidate emotional terms was relatively frequently used correctly, though in a clearly non-emotional sense. This term was the *feel* originally intended to capture the lexical thematisation of the subjective emotional experiential aspect of an emotional syndrome.

Specifically, two broad functional categories were established to cover these non-emotional uses of *feel*. The first category was called '**sen**sation' and coded as SEN, since these uses allude to different types of sensory based experiences. While the second category, the presence of which is broadly connected to such state of affairs where entertaining some knowledge is at issue, was termed '**epi**stemic' and coded as EPI. Furthermore, within the category termed 'sensation' a further distinction could be detected between uses signalling '**per**ception' and coded as PER, and uses clearly marking an uncomfortable sensation such as '**pai**n' and coded as PAI.[9]

Examples for each of these uses are presented below. First consider an example for using the lexical element *feel* where sensation (SEN), more closely, a perceptual type of sensation (PER) occurred.

*NAT:	my penis <*feel*> [/] *feel* de [: the] *wet* .
%emo:	$EME:SEN:PER
*MOT:	your penis feel-es wet sometime-s after you-'ve gone peepee .
%emo:	$EME:SEN:PER
*NAT:	I wan(t) go peepee in my pj@ .
	(age of Nat: 3;2.27)

This section of the transcript presents a part of a conversation in which the perceptual experience of *wet*, which is an intricately combined tactile experience, is discussed. Interestingly this is the only case in the whole corpus when the child uses the term *feel*. The further 35 occurrences of similar uses of the same term which fall into this (perceptual) category, were all uttered by an adult interlocutor, and all cover tactile, internal or other bodily experiences.

The next example presents the same use of *feel* as conveying sensation (SEN) as the previous one, but this time it is not so much a perceptual, but rather pain (PAI).

*MOT:	wanna [: want to] stand up to put your nappy on ?
*NAT:	wanna [: want to] stand up to put the nappy on .
*NAT:	0 [=! moans] .

*MOT: what-'is the matter .
*MOT: you *feel-ing bad* ?
%emo: $EME:SEN:PAI
*NAT: 0 [=! moans] .
*MOT: does it hurt ?
(age of Nat.: 2;6.25)

Only two cases of *feel* fell into this category, both of them uttered by an adult. Although the talk about pain such as *feeling bad* and other complex bodily sensations such as *feeling wet* was not a subject of the present study at its onset, the above type of case encountered during data purification hints at a possible area of research. A research project of this type would aim to uncover the details of complex perceptual experiences, bodily sensations and pains as they enfold in discourses, and which one, at least partially, acquired conversationally. At the end of the present section I will return to these issues and formulate some guiding principles for such a project. But irrespective of the merit of such speculation, the psychosomatic and medical relevance of this type of research would be tremendous.

The last example of non-emotional usage of a target term is an epistemic usage of the term *feel*, and stems from a book reading part of the mother-child conversation.

*NAT: ++ <his <tractor> [>]> ["] .
*NAT: why he jump ?
*MOT: <tractor> [<] .
*MOT: I do-'nt know .
*MOT: he just *felt* [: feel&ed] like it .
%emo: $EME:EPI
(age of Nat.: 3;4.18)

In this example, just as in the other two similar cases which fell into this category, the speaker conveys a certain type of epistemic uncertainty through the use of *feel*. By doing this, the speaker qualifies his/her commitment towards the expressed proposition.[10] Clearly, the above cited and similar examples are not cases where subjective experience is involved, and especially not of its emotional type.

The following table summarises all uses of candidate emotional terms which proved to be non-emotional uses on a closer inspection.

Table 5.4
Summary of Non-Emotional Uses of the Target Terms

	All Speakers	Input	Output
All occurrences	64	54	12
Accidents	2	0	2
Non-emotional cry/ Homonyms	11	9	2
Pain related uses	12	5	7
Non-emotional feel/ Epistemic uses	3	3	0
Sensational uses/ Perception	36	35	1
Pain	2	2	0

The cases exemplified above and similar occurrences of accidents, the use of *cry* and *feel* tabulated in Table 5.4. will not be taken as emotional in the further analysis. From this one might conclude that we can forget about them entirely. Indeed, as it was already noted, some researchers opt not to deal with discounted empirical data whatsoever. However, note, that their presence poses a set of problems generally, also to the child who is about to acquire his/her first language, specifically. While homonymy seems less troublesome, since the different senses of *cry* are relatively isolated, the cases of *feel* and pain *versus* emotion-related *cry* seems to be much more difficult. How are the different kinds of functions of the same forms used and acquired? Does the functional multiplicity of the same forms hinder acquisition or just the opposite, help to crack the code? Is there any sequence in the enfolding of the different, though related functional uses? Be as it may, the functional (semantic/ pragmatic) ambiguity detected above respecting *feel* and certain uses of *cry* seems to be parallel to the verb/noun ambiguity Nelson (1996) proposed recently as a promising field of further scrutiny.

The findings regarding the subtle difference between pain related and emotion-related uses of *cry*, and perhaps even more, the different uses of *feel* exemplified and summarised above are in accord with some insights and distinctions introduced by other researchers, most notably

some philosophers and described earlier. Empirical analysis thus highlights their relevance above and beyond mere conceptual investigation.

First note, that the above devised conceptual differentiation between the *epistemic* versus *affective stances*, borrowed from Ochs, proved to be relevant for empirical analysis as well. Thus, as we have seen, the epistemic use of *feel* can be differentiated from other uses of it, i.e. depending on the context two functions are played by one and the same linguistic form.

Next, consider the status of feel, as the conscious experience of an emotion. As was argued above on a conceptual basis (especially in Chapter 1.), there might be non-emotional bodily feelings, such as the feeling of a need to go to the loo. The analysis of natural conversations presented above proved that non-emotional use of *feel* is not a mere conceptual possibility, but an inherent feature of conversations. Parallel to this, note, that there might be emotions without feelings, as the case of jealousy exemplify:

> For if we have good grounds for the assertion that a person is jealous, we do not withdraw this assertion on learning that he does not feel jealous, although we may accept this as true. It is, after all, notorious that we can be mistaken about our own emotions, and that in this matter a man is not the final court of appeal in his own case; those who are jealous are often the last, instead of the first, to recognise that they are. (Bedford, 1986, p. 17)

A number of philosophically oriented authors highlighted these issues. In this way, subjective experience of an emotion can not be taken uncritically as a given, as an Archimedean point in understanding emotions and their development.

Following Wittgenstein (1968), Coulter (1979) explicitly argues, it is a logical mistake to assimilate emotions to sensations. As he shows, part of the reason for confusing sensations with emotions lies in the fact that in some instances our *feel-talk* is sensation tied, while some other instances conveys emotional feelings which are based on "apprising an object or situation" (Coulter, 1979, p. 121). His remarks were confirmed by the findings presented above, with the upshot that certain of the distinctions that a mere conceptual analysis revealed are to be drawn by ordinary conversationalists just like language learners, as well.

The origin of the confusion of two types of *feel-talk* or "the misassimilation of emotions to sensations" in Coulter's formulation

(1979, p. 121.) is interesting, however. The pattern of our data suggests a scenario in this respect. Thus, following Sellars' analysis of *look-talk* mentioned above, one might even propose from a developmental perspective, that originally all *feel-talk* is a *qualification of the actor/speaker commitment*, marking some evaluative or broadly epistemically (the sensations included) loaded qualification on behalf of the actor. Thus, they could mark a person's stance toward some state of affairs. Being a qualification of the experience of some highly relevant state of the arts on behalf of the actor, all of these qualifications may eminently involve the person's own perspective, in a sense his or her subjectivity. In this way there would be a common functional core of all *feel-talk*, which is differentiated through development only gradually. This scenario therefore would have developmental consequences as well.

Furthermore, this scenario could be used as a starting point for the research project I already alluded to above, which would try to uncover the interactional and the developmental logic of all the above differentiated types of *feel* each of which constitutes an important element of the person's subjectivity. From this scenario regarding our present emotion-focused interest, it would follow that emotional feeling as a psychological entity is just a later achievement of ontogenetic development, a differentiation of evaluative processes from the sensation based and epistemic experiences. In this account emotional feelings could be the outcomes of the crystallization of the evaluative process around the agent's sovereignty, thus, forming a bedrock of his/her identity. In this view thinking on emotional experience as a given could be taken as a reified construct, a reification of the commitment of the speaker, a reification of the stance or positioning of the person within the local moral order.

Furthermore, these findings and their interpretation also pertain to, and at the same time help to further qualify, some distinctions described earlier, in Chapter 2., which was devoted to outlining a general framework for conceptualising emotions. There, following Werner and his co-workers, the concepts of geometric versus physiognomic psychic orientation was introduced, and the latter was broadly equated with emotional functioning. However, in the light of the different sensual and epistemic uses of *feel* and the pain versus emotion related *cry* described above, this position should be reconsidered slightly. Thus, for example, it was taken above that the perceptual and pain oriented uses of *feel* are not really emotional. Nevertheless, note that they are physiognomical in the Wernerian sense. According to this, the following hypothesis can be formulated on the basis of the findings presented: the common ground of the different type of physiognomic orientations might lie in the fact

that the relevant sensual experiences are very much bodily anchored, and thus implying vitally the perspective of the whole organism, either informing on inner bodily sensations or on some other but equally proximal and frequently complex perceptual experiences, also pertaining to the whole organism, and usually originating on the skin. Thus, it seems, that under the title of physiognomic orientation four psychological processes can be further differentiated: two sensual, such as pain related and perception related experience, one epistemological in its more narrow sense, and finally the emotional feeling proper. All of them tend to involve the whole organism, the overall perspective of the acting person, and this feature can be instrumental in understanding and at the same time misunderstanding anyone of them on the basis of the others. Thus, for example, the modelling of emotion on the basis of pain or perceptual experience, a characteristic constituent of a number of theories on emotions.

5.3 *Prevalence of Emotional Talk in the Transcripts*

5.3.1 Distribution of Emotion Related Terms in the Analysed Data

After purifying the data, one is in a position to summarise all the relevant data from the perspective of the specific research, namely from the perspective of the development of emotional talk realised by lexical devices. Thus, a summary of all relevant data is presented in Table 5.5 below.

Table 5.5
Absolute Number of Emotion Related Terms in the Transcripts

	All Speakers	Input	Output
All emotional terms	202	146	56
Emotion Words	120	94	26
Words for Display	75	45	30
Words for Experience	7	7	0

Just as in Table 5.3., the rows of Table 5.5. show the absolute frequencies of occurrences of target terms. The first row presents the summarised data of all occurrences of emotional terms. The second, third and forth rows depict the number of occurrences of emotional terms in the transcripts according to the three different aspects of emotional syndromes: emotion words (*love, hate, scared, sad, mad, happy*), emotional displays (*cry, laugh, smile*), and emotional experience (*feel*). This additional data will be analysed in the next section. The columns represent the overall frequencies and the input-output distribution of emotion terms as found in the transcripts.

First consider the overall number of emotion related terms in the transcripts, (202, the first number in the first row on Table 5.5.) and their presence in the input and output (146 and 56, respectively). It seems evident from the data, that the terms selected for analysis are just a tiny slice of ordinary verbal interactions. Previous research on emotional terms found relatively low frequency of use, as well, although it is not very clear what kind of data purification procedure they applied (cf. Smiley and Huttenlocher, 1989; Wellman et al. 1995). Of course, from the relatively rare use of emotionally relevant lexical devices one does not entitled to infer to a lack of emotionality in the interactions the transcripts originated from. As the thesis on the universality of emotions implicates, and as the previous overview of the linguistic marking of emotions suggested, emotionality is continuously present and indexed by linguistic (among them other non-lexical devices such as interjections, prosody, tempo, intonation, etc.) and non-linguistic (posture, mimics, gestures etc.) manner. But they do not frequently come to be overtly marked by a lexical device.

A related issue concerns when these devices surface during a conversation, when is emotionality thematized in our everyday life. At least two functional possibilities seem plausible: in the case of urgency, when the smooth functioning, i.e. interpretation of each other's emotionality during intercourse is somewhat hindered, and in the case of overt training episodes. Of course, the first of these possibilities could lead either to negotiating emotionality or emotional sharing. Naturally, this is mere speculation at the moment, and will guide us only as possibilities. Be as it may, the selected terms for emotions are present in the conversations, except for the word *hate* which appeared only once and even that occurrence was clearly a misspelling on behalf of Nathaniel (see the excerpt above where *hate* was used instead of *eight*). It is also worth mentioning here once again that the word *feel* appeared only once in Nathaniel's talk, and even that occurrence marked a perceptual rather than an emotional experience.

Generally, it is not yet known how frequently in ordinary interaction emotionality surfaces at the lexical level, and becomes overtly marked by a lexeme or *horribile dictu* deserves a more or less elongate discussion and turns to be topic of the conversation. Regarding this, there is no available data in the literature to my knowledge. Our preliminary analysis - which included only a subset, although probably a significant subset of terms used during emotional talk - shows that it is rather rare, at least if we compare their frequency to the occurrences of other words. Out of 142543 words 202 fell into our proposed list intended to capture a slice of emotional talk. Although, we should note, that emotional talk is continuously present, and surfaces most of the transcripts.

Clearly, as adults, we are quite capable of engaging in emotional talk on a reflexive level and utilise the emotional lexicon in various domains of our life. Thus, we are able to engage, for hours, days, even years, in reflexive emotional talk during our everyday conversations, during a consulting session such as that analysed by Edwards (cf. Chapter 1.), discussions of films or readings on guilt, happiness, love or anger, to mention but a few. From romantic novels to soap operas, from Dostoevsky to everyday crime stories on TV, many cultural product names openly, cultivate and thematize emotions. And our psychological and philosophical discussions neither are exceptions in this respect.[11] But the frequency of lexically realised emotional talk in real conversations between adults and between adults and children, their distribution, their immediate role within interaction, and finally their developmental pattern and consequences are much less known. A field we dwell on, which is a *terra incognita*. The data presented above on Table 5.5, which is, perhaps needless to say, strictly dependent on the selected set of emotion terms and the applied data purification procedure detailed in the previous section, represents just the first steps into the discovery of this domain.

5.3.2 Aggregated Input and Output Patterns alongside Aspects of Emotional Syndromes

Considering the differences between input and output as presented in Table 5.5, perhaps the most striking result is that the term *feel* is practically absent from the child's talk. More properly its only occurrence is clearly not an emotional usage, but rather evokes a sensation as was shown above. Adults were not engaged in emotional feeling talk frequently, either. As the Table shows (4th row, 2nd column) they used the term *feel* only 7 times with the relevant function.

This data suggests that among the different possibilities of realising emotions discursively, the announcing and ascribing of subjective emo-

tional states did not play a definitive role in the transcribed conversations - to put it mildly. This fact is, of course, open to a number of interpretations. Regarding the absence of emotional *feel* in the child's talk one might suppose that announcing and ascribing a subjective state was difficult for Nathaniel; or alternatively, it was indifferent to him; he was simply not interested in it.

The analysis of data does not confirm the widely held supposition that emotions are originally and most basically subjective states. If that were the case, some indexing of the putative subjective experience, such as the emotional use of *feel* should be detected empirically, possibly before, or at least parallel with, other facets of emotional discourse, such as commenting on emotional displays or using emotional words. It seems, that this is not the case: Both of the two further investigated aspects of emotionality realised or marked by lexical devices appear much earlier, and much more frequently then the word *feel*. Thus, for whatever logical reason, a family of lay conceptualisations and scientific theories of emotion, including theories of emotional development, find it necessary to suppose the primacy of subjective experience within the field of emotions, their supposition is not given empirical support.[12] The results of the present empirical analysis imply rather that subjective emotional experience is a derivative construct, and not a given. Perhaps there might be other indicators of the subjective aspect of emotionality which will prove its earlier presence, but at the moment the supposition of it as the primary source of all later emotionality is unfounded. The results of C. Stearns psycho-historical inquiry described in Chapter 1. also support the interpretation of emotional feelings as derivative constructs.

With respect to the words related to bodily displays of emotions and *sui generis* emotion words (3rd and 2nd rows on Table 5.5, respectively) there is a greater prevalence of emotional talk and a more balanced input-output ratio in the data. In other words: Nathaniel is able to, and wants to, deal with these further aspects of emotional syndromes through lexical devices. Perhaps thematizing emotional displays rather than using emotion words was somewhat more interesting and/or easier for the child, since in his talk the proportion of using display terms is higher than using emotion words proper (26:30), while in the input an opposite tendency is present (94:45).

5.3.3 Emergence of Emotionality in the Child's Talk and the Related Input Pattern

Up to this point the aggregated data emerged from confronting the transcripts with a restricted emotion term vocabulary and was used to reconstruct some general characteristics of emotional talk in the transcripts without considering time. In this section, the focus will turn to the distribution of the emotional terms in Nathaniel's and in his caregiver's talk in relation to the age of the child. But first, some general remarks on the logic of developmental psycholinguistics seems relevant.

Longitudinal studies on language development seek to find some order for the emergence of certain sets of linguistic form-function pairings over time. The most straightforward way to assess this issue would be to find the first use of a particular type of linguistic device. However, since transcriptions usually can not cover the entire verbal production of a child, data on onset time is usually complemented by frequency data. The assessment of acquisition is usually based partly on the time of first use of certain linguistic device and partly on the measure of frequency of use of it at different times.[13]

As is clear form the above considerations, the onset time of target forms and the increase in usage (higher frequency) could help to tackle the pattern of development. To find the first use in time aided by CHILDES is not a difficult task, though it is considered not informative in itself. But to assess the frequency of relevant uses is slightly less straightforward. Therefore, in order to assess the prevalence of the child's and his conversational partners' emotional talk at different ages of the child, an indicator has to be constructed. Its construction has to take into account that the transcribed sessions vary in length as measured, for example, in the number of words. Thus, the absolute number of occurrences of emotional terms for each age were divided by the number of all words in the talk of the respective speakers. These proportions might be considered as reflecting the strength of the lexical thematization of emotions at a particular age, and can be interpreted as an indicator of the mastery of relevant linguistic devices. Considering that the absolute number of occurrences of emotional terms at each particular point in time was rather low, it is not surprising, that in this way rather small values were gained. Therefore, these numbers were multiplied by 10000, for the shake of easier comprehension, and this proportional number was labelled the Emotion Thematization Index (ETI).

Figure 5.1 presents the ETI measures for three age period of the child (the applied three age period here and below are: Age I. – 29-33 months;

Age II. 34-38 months; Age II. 39-43 months), the overall presence of lexically realised emotion thematization and its presence in the input and output.

Figure 5.1
Values of Emotion Thematization Index (number of emotion terms out of 10.000 words) in the Child's and His Conversational Partners' Talk in Three Different Age Periods.



As Figure 5.1 shows, the use of the selected emotion terms shows an equivocal increase in Nathaniel's talk. This fact might be interpreted as a marker of the gradual mastering of the lexical aspects of emotional language during the relevant period.

We can also put forward some cautious propositions about the input patterns. The strength of emotion thematization in the input seems quite uniform in the first two periods. However, its characteristic growth in the third period is congruent with the idea, that there is some kind of "accommodation" or "fine-tuning" on the part of the caregivers (cf. Snow, 1995). Perhaps the child's increasing interest in emotions is reciprocated in this way, perhaps the caregiver's exert some gentle push towards emotional talk. The low number of absolute cases does not permit any firm conclusion. Nevertheless, we can say that our data does not contradict the following two statements. First, that there is some development with respect to emotional language during the period we focused on. Second, that caregivers might play an active role in this process. Thus, what one might suspect deductively, was given empirical support, inductively.

5.3.4 Emergence of Emotional Terms Conveying Three Aspects of Emotion Syndromes

After presenting data on the overall presence of emotion thematization and its input-output distribution across time, the different aspects of emotion syndrome can be considered in a similar vein. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 depict the strength of emotion thematization with respect to the different aspects of emotion syndromes in the child's and in his caregivers' talk, respectively. As was introduced earlier, these three aspects are displays (EMD), real emotion words (EMW) and words for emotional experience (EME).

Figure 5.2
Measures of Three Aspects of Emotional Syndrome in ETI in the Child's Talk in Three Different Time Periods



This diagram shows that of the three different aspects of emotionality, the terms for display (EMD) and the emotion words proper (EMW) are roughly equally accessible to the child. Both of them are discernible, (although to a modest degree) at the first applied time window. The first use of the EMD type was detected at the age of 30 months, and reads like this:

*MOT: have-ing a bath.
*MOT: the three piglet-s.
*NAT: dis [: this] eh have-ing de [: the] bath de water.
*MOT: in the water.
*MOT: they do-'nt like to have bath-s.
*NAT: Nathaniel ha(ve) bath too.
*MOT: Nathaniel had [: have&ed] a bath too.
*MOT: but the piglet-s are cry-ing about have-ing a bath.
%emo: $EMD:GEN:PLU:3rd
*NAT: *cry-ing* de [: the] piglet *cry-ing* a de bath.
%emo: $EMD:GEN:PLU:3rd
*MOT: cry-ing the piglet-s cry-ing had a bath.
%emo: $EMD:GEN:PLU:3rd
*NAT: dis [: this] is dis [: this]?
*MOT: they do-'nt #.
*MOT: that-'is an ostrich.
(From Nat04.cod)

Note that the above uses of *cry*, as elements of emotion term type EMD, occurred within a picture-book reading format, an issue we will return to soon. The appearance of display talk is followed by the appearance of *sui generis* emotion words (EMW), according to the transcripts. The first use of an emotion word occurred within a singing routine, a little after Nathaniel became 31 months old:

@Situation: MOT and NAT begin singing.
*MOT: tra la+la la+la la+la la+la.
*MOT: joy is eis everywhere.
*NAT: joy everywhere.
*NAT: <la> [>].
*MOT: finiculi <finicu(li)> [<].
*MOT: oh oh love oh careless love.
%emo: $EMW:OTH
*NAT: love oh careless love.
%emo: $EMW:OTH
*MOT: love oh love oh careless love.
%emo: $EMW:OTH
*MOT: you see what careless love has done [: do&en].
%emo: $EMW:OTH
*MOT: once I wore [: wear&ed] my apron low.
*NAT: dat-'is [: that-'is] a whole yellow dog [?].
(from Nat10.cod)

No doubt, as in the first use of a display word, the first use of an emotion word occurred within a specific, highly "guided" type of language use – the former within a picture-book format, while the latter within a singing routine. These findings are in accord with a general and frequently documented insight into language acquisition studies: "the earliest stage of vocabulary acquisition is characterised by words used in routines" (Nelson, 1996, p. 113).

Regarding the thematization of emotional experience (EME), no pattern of increase was found in our data. Most probably it develops later than the time scope of our transcripts affords its detection. In sum, the ETI for EMD just like the ETI for EMW, although perhaps at a different speed, increases as the child gets older. This fact may be interpreted as reflecting the linguistic mastery of the respective aspects of the emotional syndromes.

Figure 5.3
Measures of Three Different Aspects of Emotional Syndrome in ETI in the Caregiver's Talk at Three Different Time Periods



The caregivers strength of emotion thematization regarding the display facet of emotionality (ETI for EMD) is rather uneven. It starts at a moderate level, then drops a little, and finally increases to a relatively high level. Compared to this, their ETI for EMW seems rather even, and relatively high, across the three time windows. The measure of ETI for EME is pretty low even in the adult's talk throughout the transcripts.

In this section the mastery of emotional talk and the specific input conditions was assessed with the help of ETI measures. In sum, it appears that the use of display talk starts somewhat earlier than the use of emotional words. Data on onset time shows approximately a two months lead of EMD, but the delay of EMW is relatively small. However, it seems that the advantage of display terms over emotion words is not reflected by frequency data, and it is definitely over by the second developmental period. These findings, it seems, are in accord with a recent proposal formulated within children's theory of mind tradition (Kiss, 1999; see also Beckwith, 1991). And finally, the display talk again outnumbered the uses of emotion words during the third applied time window. Due to the absence of terms for emotional experience (EME) in Nathaniel's talk, its mastery could not be assessed with ETI measures.

Up until now, the development of the three different types of emotional terms, EMD, EME and EMW, was assessed primarily contrastively, i.e. by comparing their particular ETI measures to each other.[14] In the next section we will introduce a set of further functionally or pragmatically motivated differentiation within uses of emotion words. As we will see, the description of the data respecting emotion words (EMW) will be further qualified, according to a further set of functional differentiation within different uses of EMWs. This will lead us to identify such uses of emotion words which are emotion avowals or ascriptions, the next tactical step to getting closer to our strategic aim; the characterisation of their developmental enfolding.

5.4 *Distribution and Evolving of Functionally Different Uses of Emotion Words*

In this section certain theoretical concerns regarding development already raised in Chapter 5. will be considered first. That will be followed by description of a set of further coding categories. These categories are devised for a more sophisticated analysis with the intention of revealing subtle differences in the pragmatic functioning of the relevant terms. Finally, the results of pattern searching based on these functional categories will be presented.

Although the paths of development of different aspects of emotional talk were tackled in the previous section, we should not forget that the approach we applied until now is still within the simplified concept of development which equates development with the order of acquisition (cf. Budwig, 1995). Correspondingly, the measures we applied to this point were mainly the onset time and the prevalence of certain specified

linguistic devices in production data. It seems that in the background of this vision, and the corresponding assessment, of development there lies a binary supposition: either the child does not know something, or he/she knows it, and uses it more and more with time. This stance depicts development as a one step process, instead of being a gradual process of differentiation and integration. In this way, the *protracted* nature of development remains out of sight. However, an increasing number of developmentalists are dissatisfied with this view on development. As Nelson puts it "the major problem for both evolution and development is the *emergence of new forms* - species in evolution and individuals in development - a problem with no satisfactory solution in the framework of genetic determinism" (1998 p. 29, italics added), and we can add, neither in plain environmentalism.

Regarding linguistic development Budwig, whose works were instrumental for the present investigations can be referred to. As she puts it:

> developmental examination of language according to this [developmental functionalist] view examines the protracted nature of development and focuses on the changing relationship between forms and functions of the entire linguistic system. Children are not assumed to be passively adapting to the adult system. (1998b, p. 10)

Turning back to the development of emotions in and through language, note that developmental change was not really closely touched upon. Specifically, neither functional differences of different uses of emotion terms, nor the significance of their interactional context, were taken into account in detail.

As was noted above, the summarised data we dealt with up until now can offer a gross picture of the emergence of emotional talk, but does not allow us to look into the details of the enfolding developmental process. In other terms, up to this point we described the pattern of development as a mere "product", while the micro-details of genesis remained out of our scope. Furthermore, neither the functional varieties of the usage of the selected emotional terms, nor contextual embededdness were considered by the type of aggregating approach we engaged in up until now.

In the next phase of this empirical analysis, instead of this route, we will try to follow an alternative possibility and try to explicate development as a gradually unfolding process. We will try to investigate the "niche" of development in more detail. It requires a finer-grained conceptualisation of the development of emotional talk and its contextual characteristics just as in their tracking in the transcribed conversations.

With these remarks we already leave behind the level of developmental norms. Or more properly speaking, we ask what is behind the developmental norms, behind the mere description of summarised production (or in other, quasi-experimental studies comprehension) data, or input-output patterns, in time. Where is the child and where is development? What is the nature of the occasioned or situated use of emotional language during the developmental process? In order to gain a more thorough analysis of the transcripts, a further, more sophisticated coding schema has to be developed, which allows us to get closer to the details of the personal indexing of emotional words, their conversational context, and the type of events to which they were applied.

5.4.1 Coding Schema for the Various Uses of Emotion Words

As we noted above, the analysis concentrated up to this point solely on the occurrence of the target words and their morphological varieties. Although, a broad functional identification was performed, which resulted in the filtering out a number of non-emotional uses of the target terms, especially in the cases of *feel* and pain related *cry*, no further distinctions were made. Parallel to this, neither the immediate context of these terms, the utterance in which they were used, nor the conversational context of uses were devoted much consideration. Evidently, a number of different functions are fulfilled by the selected terms depending on their linguistic, interactional, and pragmatic context. In order to differentiate between them and to capture certain further details of emotional talk, and at the same time in the hope of getting closer to their developmental unfolding, a further refined coding schema was developed.

Within a social constructivist framework, the linguistic marking of emotions by lexical devices can be performed through either explicit emotives *or* references to other's emotions, as it was explained in Chapter 3. Furthermore, as was explained in Chapter 4., their development might proceed within a Vygotskian, socially guided discourse, and at the same time might follow a Wernerian path, where gradual differentiation and integration should occur.

On the basis of the above considerations, and taking into account the strategic aim of the present study, i.e. finding "genuine" emotional usage of emotion markers as opposed to other uses of the same forms, a further set of functional differentiation could be anticipated. Specifically, emotion avowals and ascriptions realised by lexical devices should be differentiated from other aspects of emotional talk involving the use of the same forms. Since EMD terms refers to overt behaviour only items falling into the categories EMW or EME were potentially relevant in this

respect. However, due to the lack of emotional usage of *feel* in the child's talk the analysis in this section will be restricted to the items already coded as EMW.

It should be recalled that every emotion word included in the list has already been given a code: EMW. Furthermore, as was previously indicated, where the emotion word was a misspelling, it was termed an "accident" and given the code ACC. Thus, on the basis of the preceding considerations and following repeated reading and re-reading of the relevant sections of the transcripts, a further coding schema was developed and implemented. Amongst the emotion words which index emotionality (i.e. already coded EMW, and not having the code ACC), a threefold division was devised. Or to put it in operational language: the next step of research involved a decision between three possibilities.

First, an emotional term was considered as *genuine* emotional usage, and honoured by the code GEN, if it clearly indexed one or more creature's or person's emotionality, i.e. either manifested an evaluative judgement on behalf of the speaker or referred to somebody else's evaluative judgement. Second, where the emotion word was used as a constituent of a *phrase*, such as "Happy New Year", the code PHR was assigned. Third, all further cases were put into the category termed *other*, OTH. Interestingly, these cases were predominantly nominalizations, or if you like, personifications or metonymical extensions of an emotional event, such as the uses of "lover", or "love" as someone who can be evoked to, attests.

Examples for each of these categories will be presented below. Furthermore, in order to gain an impression of the onset time of the respective functional uses as they occurred in the data, the illustrations of coding categories will be usually the first relevant uses by the child.

An emotional term was considered as genuine emotional usage, and was coded GEN, if it indexed one or more person's or other being's emotionality, or in other terms, and in line with the proceeding analysis, if it mentioned or realised an evaluative judgement. The first instance of this in Nathaniel's talk occurred when he was 3;2.27, within the following conversational segment:

*MOT:	<Dad is sad> ["].
%emo:	$EMW:GEN:SIN:3rd
*MOT:	very very *sad*.
%emo:	$EMW:GEN:SIN:3rd
*MOT:	<he had [: have&ed] a bad day> [„].
*MOT:	<what a day Dad had [: have&ed]> ["].

*NAT: eh why?
*MOT: <I do-'nt know> [>].
*NAT: <very *sad*> [<].
%emo: $EMW:GEN:SIN:3rd
*MOT: I do-'nt know.
*MOT: (be)cause he had [: have&ed] a bad day.
(From Nath18.cod)

One might consider Nathaniel's use of *sad* above as an imitation, and discount it. However, note, that Nathaniel's contribution to the conversation is not a mechanical type of imitation.[15] Consider that he is asking the reason for being sad, which presupposes that somehow he knows what it is to be sad. He knows, in particular, that, it should have a reason.

If the emotion word was used within a phrase, such as "happy birthday", the code PHR was assigned to it. The first instance of this type of usage in the transcripts by Nathaniel (age of child 3;0.19) was this:

*NAT: now have &m ordinary cake for my breakfast?
*MOT: you can-'nt have ordinary cake for breakfast.
*NAT: not <ordinary> [>].
*FAT: <we have-'nt got any> [<] ordinary cake.
*NAT: why?
*FAT: we do-'nt have any.
*NAT: we have *happy* birthday cake here?
%emo: $EMW:PHR
*FAT: we do-'nt have any birthday cake here, no.
*NAT: ee do eh de ee ee apposed [: suppose-ed] to buy some more *happy* birthday cake.
%emo: $EMW:PHR
(From Nath15.cod)

And finally, all the remaining cases were put into the category termed 'other', marked as OTH. Interestingly, the first occurrence of an emotion word in the child's talk fell into this category (see above, under 5.3.4.). The following example fell into this category, as well, just like a number of others, and was produced by Nathaniel between age 2;7.1 and 2;8.20, within a singing routine:

*MOT: okay let-'us find some more that we know .
*MOT: did you ever hear tell of sweet betsy .
*MOT: from pike .

*MOT: who .
*NAT: cross-ed de prairy-s with *lover* Ike .
%emo: $EMW:OTH
*MOT: who cross-ed the prairy-s with her lover .
*MOT: Ike .
*NAT: 0 [=! screams]
(From Nath10.cod)

5.4.2 Prevalence and Pattern of Emergence of Emotion Words in a Child's Talk

Following a description and exemplification of the distinctions devised within the EMW, namely GEN, PHR and OTH uses, their overall distribution will be presented as they occurred in the transcripts in Figure 5.4. This will be followed by two diagrams, Figure 5.5. and 5.6. showing their distribution in Nathaniel's and in his caregiver's talk, respectively, in three time periods. The number of relevant occurrences in each case will be presented in ETI form.

Figure 5.4
Strength of Emotion Thematization (ETI) along "Genuine" (GEN), "Phrasal" (PHR) and "Other" (OTH) Uses of Emotion Words (EMW) in the Transcripts



It should be noted that the diagrams above and below depict the strength of emotion thematization realised with the same forms but possibly with different functions. Thus, it might be supposed that different aspects of emotions and/or in a different manner are signalised through these devices. In this way, their pattern of distribution might reflect the "difficulty" and "easiness" of specific functional uses for a language learner, who is about to acquire both forms and functions. Furthermore, their acquisition could follow different paths, as well.

Specifically, it might be supposed that GEN uses reflect in a sense the "central" uses of emotion words, insofar as they are the most explicit linguistic realisations of emotions; these are the lexically realised references to and/or avowals of emotions. As was noted above in Chapter 3., some of their uses can be termed *emotives* since they are similar to the explicit performatives, which are usually marked by a performative verb (Austin, 1962/1973).

Using emotion words within a phrase, coded PHR, evokes emotions from a somewhat different perspective than GEN uses. It seems, that these latter uses serve the function of expressing some kind of general good wishing.[16] These are "general" good wishes insofar as they are not specified in details, and usually connected to highly ritualised and recurrent contexts.

Finally, most further uses of emotion words were coded OTH. These uses neither indicate nor realise emotions centrally, like GEN uses do, nor evoke general "goodness", as PHR uses do, but rather seem to dramatise emotionality especially with the help of the reification and/or personification of it or some of its aspects.

Against this background it should be considered that, both the GEN and OTH uses of emotion words are more frequent in adult talk than in Nathaniel's, as Figure 5.4 shows. In other terms, for some reason, Nathaniel could not fully reciprocate their occurrence in the conversations. This fact might be an indicator that the functions of the linguistic tokens which fell into the GEN and OTH categories, comparing to the ones which were used in phrases (PHR) were less easy to apply for Nathaniel than for his conversational partners. Note however, that PHR uses at the same time show the opposite tendency: it seems, that using emotional words within a phrase was easy and important enough for the child to apply more than his interlocutors.

A more detailed picture might emerge from the next two Figures which depict the distribution of the three different functional uses of emotion words in the child's and in his conversational partners' talk along the time.

FIGURE 5.5
STRENGTH OF EMOTION THEMATIZATION (ETI) ALONG "GENUINE" (GEN), "PHRASAL" (PHR) AND "OTHER" (OTH) USES IN THE CHILD'S TALK IN THREE TIME PERIOD



FIGURE 5.6
STRENGTH OF EMOTION THEMATIZATION (ETI) ALONG "GENUINE" (GEN), "PHRASAL" (PHR) AND "OTHER" (OTH) USES IN THE CAREGIVERS' TALK IN THREE TIME PERIODS.



As Figure 5.5 shows, the first words taken in this context as EMWs and used by the child were nearly all from the category OTH. The earliest occurrence of this type was detected roughly at 31 months of age (between 2;7.1 and 2;8.20; see the example above). Furthermore, all five of this occasions were connected to singing a song on *love* and *lovers* which the family, including Nathaniel, apparently loved to sing. Although, one might say, that words for the romantic relationship called love, and their principal participants, the lovers, are not emotion words in the strict sense, they are transparently connected to emotions. Their connection can be explicated in a number of different ways. But in line with the proceedings, I would suggest, that these words can be taken as a dramatisation of an emotion called love. Their early use perhaps prefigures those later narratives which are accounts of emotional episodes, and animate significant emotional events within the discursive realm of a given culture. As we have seen, according to the data, some of these types of functional use are present in the child's talk relatively early. However, they occur solely within singing routines. Therefore, although, these early uses might play some role in the acquisition of emotions and emotional language, they can not be considered uncritically as real, productive uses. It seems more likely, that productive usage of emotion related words of this category develops later.

The next - and perhaps the first real and productive - use EMWs are from the category termed PHR with the function of the general marking of good *versus* bad characteristics of an event or some of its constituents. Thus, if one discounts the OTH uses, the earliest productive uses of EMWs were PHRs. In the transcripts, Nathaniel first used an emotion word with this function at age 3;0.19. Furthermore, as Figure 5.4 shows, these functions were relatively frequently utilised by Nathaniel during the second period analysed. However, just as in the case of OTH uses, one might argue that these (PHR) uses are not at all emotional uses of emotional words, since they are simple phrases. Instead, I would argue that, although they are not fully-fledged emotional uses, they still realise some general evaluative stance, which is possibly based on a shared evaluation of the relevant situation. The comparatively early occurrence of EMWs of this type is probably enhanced by the relatively constrained, ritualised and reiterated contexts of these phrasal uses of emotion words.

It seems that only after mastering the lexically realised good(-bad) evaluation are the possible emotional stances further differentiated. This claim is supported by the fact that GEN use appears somewhat later (3;2,27) than PHR use (3;0.19), in the transcripts. Besides onset time, data on the usage of frequency (see Figure 5.5), also supports this interpreta-

tion. Thus, using emotion words in phrases was relatively easier for Nathaniel. Indeed, he apparently liked to use these devices more than his companion. It seems that the aspects of emotionality which the phrases like "happy birthday" evoke are generally more accessible to the child than the further two types of uses, identified as "genuine", and "other". And as we have seen, from these latter types, if we discount singing routines, GEN precedes OTH uses.

In sum, on the basis of onset time and the distribution of frequency data depicted in Figs. 5.5 and 5.6, the following tentative scenario of the emergence of functionally different uses of EMWs in Nathaniel's talk can be reconstructed.

Marking of *general evaluation* is attained first by the child and is realised by phrasal uses (PHR). It is followed by more *specific emotion markers* (GEN). And finally, the more *dramatic talk about emotions* are acquired as the OTH uses emerge.

Further research may very well lead to other scenarios of the acquisition pattern of use of *sui generis* emotion words, and overwrite the present account. However, in my view, they should consider that both PHR and OTH uses might contribute to the acquisition of the use GEN emotional words, and *vica versa*. In my view, discounting PHR and OTH uses from the analysis on the basis that they are not properly emotional uses of emotional words would prevent one from appreciating the very process of development.[17] Furthermore, acquisition of different functional facets of emotion words can be differentiated, but should be interlinked in the analysis, and integrated as time passes. To put it differently: all three differentiated functional uses of emotional words of the above can be taken as the roots of the later, adult emotionality and emotional language use; all of them contribute to a rich and integrated conceptualisation and realisation of emotions.

The moral of the above presented investigation of different functional uses of emotion words is that it offers us some cues on the gradual differentiation within a broader functional network regarding uses of emotional words.

5.5 *Summary and Qualifications*

In this chapter a case study was presented which intended to uncover the pattern of development of emotional language use within a developmental social constructivist framework. From the two key issues of development, such as the gradual enfolding of the target of development, i.e. relevant uses of form-function pairings, and the possible

"mechanisms" which bring about developmental changes, the present study focused primarily on the first issue.

In the first section of the chapter, under 5.1., the "raw-material" and primary research tools were introduced, described and characterized: the data base analysed, the vocabulary items targeted, and the CHILDES as a research resource and tool-kit.

The second section, point 5.2, was devoted to the explanation and exemplification of the devised data purification procedure, i.e. filtering out non-emotional occurrences of the targeted terms from the transcripts. Specifically, possible non-intentional uses or accidents (ACC), certain structural possibilities such as homonyms (HOM) and a set of non-emotional uses of the target terms such as pain-related uses of display terms (EMD:PAI), sensation-related (perceptual and pain) uses of experience terms (EME:SEN:PER; EME:SEN:PAI), and epistemic uses of experience terms (EME:EPI) were identified and coded as non-emotional uses. However, due to the qualitative character of the study, these non-emotional uses were not simply discounted, but were to a certain degree also analysed and interpreted. Thus, as a by-product of this phase of research two main points emerged:

First, regarding acquisition of emotional language some non-emotional uses of *cry* (EMD:HOM; EMD:PAI) and a relatively high number of similarly non-emotional uses of *feel* (EME:SEN:PAI; EME:SEN:PER; EME:EPI) points to the possibility that a number of subtle conceptual distinctions disclosed by ordinary language philosophers are to be drawn by ordinary language users, including children as well.

Second, regarding the status of *feel*, the data indicated a hypothesis that originally all feel-talk is a qualification of actor/speaker commitment. According to this proposal, the use of *feel* realises a person's own stance towards some state of affairs, indexes his or her subjectivity or own perspective. In this way there would be a common functional core to all types of *feel-talk* present in the data, such as perceptual (EME:SEN:PER), pain related (EME:SEN:PAI), emotional (EME) and epistemological (EME:EPI), which differentiate only gradually through development. Of course, both of these points deserve further, more detailed studies.

In the third section, under point 5.3, production data regarding emotional language use generally, and according to the three previously differentiated aspects of emotional language use, such as the terms for display (EMD), for emotional experience (EME), and emotion words proper (EMW), in particular, were analysed. The results of these analyses can be summarized in three points:

First, using lexical devices for emotional talk is relatively infrequent in everyday conversation. Although on a reflective level people easily engage in emotional talk involving emotional terms, the data analysed shows that lexically thematized emotional talk is a rather rare phenomena in real life conversation. From the 142543 analysed words only 202 were emotional terms.

Second, the types of emotional terms or lexical devices differentiated against the conceptual background of constructivist emotional theory, specifically on the basis of the emotional syndrome concept, such as emotional words (EMW), words for subjective, experiential aspect of an emotion (EME) and words for emotional display (EMD) do appear differentially in natural conversations, at least in the transcripts analysed. Altogether, words for emotional display (EMD) seem to be the easiest for and/or most favoured by the child. They are followed by the uses emotional words (EMW). At the same time words for emotional experience (EME) could hardly be detected in the transcripts. This fact casts serious doubts on those accounts of emotional development which attribute priority to the subjective/experiential constituent of emotions.

Third, regarding the genesis of lexical thematization and/or realisation of the three differentiated aspects of emotion syndrome, frequency and onset time data suggests equally the following developmental pattern: first, terms referring to emotional display (EMD) are acquired; then, with only a slight (approximately two month) delay *sui generis* emotional words (EMW) are mastered; and finally, the subjective feeling component (EME) of an emotion syndrome, at least assessed from its linguistic realization, emerges relatively late.

In the fourth section, under 5.4, further functional and pragmatic details of the emergence of emotional talk were investigated. Here, only the details of the use of such emotional terms were analysed which were considered *sui generis* emotional words (EMW), such as *fear*, *mad* or *happy*. The results of these investigations can be summarized in two main points.

First, within the category termed emotion words (EMW) three types of use could be further differentiated on closer inspection. There were uses of emotion words which were called genuine (GEN), i.e. such uses of the relevant lexical devices which indicated or realized somebody's emotionality as an evaluative judgement. Furthermore, certain cases of the use of the same lexical items were identified as phrasal uses (PHR). They occurred within phrasal frames. Functionally, these uses of emotion words were described as marking some general positive evaluation of certain state of affairs. In our data they were most frequently good wishes, such as "happy birthday". Finally, a set of further cases of the use of the relevant lexical items were occurred and coined as "other"

uses (OTH). Most of these uses could be related to the genuine uses metonymically as personifications, such as the "lover", who is a principal actor of a love episode.

Second, the enfolding of these three types of use of emotional words (EMW) was reconstructed as follows in the next scenario: indexing a general evaluative stance conveyed by phrasal uses (PHR) seems to be attained first; it is followed by the acquisition of genuine uses (GEN) of emotional words; and finally, other uses (OTH) are mastered.

Clearly, there are obvious limitations to the case study presented, especially regarding the inductive generality of the findings. This is a common feature of all case studies, and the present project is no exemption. The size of the database, the number of the persons investigated, particular characteristics of the language under study, and the limited set of lexical elements, can all be mentioned in this respect. However, throughout the chapter an attempt was made to describe the research operations and the emerging data as clearly as possible. For example, instead of selecting the "best" example for the devised coding categories, which is a methodologically doubtful while rhetorically wonderful move in a qualitatively oriented investigation, in this study the presented illustrations were all the earliest cases of the relevant categories. Therefore, insofar as the maxim "let all the conceptual and methodological concerns be as transparent as possible" was followed, further research could apply the same procedure developed and engaged during this study, and at the same time, the results of the present investigations could serve as a reference point for them. In my view this is what one can anticipate from an exploratory kind of study.

» Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions

This paper has presented the conclusions of my theoretical, conceptual and empirical investigations conducted over the past few years on the nature and development of a major human psychological faculty, the emotions. The original impetus for the present study came in the early nineties, when my attention was caught by social constructionist ideas on the emotions. Soon after, I presented a poster at a conference on child language in Trieste, Italy, and subsequently a lecture in Visegrád, Hungary (1993a, 1993b). The poster was called *The social constructionist approach and Vygotsky's psychology: the case of emotional development*. In that paper I argued that social constructionist theory of emotions lacked an explicit account of development, and proposed a rudimentary theoretical solution to the problem on the basis of a Vygotskian approach to development. The same issues are still very much at the centre of the present work, as Chapters 3. and 4. attest. However, while working on the project, I gradually realised, that in order to make the case more sophisticated, several interrelated conceptual, theoretical, and empirical, issues had to be worked out in much finer detail.

First, I had to think through the status of social constructionism in psychology. The results of these studies are summarised in Chapter 1., where an overview of social constructionist ideas within contemporary psychology is offered. Special attention is devoted to discursive and narrative psychology. Remaining faithful to my original interest, both of these stances are exemplified through their way of conceptualising and analysing emotions. Furthermore, the relation of psychological social constructivism to the general project of cognitive psychology; its philosophical propensities, such as socialized epistemology and a corresponding discursive ontology; its historical context and emergence; its possible allies within other stances present in contemporary psychology; and finally its historical antecedents, are all considered in detail to a greater or lesser extent in the opening essay of the study.

Secondly, and more or less parallel to the first set of investigations, it seemed inevitable that a working conception on how to consider emotions at all would have to be developed. Thus, Chapter 2. offers a

conceptual and theoretical analysis of the place and constituents of emotions in human life on a more general scale, i.e. without specific commitment to a social constructionist standpoint, and only gradually narrowing the topic to their psychological study. Three main frames of reference were detailed in this respect: science *versus* art, epistemological *versus* affective stances, and geometric-technical *versus* physiognomic psychic functioning. The second part of the chapter turns to a psychological characterization of emotions, which fits my original intention, while still not biased toward social constructivism. First, the concept of the psychological universality of emotions is introduced and explained; the thesis of the omni-presence of emotionality maintains that human conduct and the corresponding mental processes always contain emotional ingredients or constituents; emotions are always present in human life, either overtly or covertly. Second, a number of issues regarding the conceptualisation of emotions as an evaluative aspect of human conduct are detailed, such as the question of the standards of emotional evaluation; the intentionality of emotions; their relation to actions, including emotional displays; the place of physiological studies of the emotions; and the concept of emotional feelings as the subjective experience of an emotion. Third, the topic of emotions in time is discussed. It is argued that by considering time, different types of emotion-related aspects of life can be arranged, starting with short term emotional states and emotional episodes, across semi-steady states like neurosis, to such enduring features of persons which are usually called character.

In this way, the present study starts with a twofold theoretical and conceptual anchoring of the later investigations. The two parallel introductory chapters converge to the presentation of a social constructionist account of emotions, which is presented in Chapter 3. This chapter starts with a description of three major versions of conceptualising emotions within psychology, termed biological reductionism, subjectivism and their admixture. On the one hand, it is argued that none of them is able to account for a crucial feature of mature human emotional life, namely, responsibility. On the other hand, on the basis of Coulter's conversation analytical demonstration (1979) it is shown that emotions are indeed connected to responsibility. Consequently, any psychological theory of emotions must be able to offer an account of this fact. A social constructionist theory of emotion is consequently presented as such a theory, i.e. one which is able to handle the issue of responsibility regarding emotion. Next, the basics of a constructionist theory of the emotions is presented together with an analysis which aims to qualify further the connections between emotion and responsibility. Moreover, the paradox of the active and at the same time passive character of emotion is

identified and a solution is suggested. The proposal relies on the Schützian concepts of in-order-to and because–of motives. The chapter ends with a constructionist proposal for accounting for the language of the emotions, usually implicated by other constructionist authors, but hardly accounted for explicitly.

Chapter 4. turns to the topic of emotional development within a constructionist framework and its connections to linguistic development. First, the "telos" and the "mechanism" of development are differentiated conceptually. Then, a Vygotskian model is introduced and detailed for the "mechanism" of emotional development. The proposed model may serve as a framework for interpreting the natural-conventional transition problem in emotional development as taking place within a tutorization process, within actual discourses between children and their caregivers. Then, after narrowing the scope to linguistic, more specifically lexical, marking of emotions, the "telos" of development is specified as the attainment of specific form-function mappings. Both formal and functional aspects of the acquisition of the lexical markers of the emotions are detailed. Finally, two possibilities for the acquisition of the relevant form-function mappings are circumscribed: the one step view, and - following a Wernerian analysis - the protracted view of development is described.

On the basis of the previous chapters, an empirical analysis of emotional and linguistic development is presented in Chapter 5. In general, it represents an attempt to analyse natural conversation between the child and his caregivers from a developmental social constructionist stance. According to this, analysis of the linguistic manifestations of different aspects of emotion syndromes, such as words for emotional displays, words for emotional experiences, and *sui generis* emotion words, was performed. The main findings in this respect are that display words are the first which are accessible to the child, and these are then followed with only a slight delay by the emotion words proper, while the words for subjective experiential aspects of the emotions most probably appear much later. One of the main strategic aims of these investigations was to identify on the one side emotion avowals or emotives, and on the other side, devices which describe somebody else's emotion. In proceeding to this direction, a number of slightly different functional uses of the relevant forms were found. Thus, on a closer look, alongside "genuine" uses, "phrasal", and "other" uses were also identified. The following developmental pattern was reconstructed regarding these functions: first "phrasal" uses appear, marking some general good wishes; next, the same devices are used as "genuine" emotion words, i.e. announcing the speaker's own, or ascribing somebody else's emo-

tion; finally, "other" uses are attained; these uses usually personify or in other ways reify aspects of an emotional episode.

Although many of the issues pertaining to social constructionism in psychology - the conceptualisation of emotions in general, the rationale and details of a social constructivist stance toward emotions, the conceptual problems of development especially linguistic development, and the common field of linguistic and emotional development - were considered in the present study, a great many relevant issues were not explicitly discussed. Further research can enlarge, and certainly modify, the developmental social constructivist theory of emotions, which was worked out in this study. Below some directions for further research will be shortly considered.

The relevant theoretical and conceptual issues involve such questions as how a psychologically oriented social constructionist understanding of emotions can be embedded into the wider framework of the social sciences, and more specifically into the sociology of emotions (Bendelow and Williams, 1998; Gordon, 1985). On a more general conceptual level, it should be asked what kind of implications a social constructionist account of the emotions has regarding the various social and moral philosophical questions which implicitly or explicitly pertain to emotions (Schoeman, 1987; Sabini and Silver, 1998).

The empirical aspects of the study presented above deserve further research. The issue of the generality of the findings was already mentioned. Similarly, a by-product of the applied "data purification" procedure were the connections between emotion-talk, perception-talk, and pain-talk, which as a possible field of further study have been raised in the paper. Although the problem of the integration of different aspects of emotional syndromes was mentioned briefly, it deserves a much more targeted analysis.

Furthermore, a whole set of empirically relevant issues were not considered explicitly in the present study. Particularly when considering that a major, and perhaps the main *developmental* issue which was raised in the study on a theoretical level was not followed up explicitly in the empirical chapter. That pertains to the discursive "mechanism" of emotional development in and through language. This issue was not studied empirically in Chapter 5. However, major steps toward the preparation of such an analysis, i.e. the characterization and description of the "telos" was performed in the chapter. Thus, the analysis of "telos" and its pattern of attainment opened up the possibility for further research directed explicitly to the reconstruction of the sequence of emergence of the linguistic marking of emotions within a discursive context. In other

terms, it can be taken as preparation for further research on emotional development as tutorization.

Secondly, it should be borne in mind that only the lexical level of emotional *language acquisition* was the primary target throughout Chapter 5. Thus, further aspects of talk, which are "above" and "below" the lexical level, such as metaphors and grammatical devices such as diminutives (cf. Gleason, Jean B., Perlmann Rivka Y., Ely Richard, and Evans David W., 1996)), respectively, were not afforded explicit consideration. Further studies can, and indeed, should contribute to this line of research.

As the above questions indicate, more and more questions emerged as I proceeded with my work. During the years I worked on this project I began to realize, that there are tasks which cannot be completed altogether, but rather only suspended for a break perhaps for feedback from others at some reasonable point. And it seems, that I have now arrived at this point. So, the next move within this cat's cradle is in your hands, the reader's.

Appendices «

Appendix 1

Transcription conventions used by Edwards (1997) and Coulter (1979), are from the notation system of conversation analysis. For further details see Psathas 1990, on pages 297-307. The presented transcripts include the following notations:

– Sentences beginning in lover case are behaviour descriptions of the relevant speakers.
– Utterances beginning in upper case are turns of the relevant speakers.
– Paralinguistic information is described within rounded brackets.
– Numbers in parentheses stands for longer pauses, silences. They are timed in tenths of a second.
– Short pauses are marked by three dots - ... -.
– Sound stretches are marked by a colon - : -.
– Emphasis is indicated by underlining (Edwards) or italics (Coulter).

Appendix 2

CHAT transcription conventions used by Snow are detailed in MacWhinney 1991, they include the following:

Word symbols: @ special form markers
0 actions without speech
() noncompletion of a word
[?] best guess

Morpheme symbols:
- suffix marker
+ compound or rote form marker
& fusion marker

Utterance and tone unit terminators:
-: previous word lengthened
pause between words

Special terminators:

++ other-completion

Scoped symbols:

[=! text] paralinguistics, prosodics
[“] quotation marks
[: text] replacement
<> [/] retracting without correction
<> [>] overlap follows
<> [<] overlap precedes

TABLE 1.
THE LIST OF FILES CONTAINING THE ANALYSED DISCOURSES AND THE AGE OF THE CHILD

File	Age	File	Age	File	Age	File	Age
01	2;5.18	08	2;6.25	15	3;0.19	23	3;4.10
02	2;6.0	09	2;7.1	16	3;0.22	24	3;4.10
03	2;6.0	10	unknown	17	3;1.6	25	3;4.18
04	2;6.0	11	unknown	18	3;2.27	26	3;4.21
05	2;6.3	12	unknown	19	3;4.8	27	3;4.21
06	2;6.19	13	unknown	20	3;4.8	28	3;7.14
07	2;6.19	14	2;8.20	21	3;4.9	29	3;9.2
				22	3;4.9	30	3;9.4

TABLE 2.
LEXICAL DEVELOPMENT NORMS: INFANTS’ PRODUCTION

WORD	M08	M09	M10	M11	M12	M13	M14	M15	M16
cry	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	3.5	7.8	19.4
love	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	2.3	1.3	8.1	6.2	13.9
smile	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	8.3
happy	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0	1.3	2.3	9.4	11.1
scared	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.4

Notes «

Chapter 1.

[1] In his *The Social Construction of What?* Hacking offers a thorough and insightful analysis of various versions of social constructionism. However, his general characterization of social constructionist ideas seems to me misleading regarding the project of social constructionist psychologies. Thus, I am not aware of any serious social constructionist analysis of such psychological issues such as mind, personality or emotion, which would "tend to hold that" mind, personality or emotion are "not inevitable"; that mind personality or emotion are "quite bad" as they are, and that the situation "would be much better off if" mind, personality or emotion "were done away with, or at least radically transformed". (Hacking, 2000, p. 6.)

[2] For the relevant transcription conventions see Appendix 1.

[3] In this regard Fodor's cryptic remark in his introduction to himself is symptomatic (entitled: Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation): "until Uncle Wilifred thought of Mental Representations" (1994, p. 76). Here Fodor clearly refers to Sellars. Although Sellars' real first name was Wilfrid and not Wilifred, and Fodor did not refer to him explicitly throughout his study.

Chapter 2.

[1] Indeed, according to Hymes (1996, pp. 28-29), most pre-Chomskian American linguists, as a consequence of their humanistic - or we should add, intuitive anti-colonialist - conviction, firmly believed in the equality of all languages. This deep belief of equality of the different languages was naturalised by Chomsky's move, by the postulation of an innately given universal linguistic competence.

[2] The following explication will be followed up in the next chapter, when the "intuitive act" will be explicated as a special type of judgement.

[3] A similarly abstract given, the epistemologically given, was the target of Sellars' concentrated attacks in his most famous studies on the foundation of knowledge (cf. Sellars, 1963). It is not clear, that this other type of similarly abstract given in the realm of morality and biology would have survived his criticism.

[4] Thus, in my understanding Ortony, Clore and Collins' cognitive structural model on emotion types relies on further articulation of positively or negatively evaluated intentional objects into "consequences of events", "actions of agents" and "aspects of objects" (1988, p. 19). Some other cognitive theories which bind generation of emotionality to the goal attaining activity (for example Mandler, 1984) can be easily fitted into this framework, as well.

[5] A sociobiologist definition of emotions reads like this: "An emotion is the result of a conscious or unconscious decision-making process; it results from an external event changing what is adaptive for the individual feeling the emotion to do. It is the internal motivator that creates a readiness to change behaviour to increase adaptation. An emotion can be discharged by an act that would (if successful) bring the external world more into line with what would be adaptive for the individual having the emotion. Or it can be dissipated by a further change in the environment, that reduces the value of adaptive action." (Weinrich 1980 p. 133) As a further illustration, consider a leading cognitive oriented emotion theorist definition of emotion: "we can now generate a summary definition of emotion: Emotions are complex, organized states … consisting of cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions. Each emotion quality (e.g., anger, anxiety, joy) is distinguished by a different pattern of components, which is what urges the analogy to a syndrome. Moreover, the three components of emotion are subjectively experienced as a whole, that is, as a single phenomenon as opposed to separate and distinct responses." (Lazarus, Kanner and Folkman, 1980, p. 198) Another influential cognitive theory of emotion defines emotions in this way: "Our working characterisation views emotions as *valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the way in which the eliciting situation is constructed.* (Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1988, p. 13)

[6] A rather behaviourist account of emotions is summarised in the following proposition: "It is my view that affects are sets of muscular and glandular responses located in the face and also widely distributed throughout the body, which generate sensory feedback that either inherently »acceptable« or »unacceptable«." (Tomkins, 1980, p. 142)

CHAPTER 3.

[1] As Tomkins clearly states: "I propose that affect is primarily facial behavior. Secondarily it is bodily behavior and outer skeletal and inner visceral behavior. When we become aware of these facial and/or visceral responses, we are aware of our affect." (p. 142)

[2] Think on the promise of the polygraph, where through the help of psychology we can know something about other people that they do not want to share with us.

[3] For the relevant transcription conventions see Appendix 1.

[4] See also Kövecses' distinction between expressive and descriptive emotion words (1995, pp. 3-4).

[5] Although the present analysis primarily pertains to emotional display by linguistically realised acts, namely speech acts, the analysis can be extended to other non-verbal communicative acts and even to object directed acts, as well. Thus, for example at being clearly angry, we may be equivocally harsh toward even some objects, we can start kicking a broken car. Or, alternatively, we can be implicitly angry, which could be realized in the manner we drive the car.

[6] Interestingly, a number of researchers implicitly or explicitly entertain this position. One of their common characteristics is that that they do not consider emotionality as a general aspect or stance of the organism/person. Instead, they try to assimilate emotionality into the scheme of sensation and consider emotions as responses to stimuli.

Chapter 4.

[1] In this way, episodes of social referencing and affect attunement on the one side, and negotiating the manner of activities on the other, can be nonverbal parallels of overt and covert episodes of emotions discussed in Chapter 2, respectively. Thus providing support for the thesis of the omni-presence of emotionality.

[2] The conceptual problems regarding the very concept of internalisation were historically explicated and clarified by Lawrence and Valsiner (1993). Following their analysis, internalisation can be taken as a process of "constructive transformation".

[3] Although I referred to person's emotionality, clearly animals and even inanimate objects such as rooms or circumstances such as weather conditions can be emotional – possibly via some analogical or metaphorical extension. See Bakhtin's wonderful analysis of "intonational metaphor" (1926/1985).

[4] See especially Wittgenstein related remarks in last third of *Philosophical Investigations* (1968).

Chapter 5

[1] Although the term "word" is used, note that the data presented in table 5.1 was generated by the CLAN program called MLT, which includes counting of xxx and yyy. Both of them stand for unintelligible words according to the transcription conventions, and certain nonverbal contributions, such as laughing, as well. Furthermore, material coded as retracting and marked with angle brackets is excluded from these counts.

[2] The numbers in this paragraph are calculated by the use of the FREQ program. The numbers refer to how many different vocabulary items are used by specific speakers and how many times.

[3] Fourteen versions of the "basic emotions" were collected by Orthony and his colleagues (1988, p. 27). Consider also the concept of modal emotion which is a relatively recent alternative to the well known concept of basic emotion. "One can argue that some emotional themes have universal significance in people's lives, because they reflect major contingencies of organism-environment interaction." (Masquita, Frijda and Scherer, 1997, p. 260) These kind of general emotional themes lie in the background of the concept of modal emotions. Furthermore, "[t]he existence of such modal emotions could account for the evidence for universal emotion patterns. It is important to highlight the central difference between the notions of modal emotions and of basic or fundamental emotions: the former does not assume a definite number

of homogenous, integral categories or mechanisms that justify an a priori definition of basic or fundamental emotions. Instead, the concept of modal emotions advocates the empirical study of the frequency with which certain patterns of appraisal, accompanied by typical changes in different components of emotion, occur." (Masquita, Frijda and Scherer, 1997, p. 261)

[4] These research operations were implemented by the so-called Coder Mode available within the CED Editor, a major tool within CHILDES.

[5] This phase of the research was initially conducted with the help of the KWAL program. Later, when a set of prospective coding categories was established the Coder Mode of the CED Editor was applied.

[6] Thus, for example, Bartsch and Wellman (op. cit.), in their research on the development of mental state words explain their data purification procedure as follows: "Specificially, a term was not counted as a genuine belief or desire reference if it served only such conversational functions as getting someone's attention (e.g., "You know what?"), turning over the conversation to someone else (e.g., "Let's go to the park, what do you think?"), or softening a command or request (e.g., "I wonder, Mom, can we have spaghetti?" or "I think it's time to watch Sesame Street")." (1995, pp. 31-32) As usual, they did not attempt to account for these discounted material, and did not attempt to relate them (i.e. the terms which, in their formulation "served only ... conversational functions") to their target of analysis. However, it could be argued, that by the very process of data purification they deprived themselves of the possibility of analysing the "genesis", i.e. gradual enfolding of the use of terms ("genuine belief or desire reference") they were allegedly interested in developmentally. No attempt was made to account for the discounted material in the Wellman et al. (1995) study, either.

[7] For transcription conventions see Appendix 2.

[8] Examples for the devised coding categories are always the first occurrences according to the age of the child.

[9] The following list summarises the codes for the differentiated functional uses of feel (EME), which were applied throughout the transcripts:

emo%:EME:SEN:PAI
emo%:EME:SEN:PER
emo%:EME:EPI

[10] This use of *feel* may correspond to the use of *look* Sellars (1963) analysed, when he compared the cases where something - actually a necktie - "is green" according to someone, with the case when something merely "*looks* green" to someone. His analysis aimed to demonstrate that the *look-talk* cannot serve as an argument for sense-data theories, i.e. building knowledge on subjective experience as a given. Rather, according to Sellars, the second case can be accounted for as involving a much more modest degree of warrantedness of the proposition on behalf of the speaker. We will turn back to this point below.

[11] In this context consider also Wittgenstein's parallel remark cited as a motto for the present chapter.

[12] Smiley and Huttenlocher, for example, built their analysis of the development of emotional language on the following position: "Emotion categories

are one of a larger set which we will call person categories. These have an essential feature some internal state – a feature *directly accessible only for* instances involving *the self*." (p. 27, emphases added) In this respect Harris' proposition is the same, when analysing the possible connections between emotional experience and its conceptualisation he supposes that experience is primary and "guides" conceptualisation (Harris, 1995, pp. 269-270). Furthermore, insofar I could grasp their interesting position, Wellman et al. (1995) considers linguistic marking of causes and/or intentional object of an emotion as evidence for its conceptualization as a subjective experience.

[13] See Bartsch and Wellman, op. cit., p. 30, and see also Bloom, 1991. The situation is somewhat different in the case of morphological development, since there the relevant studies can rely on the utilisation of "obligatory contexts" (i.e. to the idea that certain linguistic forms are obligatory within a sentence, since they are required by the rules of a given grammar) in assessing of acquisition beside onset time and frequency data.

[14] It is highly possible that different aspects of emotionality and their linguistic marking and/or realisation not only develop at a different speed, as the above presented data attests, but are probably co-ordinated or integrated somehow at some point during development, as well. For example, being a victim of a fully developed emotional episode of sadness is constituted by evaluating and judging some event as sad, and manifesting the relevant judgement by a whole set of syndrome constituents, such as behavioural displays (crying), subjective experiences (feeling sad), verbal emotion avowals (announcement of being sad), and characteristic actions (such as withdrawing from other people). Although there are certain cues in our data which indicate the integration of different aspects of emotionality, this issue will not be pursued further in this study.

[15] In child language research, imitation *versus* spontaneous production are usually taken as clear opposites, the first of which is mostly discounted from analysis. However, from a perspective which focuses not purely on language development, but rather on development in and through conversation, this opposition should be reconsidered. One may argue, that a spontaneous, (i.e. independent of previous utterances) contribution to a conversation is incoherent and nonsense. See also Ninio and Snow 1996, p. 62.

[16] The logical counterpart of good wishes are bad wishes: maledictions and curses. Naturally, since the data was collected in a western society which promotes positive emotions and represses negative ones, they are not present in the data (cf. Gordon's remarks on "emotional exposure", 1989, pp. 326-330). These further linguistically realised moves, perhaps can be more available to children of other cultures. This is an empirical question. Be as it may, bad wishes, similarly to good wishes, indicate very generally the speaker's wish that someone could get into a negatively evaluated situation.

[17] Wellman et al. (1995, p. 126) openly discarded "happy birthday" and similar phrasal uses.

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